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1 Abstract 
Two conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) algorithms for the terminal maneuvering area (TMA) 
were evaluated in a fast-time batch simulation study at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Langley Research Center.  One CD&R algorithm, developed at NASA, was designed to enhance 
surface situation awareness and provide cockpit alerts of potential conflicts during runway, taxi, and low 
altitude air-to-air operations.  The second algorithm, Enhanced Traffic Situation Awareness on the Airport 
Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF IA), was designed to increase flight crew awareness of the 
runway environment and facilitate an appropriate and timely response to potential conflict situations.  The 
purpose of the study was to evaluate the performance of the aircraft-based CD&R algorithms during various 
runway, taxiway, and low altitude scenarios, multiple levels of CD&R system equipage, and various levels 
of horizontal position accuracy.  Algorithm performance was assessed through various metrics including 
the collision rate, nuisance and missed alert rate, and alert toggling rate.  The data suggests that, in general, 
alert toggling, nuisance and missed alerts, and unnecessary maneuvering occurred more frequently as the 
position accuracy was reduced.  Collision avoidance was more effective when all of the aircraft were 
equipped with CD&R and maneuvered to avoid a collision after an alert was issued.  In order to reduce the 
number of unwanted (nuisance) alerts when taxiing across a runway, a buffer is needed between the hold 
line and the alerting zone so alerts are not generated when an aircraft is behind the hold line.  All of the 
results support RTCA horizontal position accuracy requirements for performing a CD&R function to reduce 
the likelihood and severity of runway incursions and collisions. 
2 Introduction 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) concept for the year 2025 and beyond 
envisions the movement of large numbers of people and goods in a safe, efficient, and reliable manner 
[JPDO, 2010a].  NextGen will remove many constraints of the current air transportation system, support a 
wider range of operations, and provide an overall system capacity up to three times that of current operating 
levels.  Emerging NextGen operational concepts [JPDO, 2010b], such as four-dimensional trajectory based 
airborne and surface operations, equivalent visual operations, and super density arrival and departure 
operations, require a different approach to air traffic management and as a result, a dramatic shift in the 
tasks, roles, and responsibilities for the flight deck and air traffic control (ATC) to ensure a safe, sustainable 
air transportation system. 
The worst aviation accident on record resulted in 583 fatalities and was caused by a runway incursion 
when two fully loaded 747 airplanes operating in low visibility collided on a runway at Tenerife airport in 
1977. Airport surface safety, including runway incursion prevention, is a serious concern of the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) [NTSB, 2012], Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  The FAA is committed to reducing the severity and rate 
of runway incursions by implementing a combination of guidance, education, outreach, training, 
technology, infrastructure, and risk identification and mitigation initiatives [FAA, 2011].  Progress has been 
made in reducing the number of serious incursions, from a high of 67 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to 6 in FY 
2010; however, that number is again on the rise with 18 serious incursions in FY 2012, 11 in FY 2013, and 
14 in 2014.  The rate of all incursions has risen steadily over recent years – from a rate of 12.3 incursions 
per million operations in FY 2005 to a rate of 24.8 incursions per million operations in FY 2013 [FAA, 
2011; FAA, 2007; FAA, 2009a; FAA, 2012; and FAA, 2015].  Without proactive counter-measures, the 
increase in air traffic forecasted under NextGen could potentially result in corresponding increases in 
runway incursion accidents. 
NASA is conducting research to develop technologies, data, and guidelines to enable aircraft-based 
conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) in the terminal maneuvering area (TMA) under current and 
emerging NextGen operating concepts, providing an additional, protective safety layer for NextGen 
operations in the event that the tactical or strategic situation awareness is not sufficient or human errors or 
blunders occur.  The CD&R concepts use cockpit display designs to promote surface situation awareness 
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and associated flight deck alerting concepts for safety assurance.  The concepts employ continual ownship 
and traffic data monitoring and algorithms to detect conflicts on the runway, at low altitudes near the airport, 
and during taxi and ramp operations for multiple classes of aircraft and surface vehicles.  Alerts are 
generated as necessary and appropriate when traffic could affect runway safety or other TMA operational 
conditions that may require flight crew response.  Although substantial NASA research and testing has been 
conducted in the areas of surface operations situation awareness and runway incursion CD&R [Jones, et al, 
2001; Jones, 2002; Jones, 2005; Jones and Prinzel, 2006], much of this research has been conducted with a 
human-in-the-loop and has not included the effect of navigation accuracy and CD&R system equipage 
levels on CD&R performance. 
The Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF 
IA) application has been established by RTCA Special Committee 186 to reduce the likelihood and severity 
of runway incursions and collisions.  Safety, performance, and interoperability requirements (SPR) [RTCA, 
2010] have been developed for SURF IA to increase flight crew situation awareness of the runway 
environment and facilitate an appropriate and timely response to potential conflict situations.  The SURF 
IA application utilizes cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) to promote surface situation awareness 
and associated flight deck indication and alerting concepts for safety assurance.  The application employs 
continuous ownship and traffic data monitoring and algorithms to detect potential conflicts on the runway.  
Several human-in-the-loop studies have been conducted to evaluate the SURF IA concept [Moertl and 
McGarry, 2011a; McGarry and Helleberg, 2011; and Moertl and McGarry, 2011b]. 
A fast-time batch simulation study was conducted to evaluate the performance of the aircraft-based 
CD&R algorithms in the TMA, with variations in surveillance accuracy.  The algorithms were evaluated 
under various runway, taxiway, and low altitude scenarios, multiple levels of CD&R system equipage, and 
various levels of horizontal position accuracy.  Algorithm performance was assessed through various 
metrics including the collision rate, nuisance and missed alert rate, and alert toggling rate.  This paper 
presents an overview of the CD&R concepts, description of the test method, and study results. 
3 System Description 
3.1 Simulation Tool 
A simulation tool, known as Traffic Manager (TMX), was utilized for this study.  TMX is a desktop 
simulation application designed for interaction studies of aircraft in present or future Air Traffic 
Management environments [Bussink et al, 2005].  TMX can serve as a stand-alone traffic simulator, 
scenario generator, scenario editor, experiment control station, data recording tool, and rapid prototyping 
environment and can operate in real-time or fast-time mode.  For this study, TMX was used in fast-time 
mode simulating various approach, departure, and taxi scenarios at the Chicago O’Hare International 
(KORD) airport.  Although TMX is capable of simulating up to 2,000 aircraft simultaneously, only two 
aircraft per scenario were simulated.  Each aircraft used a six-degree-of-freedom dynamics model.  The 
TMX user interface is shown in Figure 1. 
Some modifications were made to TMX for this study.  These included: 1) an updated database for the 
KORD airport; 2) creation of a Global Positioning System (GPS) sensor model for position accuracy; 3) 
creation of an interface to the CD&R algorithms; 4) expansion of the pilot model to handle the required 
taxi, runway, and low altitude maneuvers; and various other minor modifications. 
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Figure 1.  Traffic Manager User Interface. 
3.2 Surveillance Data 
The quality and accuracy of reported traffic surveillance data are critical to the integrity of the CD&R 
capability.  For this study, it was assumed that Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 
will be used as the means for transmitting (ADS-B Out) and receiving (ADS-B In) aircraft surveillance 
data.  ADS-B transmissions were modeled according to RTCA DO-242A specifications [RTCA, 2002]; 
however, latency effects, transmission line-of-sight, and bandwidth blockage were not modeled to minimize 
computational overhead.  For state-vector messages, a one hertz data transmission rate was used.  The traffic 
position accuracy was simulated as dependent upon the GPS measurement errors.  A Gauss-Markov process 
modeled the time correlation between successive position measurement errors [Mohleji and Wang, 2010]. 
Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) describes the accuracy of positional information.  
NACp values range from 0 to 11 [RTCA, 2002].  The horizontal Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU) 
values for NACp categories of 8 and higher are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1.  NACp Categories. 
NACp 95% Horizontal Accuracy Bound (EPU) 
8 EPU < 92.6 m (0.05 NM, 305.6 ft) 
9 EPU < 30 m (99 ft) 
10 EPU < 10 m (33 ft) 
11 EPU < 3 m (9.9 ft) 
 
The FAA has issued an ADS-B Out Final Rule [FAA, 2010a] which includes performance standards 
for ADS-B Out.  The rule states that EPU must be less than 0.05 nautical miles (NM), which is equivalent 
to NACp 8. 
The SURF IA SPR has proposed horizontal position accuracy requirements [RTCA, 2010] for the 
SURF IA function.  Through analysis, the SPR identified that to meet safety requirements, horizontal 
position accuracy when on the airport surface may vary from NACp 9 at the largest airports to NACp 11 at 
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the smaller airports.  The airborne horizontal position accuracy requirement is NACp 7 for single runways 
and parallel runways not closely spaced.  NACp 10 is required for surface vehicles. 
To span the ADS-B Out Final Rule and SURF IA requirements, traffic position accuracy equivalent to 
levels NACp 8, 9, 10, and 11 were evaluated for this study.  Truth data, with no accuracy errors, was also 
evaluated to determine the effect of error free data in relation to the various NACp levels. 
3.3 Conflict Detection 
Two CD&R algorithms, Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance Monitor (ATCAM) and SURF IA, were 
evaluated during the simulation study. 
3.3.1 Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance Monitor 
ATCAM was designed to identify potential traffic conflicts at low altitudes near the airport, on the 
runway, and during taxi and ramp operations for multiple classes of aircraft and surface vehicles and 
generate alerts (defined below) for display to the flight crew.  An initial implementation of directive alerting 
was also developed.  Directive alerting specifies the action to take to resolve a conflict situation. 
ATCAM is comprised of three separate aircraft-based algorithms that rely on traffic state information 
obtained from ADS-B In. 
1. The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) [Green, 2006] is designed to detect and alert for runway 
conflicts.  RSM monitors ownship and traffic located in a three-dimensional virtual zone 
around the relevant runway using ownship and traffic state data and separation and closure 
rate to determine whether an alert should be generated. 
2. The Low Altitude Conflict Monitor (LACM) is designed to detect and alert for air-to-air 
conflicts near the airport at altitudes below 1,000 ft to not conflict with the Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).  LACM computes closing speed, time to closest point 
of approach (CPA), time to co-altitude, and other data between ownship and approaching 
aircraft to determine if criteria and thresholds have been met for issuing alerts, similar to the 
TCAS approach. 
3. The Taxi Conflict Monitor (TCM) is designed to detect and alert for ground taxi conflicts in 
the airport movement areas.  The TCM design is similar to that of LACM and computes 
distances between ownship and traffic, closing speeds, time to CPA and other parameters. 
The three algorithms are independent but are integrated and share data to increase the probability of 
detection for all possible conflicts during airport TMA operations.  RSM has been through extensive testing 
[Jones, et al, 2001; Jones, 2002; Jones, 2005; Jones and Prinzel, 2006].  LACM and TCM are less mature 
but have been evaluated in simulation studies [Jones, et al, 2009; Jones, et al, 2010].  Otero et al, 2013 
provides a detailed description of ATCAM including alerting criteria. 
3.3.2 Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts 
SURF IA identifies potential runway conflicts that involve aircraft or vehicles in the airport 
maneuvering area and within 3 NM of the runway threshold and 1,000 ft above field elevation (AFE).  
SURF IA generates both indications and alerts (IAs) (defined below) for a CDTI.  SURF IA utilizes traffic 
surveillance information obtained from ADS-B In and generates IAs based on the aircraft/vehicle states 
during same runway, very closely spaced parallel runway, and intersecting runway operating 
configurations.  Six types of aircraft operational states are defined:  1) taxiing on a taxiway toward a hold 
line or stopped at a hold line; 2) entering or crossing a runway (not lined up with runway); 3) takeoff; 4) 
approach; 5) after landing roll-out on runway (e.g., less than or equal to 40 kts); and 6) stopped or taxiing 
along a runway.  To prevent inappropriate crew responses during departure, IAs are inhibited above 80 kts.  
The SURF IA application does not currently address taxiway or low altitude air-to-air conflicts, directive 
alerting, and is not intended for use on helicopters or vehicles.  A complete description of the SURF IA 
application can be found in RTCA, 2010. 
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3.4 Indications and Alerts 
Indications and alerts notify the flight crew of potentially hazardous situations and are presented to the 
flight crew on a CDTI [RTCA, 2010]. 
3.4.1 Indications 
Indications are intended to generate pilot awareness and situation assessment by highlighting the 
runway and traffic status as relevant to ownship operations.  Indications identify operational conditions that 
are generally normal, yet relevant for runway safety and could be a precursor to a non-normal situation.  
Only visual annunciations are required and used for indications.  Indications are only issued for runway 
conflict situations.  Two types of indications are defined. 
A traffic indication (TI) highlights a potential runway traffic collision/hazard that could emerge in the 
near future.  TIs are intended to increase the flight crews’ awareness of the relevant runway traffic.  The 
flight crew could proceed with the intended operation after a brief assessment of the situation and if 
appropriately cleared.  An example of a TI displayed on an electronic surface map is shown in Figure 2.  
The relevant traffic is highlighted by an enlarged traffic symbol surrounded by a dashed circle in the same 
color and an identification tag showing flight identification and ground speed in knots. A status message 
(“Traffic”) is displayed.at the bottom of the surface map along with the estimated distance to the traffic in 
nautical miles until below 0.1 NM (600 ft), then displayed in feet. 
A runway status indication (RSI) identifies whether the runway that the ownship is approaching or 
using is in-use by other traffic and is not suitable for entering, takeoff, or landing.  Before proceeding, the 
crew should ensure they have the appropriate clearance and the indicated traffic is not a factor.  An RSI is 
displayed on an electronic surface map in the same manner as a TI with the addition of a solid blue line 
outlining the relevant runway (Figure 3). 
 
 
         Figure 2.  Traffic Indication.                                   Figure 3.  Runway Status Indication. 
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3.4.2 Alerts 
Alerts identify potential collision hazards which require immediate flight crew awareness and may 
require timely action or response to avoid a collision.  Alerts have priority over indications and are issued 
for both runway and taxi conflict situations.  Auditory and visual annunciations are required.  A two-level 
alerting scheme is defined. 
Caution alerts (CAs) are generated for conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness and 
subsequent flight crew response.  An example CA displayed on a surface map is shown in Figure 4.  The 
relevant traffic is highlighted by an enlarged yellow traffic symbol surrounded by a yellow circle, an 
identification tag that shows flight identification and ground speed in knots, and a yellow line around the 
relevant runway, if applicable.  An alert message (“Caution, Traffic”) is displayed at the bottom of the 
surface map in yellow text along with the estimated distance to the traffic.  An audible annunciation is also 
made (“Caution, Traffic, Caution, Traffic”). 
Warning alerts (WAs) are generated for conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness and 
immediate flight crew response.  WAs could occur without preceding CAs.  A WA is displayed in the same 
manner as a CA, except the WA is associated with the color red, a square is used to surround the traffic 
symbol, and the alert message is “Warning, Traffic, Warning, Traffic” (Figure 5). 
 
 
   Figure 4.  Caution Alert.                                            Figure 5.  Warning Alert. 
3.4.3 Directive Alerting 
Directive alerting specifies the action to take to resolve a conflict situation in lieu of providing a generic 
WA.  The directive issued depends on the conflict situation.  Examples of directive alerts are as follows:  
“go-around” when on approach, “abort” when departing, “stop” when taxiing or rolling-out, and “climb” 
when air-to-air conflict on approach.  The directive alerts can be displayed in the cockpit visually and 
audibly, similar to the method used for WAs. 
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4 Test Method 
Data collection occurred for runway, taxi, and low altitude air-to-air conflict scenarios.  Only two 
aircraft were included in each scenario to limit the interaction in this initial fast-time study.  For ease of 
discussion, the aircraft will be referred to as Aircraft A and Aircraft B. 
4.1 CD&R Equipage 
Various levels of CD&R system equipage were simulated for this study: a) both aircraft equipped; b) 
neither aircraft equipped; or, c) one or the other aircraft equipped. 
When an aircraft was not equipped, it would follow its planned flight path to the end of the test run. 
When an aircraft was equipped, it would take action after a WA was generated by following an appropriate 
maneuver (e.g. go-around, abort, stop), depending on the operational phase.  The maneuver was based on 
the relative location of the aircraft at the projected CPA. 
4.2 Test Scenarios 
Seven runway, three taxiway, and two low altitude air-to-air scenarios were developed.  Variability was 
introduced into the scenarios by varying the location of the aircraft, speed of the aircraft, and/or time when 
the aircraft started to proceed along its predefined route (Appendix B).  As a result, not every test run 
resulted in a conflict or collision.  The runway scenarios were selected based on the most common types of 
runway incursions according to RTCA, 2010 and Cardosi et al, 2010. 
4.2.1 Runway Scenario – Arrival with taxi crossing 
This scenario evaluated the situation where an aircraft was on approach as another aircraft taxied 
perpendicularly across the runway. 
The initial condition (IC) for Aircraft A was at 3.5 NM prior to the threshold at 1,110 ft AFE at an 
indicated airspeed of 142 kts.  Aircraft A flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope at 3.3 NM 
from the threshold and then descended on a 3 degree glide-path for a straight-in approach to Runway 10.  
For the nominal flight plan, Aircraft A landed, decelerated at 8.2 ft/s2, taxied down the runway at 30 kts, 
and then slowed to exit the runway at Taxiway M7 at 3 kts.  Aircraft B started at various locations around 
Runway 10 and taxied across starting from a complete stop and accelerating at 3.3 ft/s2 to 15 kts.  The actual 
taxiways for KORD were not used in this study.  Instead, Aircraft B’s initial position was placed at 14 
different locations along the length of Runway 10 (0, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 3500, 4000, 4500, 
5000, 6000, 7500, 9000, and 10,000 feet from the approach runway threshold) simulating various taxiway 
entry points and at 18 locations away from the runway (300, 320, 340, 360, 380, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 
650, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 feet from the runway centerline) (Figure 6) (Appendix 
B.1).  Aircraft B (red chevron, Figure 6) began to taxi when Aircraft A (blue chevron, Figure 6) was at 
various points in its approach and rollout (from 3.5 NM to the runway threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals, 
crossing the runway threshold, glide-path aim-point (1,000 ft), and 3,400 ft, 5,400 ft, 7,000 ft, 9,000 ft, and 
9,800 ft past the threshold).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an 
appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would conduct a go-around if above 70 ft AFE; otherwise, it 
would continue to land and stop on the runway.  Aircraft B, if equipped, would stop if its nose had not 
reached the runway shoulder (greater than 100 ft from the runway centerline) at the projected stopping 
point; otherwise, it would continue to taxi across the runway.  When conducting an emergency stop by 
either aircraft, a 13.1 ft/s2 deceleration rate was used. 
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Figure 6.  Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario Initial Conditions. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario Initial Conditions. 
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4.2.2 Runway Scenario – Departure with taxi crossing 
This scenario tested the situation where an aircraft was on departure as another aircraft taxied 
perpendicularly across the runway. 
The configuration for this scenario was similar to the arrival with taxi crossing scenario, except the IC 
for Aircraft A was in position on Runway 10 for departure.  Aircraft B’s IC was placed at 12 different 
locations along the length of Runway 10 (0, 60, 280, 660, 1100, 1800, 2500, 3400, 5200, 6800, 8000, and 
9000 feet from the runway threshold) simulating various taxiway entry points and at the same 18 locations 
away from the runway as in the previous scenario (Figure 7) (Appendix B.2).  Aircraft B began to taxi when 
Aircraft A was at various locations along its departure and climb out (0 ft, 180 ft, 470 ft, 890 ft, 1,430 ft, 
2,100 ft, 2,920 ft, 3,860 ft, 5,810 ft, 7,600 ft, 8,790 ft, and 10,000 ft from the runway threshold).  If 
maneuvering were required based on a WA being triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft 
A would abort departure if below takeoff decision speed (131 kts) and stop on the runway; otherwise it 
would continue departure.  Aircraft B, if equipped, would maneuver as described in the previous scenario. 
4.2.3 Runway Scenario – Arrival with departure from same runway 
This scenario evaluated the situation where an aircraft was on approach and another aircraft was 
departing on the same runway in the same direction. 
The IC for Aircraft A was at 3.5 NM prior to the threshold at 1,110 ft AFE at an indicted airspeed of 
142 kts.  Aircraft A flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope at 3.3 NM from the threshold and 
then descended on a 3 degree glide-path for a straight-in approach to Runway 10.  For the nominal flight 
plan, Aircraft A landed, decelerated at 8.2 ft/s2, taxied down the runway at 30 kts, and then slowed to exit 
the runway at Taxiway M7 at 3 kts.  Aircraft B’s IC was in position on Runway 10 for departure (Figure 
8).  Aircraft B began its departure when Aircraft A was at various locations along its approach path (from 
3.5 NM to the runway threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals, crossing the runway threshold, and glide-path aim-
point (1,000 ft)) (Appendix B.3).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in 
an appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would conduct a go-around if above 70 ft AFE; otherwise, it 
would continue to land and stop on the runway.  If Aircraft B were in position and holding on the runway 
for departure, no maneuvering action would be taken.  If departure roll had begun, Aircraft B would abort 
departure if below takeoff decision speed (131 kts) and exit the runway; otherwise, it would continue 
departure. 
 
Figure 8.  Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.4 Runway Scenario – Departures from intersecting runways 
This scenario tested the situation where aircraft were departing on intersecting runways, heading toward 
the runway intersection. 
Aircraft A’s IC was in position on Runway 14L for departure.  Aircraft B’s IC was in position on 
Runway 22R for departure.  Aircraft A began its departure when Aircraft B was at various speeds along its 
departure path (at the Runway 22R threshold (0 kts), 20 kts, 40 kts, 60 kts, 80 kts, 100 kts, and at the runway 
intersection (120 kts)).  Conversely, Aircraft B began its departure when Aircraft A was at various speeds 
and locations along its departure path (at the Runway 14L threshold (0 kts), 30 kts, 50 kts, 70 kts, 90 kts, 
110 kts, 130 kts, 150 kts, 170 kts, and at the runway intersection (just lifted off)) (Figure 9) (Appendix B.4).  
If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, 
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the aircraft would abort departure if below takeoff decision speed (131 kts) and stop on the runway; 
otherwise, it would continue departure. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.5 Runway Scenario – Arrival and departure from intersecting runways 
This scenario tested the situation where an aircraft was on approach and another aircraft was departing 
on an intersecting runway. 
The IC for Aircraft A was at 3.5 NM prior to the threshold at 1,110 ft AFE at an indicted airspeed of 
142 kts.  Aircraft A flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope at 3.3 NM from the threshold and 
then descended on a 3 degree glide-path for a straight-in approach to Runway 14L.  For the nominal flight 
plan, Aircraft A landed, decelerated at 8.2 ft/s, taxied down the runway at 30 kts, and then slowed to exit 
the runway at Taxiway P4 at 3 kts.  Aircraft B’s IC was in position on Runway 22R for departure.  Aircraft 
B began its departure roll when Aircraft A was at various locations along its approach and rollout (from 3.5 
NM to the threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals, and 630 ft, 0.25 NM, 0.5 NM, 0.8 NM, and 1 NM from the 
runway threshold)) (Figure 10) (Appendix B.5).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA 
being triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would conduct a go-around if above 70 ft 
AFE; otherwise, it would continue to land and stop on the runway.  Aircraft B would abort departure if 
below takeoff decision speed (131 kts) and stop on the runway; otherwise, it would continue departure. 
4.2.6 Runway Scenario – Head-on arrivals 
This scenario evaluated the situation where two aircraft were approaching a runway from opposite 
directions. 
The IC for Aircraft A was at 3.5 NM prior to the threshold at 1,110 ft AFE at an indicted airspeed of 
142 kts.  Aircraft A flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope at 3.3 NM from the threshold and 
then descended on a 3 degree glide-path for a straight-in approach to Runway 10.  Aircraft B’s IC and 
approach was similar but to Runway 28.  For the nominal flight plan of both aircraft, the aircraft landed, 
decelerated at 8.2 ft/s, taxied down the runway at 30 kts, and then slowed to exit the runway (Aircraft A at 
Taxiway M7, Aircraft B at Taxiway K) at 3 kts.  Aircraft B began its approach when Aircraft A was at 
various locations along its approach and rollout (0.5 NM intervals beginning 3.5 NM prior to the threshold, 
crossing the runway threshold, and 1400 ft, 3700 ft, 5500 ft, 7100 ft, 9,000 ft, and 9,800 ft past the 
threshold)) (Figure 11) (Appendix B.6).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being 
triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, a go-around would be conducted if above 70 ft AFE; 
otherwise, the aircraft would land and exit the runway at a taxiway. 
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Figure 10.  Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario Initial Conditions. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Head-on Arrivals Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.7 Runway Scenario – Arrivals to intersecting runways 
This scenario evaluated the situation where two aircraft were arriving on intersecting runways. 
The IC for Aircraft A was at 3.5 NM prior to the threshold at 1,110 ft AFE at an indicted airspeed of 
142 kts.  Aircraft A flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope at 3.3 NM from the threshold and 
then descended on a 3 degree glide-path for a straight-in approach to Runway 14L.  Aircraft B’s IC and 
approach was similar but to Runway 22R.  For the nominal flight plan of both aircraft, the aircraft landed, 
decelerated at 8.2 ft/s, taxied down the runway at 30 kts, and then slowed to exit the runway (Aircraft A at 
Taxiway P4, Aircraft B at Taxiway E) at 3 kts.  Aircraft B began its approach when Aircraft A was at 
various locations along its approach and rollout (from 3.5 NM to the threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals, crossing 
the runway threshold, 1,100 ft, 2,000 ft, 3,800 ft, 5,300 ft, and 1 NM from the runway threshold) (Figure 
12) (Appendix B.7).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an 
appropriately equipped aircraft, a go-around would be conducted if above 70 ft AFE; otherwise, the aircraft 
would land and stop on the runway. 
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Figure 12.  Arrivals to Intersecting Runways Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.8 Taxi Scenario – Taxi following 
This scenario tested the situation where a taxiing aircraft exhibits excessive closure on traffic from 
behind. 
Aircraft A taxied at a constant speed (between 12 and 24 kts, at 2 kts intervals) on Taxiway M toward 
Runway 10.  Aircraft B also taxied on Taxiway M toward Runway 10, ahead of Aircraft A, at a 10 kts 
(Figure 13) (Appendix B.8).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an 
appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would decrease taxi speed to 8 kts and Aircraft B would increase 
taxi speed to 25 kts. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Taxi Following Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.9 Taxi Scenario – Taxi intersection 
This scenario tested the situation where aircraft conflict at a perpendicular taxiway intersection. 
Aircraft A began taxi at 15 kts.  Aircraft B taxied across the taxiway, starting from a complete stop and 
accelerating to 15 kts at 3.3 ft/s2.  Aircraft B’s initial position was placed at 4 different locations along 
Aircraft A’s taxiway (400, 600, 800, and 1,000 feet ahead of Aircraft A) simulating various taxiway 
crossing points and at 5 locations away from the taxiway (260, 410, 560, 710, and 860 feet from taxiway 
centerline) (Figure 14) (Appendix B.9).  Aircraft B began to taxi when Aircraft A was at various locations 
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along the taxiway (0, 150, 300, 450, and 600 ft from its starting position).  If maneuvering were required 
based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, the aircraft would stop at an 
accelerated rate (13.1 ft/s2) provided it could be determined that the aircraft’s nose location was greater than 
100 ft from the intersecting taxiway centerline at the projected stopping point; otherwise, it would continue 
to taxi across the taxiway. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Taxi Intersection Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.10 Taxi Scenario – Taxi head-on 
This scenario tested the situation where two aircraft conflict head-on on a taxiway. 
Aircraft A began taxi on Taxiway M at M2, traveling toward Runway 10 at 15 kts, taking a right turn 
onto Taxiway T.  Aircraft B began taxi on Taxiway T at T1 traveling toward Taxiway M at 15 kts.  For 
some test runs, Aircraft A began to taxi when Aircraft B was at various points along it’s taxi route (at 
Taxiway T1, 1,600 ft, 3,200 ft, 4,800 ft, 6,400 ft, 8,000 ft, and 9,600 ft (crossing Taxiway M) from T1).  
For additional test runs, Aircraft B began to taxi when Aircraft A was at various points along its taxi route 
(at M2, 9,500 ft, 7,900 ft, 6,300 ft, 4,700 ft, 3,100 ft, and 1,500 ft from T1) (Figure 15) (Appendix B.10).  
If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, 
the aircraft would exit at a taxiway or stop if a taxiway could not be reached before reaching the other 
aircraft. 
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Figure 15.  Taxi Head-on Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.11 Air-to-Air Scenario – Arrival with crossing airborne traffic 
This scenario tested the situation where traffic crossed the path of an aircraft on final approach. 
The IC for Aircraft A was at 4 NM prior to the threshold at 1,270 ft AFE at an indicted airspeed of 142 
kts.  Aircraft A flew at a constant altitude to intercept the glideslope at 3.3 NM from the threshold and then 
descended on a 3 degree glide-path for a straight-in approach to Runway 10.  Aircraft B (a helicopter) 
traveled perpendicularly across Aircraft A’s flight path, flying level at an indicated airspeed of 50 kts.  
Aircraft B’s initial position was placed at 7 different locations along Aircraft A’s approach path at 0.5 NM 
intervals beginning 3 NM prior to the runway threshold, at 4 locations away from Aircraft A’s approach 
path (2,195, 4,445, 6,695, and 8,945 feet from the extended runway centerline), and at 7 different altitudes 
(100, 250, 400, 550, 700, 850, and 1,000 ft AFE).  Aircraft B began to fly forward when Aircraft A was at 
various distances from the runway threshold (from 4 NM to 1 NM to the threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals) 
(Figure 16) (Appendix B.11).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA being triggered in an 
appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would conduct a go-around if Aircraft B was at the same altitude 
or lower at projected CPA; otherwise, Aircraft A would continue to descend.  Aircraft B would climb if at 
or above Aircraft A’s altitude or descend if below Aircraft A’s altitude at projected CPA. 
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Figure 16.  Arrival with Crossing Traffic Air-to-Air Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.2.12 Air-to-Air Scenario – Departure climb-out with crossing airborne traffic 
This scenario tested the situation where traffic crossed the flight path of a departing aircraft. 
The configuration for this scenario was similar to the arrival air-to-air scenario, except the IC for 
Aircraft A was in position on Runway 10 for departure.  Aircraft B (a helicopter) traveled across the path 
of the departing aircraft once airborne, flying level at heading 000 and at an indicated airspeed of 50 kts.  
Aircraft B’s initial position was placed at 7 different locations along Aircraft A’s departure path (from 5,000 
to 11,000 ft from the runway threshold, at 1,000 ft increments), at 3 locations away from the runway (3100, 
3950, and 4800 feet from the runway centerline), and at 7 different altitudes (100, 250, 400, 550, 700, 850, 
and 1000 ft AFE).  Aircraft B began to fly forward when Aircraft A passed various distances along the 
runway (approximately at the runway threshold, and 115 ft, 355 ft, 620 ft, 960 ft, 1,385 ft, and 1,875 ft from 
the runway threshold) (Figure 17) (Appendix B.12).  If maneuvering were required based on a CD&R WA 
being triggered in an appropriately equipped aircraft, Aircraft A would level off if Aircraft B was projected 
to be at a higher altitude at CPA; otherwise, it would continue departure climb.  Aircraft B would climb if 
projected to be at or above Aircraft A’s altitude or descend if below Aircraft A’s altitude at CPA. 
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Figure 17.  Departure Climb-out with Crossing Traffic Air-to-Air Scenario Initial Conditions. 
4.3 Pilot Reaction Delay 
A delay was incorporated to simulate the reaction time from when a pilot would receive a WA until 
action was taken to resolve the situation.  The following delay times were used for this study: 5 seconds 
(sec) when aircraft was on approach, 3 sec when aircraft was rolling out, 2 sec during taxi, 2 sec during 
departure, and 3 sec for air-to-air maneuvers.  These delay times were selected based on reaction delays 
experienced during previous simulation and flight testing [Jones, 2005; Jones and Prinzel, 2006; Jones et 
al, 2010] 
4.4 Test Matrix 
Algorithm performance was evaluated for the 12 conflict scenarios described above using the ATCAM 
CD&R algorithm and for the 7 runway scenarios using the SURF IA algorithm, for five levels of 
surveillance accuracy (NACp 8, 9, 10, 11, and truth), and four levels of CD&R system equipage (Neither 
aircraft equipped, only Aircraft A equipped, only Aircraft B equipped, and Both aircraft equipped) 
(Appendix A).  Thus, 20 cases were examined for each of the scenarios.  A total of 240 cases were evaluated 
for ATCAM and 140 cases for SURF IA. 
Directive alerting was evaluated for three scenarios (two runway and one taxiway), two levels of 
surveillance accuracy (NACp 10 and truth), and three levels of CD&R system equipage (only Aircraft A 
equipped, only Aircraft B equipped, and Both aircraft equipped), for a total of 18 cases (Appendix A).  
These three scenarios were selected because the directive alert generated by ATCAM could have a different 
outcome from the standard maneuvering conducted for the other test cases.  Truth surveillance accuracy 
was evaluated to obtain results of directive alerting with accurate data.  NACp 10 surveillance accuracy 
was selected for evaluation based on the SURF IA requirements for large airports [RTCA, 2010].  There 
was no need to evaluate the condition where neither aircraft take action since directive alerting results in 
action. 
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The number of replicates for each treatment combination varied by the level of surveillance accuracy.  
As shown in Table 2, more replicates were conducted for the lower NACp values in order to increase the 
level of precision for estimating the true location of the aircraft.  Initial testing was conducted to provide an 
estimate of the variance across NACp values.  This estimate was used to confirm that the number of 
replicates listed in Table 2 provided a reasonable level of accuracy based on subject-matter expertise, while 
staying within the resource constraints. 
Table 2.  Number of Replicates. 
NACp Number of Replicates 
8 7 
9 6 
10 4 
11 3 
Truth 1 
 
Some of the test conditions for some of the scenarios, in which a conflict would obviously not occur, 
were omitted in order to reduce the size of the test matrix. 
The number of test runs per scenario and NACp level is shown in Table 3.  A full factorial design was 
used.  The standard number of runs per scenario is multiplied by the appropriate number of replicates (Table 
2) and by four for the four levels of CD&R system equipage.  As a result, data were collected for 504,504 
test runs with the ATCAM CD&R algorithm and for 294,756 test runs with the SURF IA CD&R algorithm. 
As described above, directive alerting data were only collected for selected scenarios, two levels of 
surveillance accuracy, and three levels of CD&R system equipage.  Therefore, data were collected for 1,545 
test runs for the directive alerting evaluation. 
Data were collected for the test runs in random order by scenario.  For data manageability of the 
scenarios that required a large number of test runs, data were collected randomly grouped by level of 
surveillance accuracy and CD&R system equipage due to limitations on computer storage and for ease of 
data collection and processing.  Based on subject-matter expertise, it was determined that this grouping 
should not have any impact on the results. 
Table 3.  Number of Test Runs. 
Scenario Standard 
Number 
of Runs 
Number 
NACp 8 
Runs 
Number 
NACp 9 
Runs 
Number 
NACp 10 
Runs 
Number 
NACp 11 
Runs 
Number 
Truth 
Runs 
Total 
number 
Runs 
Runway Scenarios: 
Arrival Taxi Crossing 2,367 66,276 56,808 37,872 28,404 9,468 198,828 
Departure Taxi Crossing 1,077 30,156 25,848 17,232 12,924 4,308 90,468 
Arrival Departure Same 
Runway 
9 252 216 144 108 36 756 
Departures Intersecting  16 448 384 256 192 64 1,344 
Arrival Departure Intersecting 13 364 312 208 156 52 1,092 
Head-On Arrivals 14 392 336 224 168 56 1,176 
Arrivals Intersecting 13 364 312 208 156 52 1,092 
Taxi Scenarios: 
Taxi Following 7 196 168 112 84 28 588 
Taxi Intersection 76 2,128 1,824 1,216 912 304 6,384 
Taxi Head-On 13 364 312 208 156 52 1,092 
Air-To-Air Scenarios: 
Arrival Crossing Traffic 1,372 38,416 32,928 21,952 16,464 5,488 115,248 
Departure Climb-Out 
Crossing Traffic 
1,029 28,812 24,696 16,464 12,348 4,116 86,436 
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4.5 Test Metrics 
Some of the metrics utilized for this study are defined in this section.  All data is referenced from the 
aircraft center-of-gravity (CG), unless noted otherwise. 
4.5.1 Near Collision / Collision 
For runway conflicts, a near collision was counted if the CG of the two aircraft were < 300 ft apart 
laterally and vertical separation was < 200 ft.  A collision was counted if the aircraft were < 150 ft apart 
laterally and vertical separation was < 100 ft (Figure 18).  The 150 ft collision separation corresponds to 
large aircraft with a wingspan and fuselage length of approximately 150 ft (which was used for this study).  
The 150 ft value also corresponds to the width of the simulated runway.  Also, aircraft that are between the 
hold line and runway edge (150 ft distance for this study) are considered hazards and classified as near 
collisions. 
For the taxiway conflicts, a near collision was counted if the aircraft CG’s were < 185 ft apart laterally.  
A collision was counted if the aircraft CG’s were < 150 ft apart laterally. 
For mid-air conflicts, a near collision was counted if the aircraft CG’s were < 500 ft apart laterally and 
vertically [FAA, 2014].  A collision was counted if the aircraft CG’s were < 150 ft apart laterally and 
vertical separation was < 100 ft. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Near Collision / Collision Definition for Runway Scenarios. 
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4.5.2 Nuisance / Missed Indications and Alerts 
According to the SURF IA SPR [RTCA, 2010], a nuisance indication or alert is defined as any 
indication or alert generated by a properly functioning CD&R system that is inappropriate or unnecessary 
for the particular situation.  Nuisance IAs could distract the flight crew unnecessarily, reduce confidence in 
the system, and negatively affect safety and operational effectiveness.  Repeated nuisance IAs could 
decrease the use of CD&R and reduce expeditious flight crew response to true IAs. 
A missed indication or alert is defined as a failure to provide an indication or alert when it is necessary 
provided ownship and traffic are adequately equipped [RTCA, 2010].  Missed IAs represent a reduction in 
CD&R benefits and result in operations that are similar to today’s operations where IAs are not provided. 
The SURF IA SPR definitions of nuisance and missed boundaries were applied.  Horizontal position 
error was the only source of error modeled.  Other sources of error, such as vertical position error, airport 
database error, and flight technical error were not included. 
When an aircraft was on approach, an approach corridor as defined in the SURF IA SPR for NACp 8 
with a probability of missed alert of 0.01 was used since NACp 8 and higher was being evaluated (Figure 
19).  The corridor width was +/- 321.5 ft at the runway threshold and linearly increased to +/- 964.6 ft at 3 
NM away from the runway threshold.  The nuisance boundary condition occurred when the true aircraft 
position was outside the approach corridor, but the detected position was within the approach corridor.  The 
missed boundary condition occurred when the aircraft’s true position was within the approach corridor, but 
the detected position was outside the approach corridor.  Since the true position of the approach aircraft 
tracked the extended runway centerline and was never outside of the approach corridor, the aircraft could 
never enter the nuisance boundary. 
 
Figure 19. Missed/Nuisance Alert Definition When On Approach. 
When an aircraft had crossed the runway threshold on landing or was traveling along a runway (Figure 
20), the nuisance boundary condition occurred when the aircraft’s true position was farther than one runway 
width (150 ft) from the runway centerline, but the detected position was within one runway width of the 
centerline.  A missed boundary condition occurred when the aircraft’s true position was within one runway 
width of the runway centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway width from the 
centerline. 
 
Figure 20.  Nuisance/Missed Alert Definition When Traveling Along a Runway. 
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When an aircraft was taxiing across a runway, the nuisance boundary condition occurred when the true 
position of the aircraft’s nose (when entering) or tail (when exiting) was at or behind the hold line, but any 
part of the detected aircraft (from nose to tail) was between the runway shoulder edges (Figure 21).  The 
missed boundary condition occurred when the true position of any part of the aircraft was between the 
runway shoulder edges, but the detected nose position (when entering) or tail position (when exiting) was 
outside of the runway shoulder edges.  A shoulder width of 7.5 m (24.6 ft), as defined in the SURF IA SPR 
for Aerodrome code 4, was used.  A 150 ft wide runway was assumed; therefore, the distance between 
shoulder edges was approximately 200 ft.  The hold line was located 225 ft from the runway centerline. 
 
Figure 21.  Nuisance/Missed Alert Definition When Taxiing Across a Runway. 
When an aircraft was traveling along a taxiway, the nuisance boundary condition occurred when the 
true position was farther than one taxiway width (75 ft) from the taxiway centerline, but the detected 
position was within one taxiway width of the taxiway centerline.  The missed boundary condition occurred 
when the true position was within one taxiway width of the taxiway centerline, but the detected position 
was greater than one taxiway width from the taxiway centerline.  Since the true position of both aircraft 
during taxi tracked their respective taxiway centerlines, the aircraft could never enter the nuisance 
boundary. 
When an aircraft was crossing at a taxiway intersection, the nuisance boundary condition occurred 
when the true position of the nose (when entering) or tail (when exiting) was at or behind the taxiway 
holding position (assumed for this study to be 129.5 ft from crossing taxiway centerline [FAA, 2009b]), but 
any part of the detected aircraft (from nose to tail) was determined to be between the taxiway shoulder 
edges.  A shoulder width of 24.6 ft was used [FAA, 2010b].  The missed boundary condition occurred when 
the true position of any part of the aircraft was determined to be between the taxiway shoulder edges, but 
the detected nose position (when entering) or tail position (when exiting) was outside of the taxiway 
shoulder edges. 
When an airborne aircraft was crossing the path of an approaching aircraft, the nuisance boundary 
condition occurred when the true position of the crossing aircraft was outside of the approach corridor 
defined above and the detected position was within the approach corridor.  The missed boundary condition 
occurred when the true position of the crossing aircraft was within the approach corridor and the detected 
position was outside of the approach corridor. 
An IA was considered to be a nuisance if the IA was generated when the aircraft was within a nuisance 
boundary, based on the definitions above. 
A straight-forward corollary for a missed IA definition does not exist.  If the aircraft was within the 
missed boundary, based on the definitions above, and an IA was not generated, that did not necessarily 
mean that an IA should have been generated.  Even though one of the aircraft was in the missed boundary, 
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the geometry of the aircrafts’ trajectory may not be on a collision path.  Therefore, an algorithm dependent 
definition was developed.  If an IA was generated when transmitting truth data but an IA was not generated 
at the same instance when transmitting NACp data, then a missed IA was counted. 
4.5.3 Unnecessary Maneuver 
Previous research has shown that pilots instinctively react upon receiving airport traffic WAs in the 
flight deck [Jones et al, 2010] without necessarily confirming with secondary or additional information 
first.  It is critical that alerting only occurs when needed; otherwise, these unnecessary maneuvers can cause 
delays, equipment wear, and other costs to airlines. 
Each occurrence of a maneuver (go-around, accelerated braking, rejected take-off, climb, descend, 
accelerate during taxi, and decelerate during taxi) was evaluated to determine if the maneuver was 
necessary.  Maneuvering was considered unnecessary if made based on a WA issued when the aircraft were 
broadcasting NACp accuracy, but for the same test conditions, a WA was not issued when broadcasting 
true position data.  This measure quantifies untimely nuisance alerts using an algorithm-dependent 
methodology.  Only the test runs in which maneuvering was possible were evaluated for unnecessary 
maneuvers.  Therefore, for Aircraft A, unnecessary maneuvering was only evaluated when Aircraft A or 
both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  Likewise, for Aircraft B, unnecessary maneuvering was only 
evaluated when Aircraft B or both aircraft were equipped. 
4.5.4 Unwanted Alert 
This metric was developed as an effort to determine how far an alert zone should be from the hold line 
so unwanted (i.e., nuisance) alerts do not occur when an aircraft is preparing to cross the runway but is still 
behind the hold line.  The edge of the alert zone was placed at the same location as the hold line (225 ft 
from the runway centerline) so an alert would be generated the moment the aircraft crossed the hold line.  
An alert was considered unwanted if the true aircraft position was behind the hold line but the detected 
position indicated the aircraft to be over the hold line, causing an alert (Figure 22).  If an unwanted alert 
was triggered, the maximum distance the detected aircraft nose crossed over the hold line was recorded, 
thus approximating the distance the alert zone should be from the hold line. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Unwanted Alert Definition. 
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5 Results 
A summary of quantitative results is presented.  All data is referenced from the aircraft CG, unless 
noted otherwise.  For the aircraft used in this study, the nose position was 72.8 ft from the CG and the tail 
position was 82 ft from the CG. 
For each scenario, the data analysis was limited to the area of interest, i.e., until the aircraft reached the 
CPA or until 10 seconds after a WA terminated, whichever was later.  Also, both aircraft broadcast the 
same level of positional accuracy for each test run. 
Pearson’s Chi-Square Test [Agresti, 2002] was utilized to evaluate relationships between position 
accuracy or CD&R equipage levels and the test metrics.  The null hypothesis tested the independence 
between the five position accuracy levels or four CD&R equipage levels and the associated test metric, 
meaning that changing the position accuracy level or CD&R equipage level was not associated with more 
collisions, for example.  This hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis, that position 
accuracy level or CD&R equipage level was not independent of the test metric if the p-value fell below a 
significance threshold of α =.05/2 =.025.  This threshold was specified to account for the fact that two 
aircraft contributed to the same data set but were tested separately.  Reducing α in this way reduced the risk 
of false positives, or concluding there was a relationship between position accuracy or equipage level and 
a test metric when there was really no such relationship.  If the null hypothesis was rejected, suggesting 
that a test metric was in some way dependent on the position accuracy or CD&R equipage level, the nature 
of that relationship was inferred from standardized residuals.  Position accuracy or equipage levels with 
positive residuals indicate the levels are different from the rest and have more reported events than would 
happen by chance. 
Some test metrics with infrequent events may produce sparse data that would violate the assumptions 
of the Chi-square test.  In these cases, the data table was systematically condensed to either fit the 
assumptions or be tested using Fisher’s Exact test [Agresti, 2002] with the same hypotheses as above.  If 
the null hypothesis was rejected, the table itself was used to draw conclusions about which position accuracy 
or equipage levels reported more events than would happen by chance. 
5.1 ATCAM Algorithm Results 
5.1.1 Position Data Analysis 
An analysis was conducted to determine the difference between the true aircraft position and the 
detected aircraft position for each position accuracy category for all test runs conducted during the ATCAM 
algorithm evaluation (Table 4) in order to validate the surveillance simulation against the NACp 95 percent 
(%) horizontal accuracy bounds specifications (Table 1).  The prediction interval is an estimate of an 
interval in which future observations will fall, with a certain probability, given what has already been 
observed.  The 95% prediction interval means there is a 95% probability that a future observation will be 
contained within the prediction interval.  These values fall within the defined NACp 95% horizontal 
accuracy bounds. 
Table 4.  Position Data Analysis During ATCAM Evaluation. 
NACp Mean (ft) 
Standard 
Deviation (ft) 
95% Upper Prediction 
Interval (ft) 
8 144.7 78.2 298.0 
9 46.9 25.4 96.6 
10 15.7 8.5 32.4 
11 4.7 2.6 9.9 
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5.1.2 Runway Scenario – Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 2,367 combinations of the initiation delay and initial position 
for Aircraft B (taxiing aircraft) were evaluated, for a total of 198,828 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – CAs were issued on 43% to 58% of the runs for the taxiing aircraft (Aircraft 
B) but only 16% to 30% of the time for the approach aircraft (Aircraft A) (Table 5).  WAs were generated 
on approximately 44% to 50% of the runs for either aircraft.  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. 
NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, CAs were issued on 
approach when the aircraft was approximately 1.3 NM to 1.0 NM prior to the runway threshold.  During a 
higher percentage of test runs, the alerting criteria was not met until the aircraft was less than 1.0 NM prior 
to the runway threshold on approach or on the runway after landing, within the WA zone.  For this study, 
the runway was 150 ft wide and the runway hold line was 225 ft from the runway centerline.  For the taxiing 
aircraft, CAs occurred approximately 570 ft before reaching the runway centerline (345 ft before the runway 
hold line) until approximately 310 ft past the runway centerline (235 ft past the runway edge).  WAs 
occurred from approximately 470 ft before reaching the runway center line (245 ft before the runway hold 
line) until 305 ft past the runway centerline (230 ft past the runway edge). 
Table 5.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 66,276 19,783,    29.9 2,557,    3.9 33,476,    50.5 10,432,    15.7 
9 56,808 11,291,    19.9   626,    1.1 25,870,    45.5   2,008,      3.5 
10 37,872  6,144,    16.2       4,    0.0 16,793,    44.3      432,      1.1 
11 28,404  4,596,    16.2       2,    0.0 12,506,    44.0      141,      0.5 
Truth  9,468  1,528,    16.1       0,    0.0   4,161,    44.0          0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 66,276 38,276,    57.8 12,890,    19.4 29,397,    44.4 11,691,    17.6 
9 56,808 26,237,    46.2   1,675,      3.0 27,513,    48.4   3,158,      5.6 
10 37,872 16,415,    43.3      685,      1.8 18,009,    47.5      820,      2.2 
11 28,404 12,236,    43.1      545,      1.9 13,534,    47.6      481,      1.7 
Truth  9,468   4,076,    43.0      186,      2.0   4,515,    47.7      128,      1.4 
 
Alert toggling occurred when multiple instances of CAs and WAs were generated during a test run 
(Table 5).  Alert toggling is undesirable (i.e., it is a distraction to the flight crew and would cause mistrust 
in the technology).  As the position accuracy was reduced, alert toggling occurred more frequently, 
particularly for NACp 8 accuracy.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 
10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The alert toggling included gaps between alerts in many instances.  In addition to position accuracy, 
the toggling can also be a result of aircraft maneuvering.  It should be noted that for Aircraft B, toggling 
occurred when truth position data was transmitted, which was not expected.  It was determined that these 
multiple alerts were generated after Aircraft B had crossed Runway 10 and was entering a nearby runway.  
Alerts should not have been generated in this situation because there was no traffic threat on the nearby 
runway. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 6), CAs were issued on approximately 22% of the 
runs for Aircraft A and on approximately 49% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  WAs were 
generated on 42% to 51% of the runs for Aircraft A, depending on the equipage level, and on approximately 
47% of the runs for all equipage levels for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p 
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< 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between Aircraft B and Both aircraft 
equipped vs. Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p 
= 0.004) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither 
aircraft, Aircraft A, and Aircraft B equipped.  There was not a significant difference (p = 0.411) in the 
number of runs in which WAs were generated between equipage levels. 
Alert toggling occurred more frequently when Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R (Table 6).  For 
Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs and 
multiple WAs were generated between Aircraft B equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft 
equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs 
(p = 0.009) and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped 
vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 6.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 10,436,    21.0    617,     1.2 25,423,    51.1 3,011,    6.1 
Aircraft A 49,707 10,248,    20.6    479,     1.0 25,441,    51.2     2,604,    5.2 
Aircraft B 49,707 11,763,    23.7 1,302,     2.6 20,959,    42.2 4,410,    8.9 
Both 49,707 10,895,    21.9    791,     1.6 20,983,    42.2 2,988,    6.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 24,497,    49.3 4,069,    8.2 23,154,    46.6 4,200,    8.4 
Aircraft A 49,707 24,348,    49.0 3,948,    7.9 23,319,    46.9 3,970,    8.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 24,425,    49.1 4,113,    8.3 23,143,    46.6 4,394,    8.8 
Both 49,707 23,970,    48.2 3,851,    7.8 23,352,    47.0 3,714,    7.5 
 
Table 7.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple  CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 8,029,    16.1       1,    0.0 25,347,    51.0    0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 49,707 8,070,    16.2       1,    0.0 24,978,    50.2    0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 8,005,    16.1       3,    0.0 18,706,    37.6    0,    0.0 
Both 49,707 8,031,    16.2       1,    0.0 18,402,    37.0    1,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 21,437,    43.1   946,    1.9 23,483,    47.2 819,    1.6 
Aircraft A 49,707 21,279,    42.8   946,    1.9 23,509,    47.3 781,    1.6 
Aircraft B 49,707 21,325,    42.9   948,    1.9 22,344,    45.0 557,    1.1 
Both 49,707 21,200,    42.6   946,    1.9 22,396,    45.1 637,    1.3 
 
In order to demonstrate the effect of accurate position data on the occurrence of alert and multiple alert 
generation, alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was 
transmitted (Table 7).  CAs were issued on approximately 16% of the runs for Aircraft A for all equipage 
levels and on approximately 43% of the runs for Aircraft B.  WAs were generated on 37% to 51% of the 
runs for Aircraft A depending on equipage level and on approximately 46% of the runs for Aircraft B for 
all equipage levels.  There were very few multiple alerts when Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R and 
less than 2% of the runs had multiple alerts for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.956), multiple CAs (p = 0.169), and multiple WAs (p 
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= 0.250) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft 
B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which CAs (p = 0.491) and multiple CAs (p = 1.0) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs and multiple WAs were generated 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 8.  Aircraft can cross 
into the missed and nuisance boundary multiple times throughout a test run, for varying lengths of time.  
The number of times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft 
were within the boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data.  For Aircraft A, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies and when it entered the nuisance boundary 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies and when it entered the nuisance 
boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 8.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD*) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 53,828,  81.2 6.6,    5.7 11.5,   11.9 7.9 371,   0.6 1.1,    0.2 0.6,    0.2 0.2 
9     655,    1.1 1.6,    1.2   1.5,     1.6 0.8 333,   0.6 1.0,    0.1 0.6,    0.2 0.2 
10     148,    0.4 1.0,    0.1   0.5,     0.3 0.2 136,   0.4 1.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.2 0.2 
11      63,    0.2 1.0,    0.0   0.2,     0.1 0.1   64,   0.2 1.0,    0.0 0.2,    0.1 0.1 
Truth        0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0      0,     0.0 0.0     0,   0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 47,889,  72.3 2.0,    1.2 4.1,   2.9 3.6 19,798,  29.9 3.6,    3.8 6.5,    9.6 5.6 
9 34,834,  61.3 1.3,    0.6 1.5,   1.2 1.3       87,    0.2 1.7,    1.4 1.3,    1.8 1.1 
10 20,840,  55.0 1.1,    0.3 0.6,   0.3 0.5         0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
11 10,079,  35.5 1.1,    0.2 0.3,   0.1 0.2         0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth         0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,   0.0 0.0         0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
*SD = Standard Deviation 
 
For the approach Aircraft A, the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the 
aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while 
on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 2.8% of the test runs when the aircraft were 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Since Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline on approach and 
centerline after landing, the nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft was exiting the runway. 
The taxiing Aircraft B entered the missed boundary at least once for a high percentage of the test runs 
for accuracy levels of NACp 8 to 11.  This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  The 
aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the true position of any part of the aircraft was 
determined to be between the runway shoulder edges, but the detected nose position when entering or tail 
position when exiting was outside of the runway shoulder edges.  As such, there was no buffer between 
when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so a measurable difference between the true 
and detected position could cause a missed boundary to be counted. 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance alerts was relatively low, overall, as shown 
in Table 9.  However, missed and nuisance alerts for both aircraft were highest with NACp 8 accuracy.  The 
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missed alert definition, as noted earlier, is algorithm dependent.  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs, missed WAs, nuisance CAs, and nuisance WAs 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies (p < 0.001 for all except Aircraft A 
nuisance CAs p = 0.004). 
Table 9.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 66,276 1,525,    2.3 4,868,    7.3       5,    0.0      24,    0.0 
9 56,808    470,    0.8 1,354,    2.4       0,    0.0        5,    0.0 
10 37,872    169,    0.4    133,    0.4       0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
11 28,404      68,    0.2      54,    0.2       0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Truth 9,468       1,    0.0        3,    0.0       0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 66,276 2,239,    3.4 5,655,    8.5 2,231,    3.4 1,896,    2.9 
9 56,808    864,    1.5 1,169,    2.1        0,    0.0        1,    0.0 
10 37,872    142,    0.4    239,    0.6        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
11 28,404      36,    0.1      61,    0.2        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Truth 9,468        2,    0.0        2,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
 
Both aircraft experienced missed alerts when transmitting truth position data.  These unexpected events 
occurred because even though the aircraft were broadcasting truth position data, the ADS-B transmission 
model was still being used.  The transmission model resulted in a slight delay between one aircraft’s position 
at the time of transmitting the ADS-B message and the position at the time of reception of the ADS-B 
message by the other aircraft.  This delay was present in all scenarios, but this position difference was 
negligible compared to the NACp position uncertainty error.  In these scenarios, one aircraft did not detect 
a conflict with the other aircraft based on the broadcast position, but if instantaneous position information 
were used, a conflict would have been detected.  The small error introduced by the movement of the aircraft 
between transmission and reception of the ADS-B message resulted in just enough difference in relation to 
the other aircraft’s position to result in the missed alerts.  For Aircraft A, the missed CA should have 
occurred when the aircraft was exiting the runway while Aircraft B was located 10,015 ft down the runway 
near Aircraft A’s exit.  The missed WAs should have occurred after the aircraft landed and was at 71 kt and 
Aircraft B was 276 ft from the runway centerline.  For Aircraft B, the missed CAs should have occurred 
when the aircraft was 286 ft from the runway centerline and Aircraft A had landed and was at 104 kt.  The 
missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was on the runway and Aircraft A was on final 
approach, approximately 2500 ft prior to the threshold and 208 ft AGL. 
An alert was considered a nuisance if it was generated at the same time the aircraft was determined to 
be within the nuisance boundary.  Therefore, nuisance alerts for Aircraft A only occurred as the aircraft 
was exiting the runway (see explanation above). 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 10), missed alerts occurred for less than 4% of the 
runs and nuisance alerts occurred for 1.2% or less of the runs for all equipage levels for both aircraft.  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.203), 
missed WAs (p = 0.777), and nuisance CAs (p = 0.604) occurred between equipage levels.  There was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which nuisance WAs occurred between Aircraft 
B equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.641), missed WAs (p = 0.127), 
and nuisance CAs (p = 0.162) occurred between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which nuisance WAs occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A 
equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 10.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 526,    1.1 1,596,    3.2     1,    0.0   4,    0.0 
Aircraft A 49,707 588,    1.2 1,609,    3.2     2,    0.0   4,    0.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 542,    1.1 1,632,    3.3     1,    0.0 19,    0.0 
Both 49,707 577,    1.2 1,575,    3.2     1,    0.0   2,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 839,    1.7 1,768,    3.6 557,    1.1 415,    0.8 
Aircraft A 49,707 810,    1.6 1,862,    3.7 525,    1.1 429,    0.9 
Aircraft B 49,707 796,    1.6 1,727,    3.5 599,    1.2 531,    1.1 
Both 49,707 838,    1.7 1,769,    3.6 550,    1.1 522,    1.1 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - As described in Section 4.5.3, each occurrence of a maneuver was 
evaluated to determine if the maneuver was necessary.  Maneuvering was considered unnecessary if made 
based on a WA issued when the aircraft were broadcasting NACp accuracy, but for the same test conditions, 
a WA was not issued when broadcasting truth position data.  Only the test runs in which maneuvering was 
possible were evaluated for unnecessary maneuvers.  For Aircraft A, unnecessary maneuvering was only 
evaluated when Aircraft A or Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft B, unnecessary 
maneuvering was evaluated when Aircraft B or Both aircraft were equipped.  This measure quantifies 
untimely nuisance alerts using an algorithm-dependent methodology. 
For this scenario, the percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily is shown 
in Table 11.  As the position accuracy decreased, the frequency of occurrences of unnecessary maneuvers 
increased.  With a NACp value of 8, approximately 11% of the maneuvers were unnecessary for Aircraft 
A and 3% of the maneuvers were unnecessary for Aircraft B.  With a NACp value of 11, approximately 
0.1% or 1 of 1,000 maneuvers were unnecessary for Aircraft A and 0.3% or 3 out of 1,000 maneuvers were 
unnecessary for Aircraft B.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
unnecessary maneuvers occurred for Aircraft A between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies 
and in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred for Aircraft B between NACp 8 and 
9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
There were some unnecessary maneuvers for Aircraft B when transmitting data with truth accuracy.  
For these 10 runs, Aircraft B was located 10,015 ft from the runway threshold and 268 ft to 450 ft from the 
runway centerline, traveling toward the runway.  Aircraft A was approximately 2,070 ft past the runway 
threshold with 129 kts ground speed. 
Table 11.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During 
Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 33,138 3,657,    11.0 1,134,    3.4 
9 28,404 1,076,      3.8    532,    1.9 
10 18,936      81,      0.4      80,    0.4 
11 14,202      19,      0.1      39,    0.3 
Truth   4,734        0,      0.0      10,    0.2 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 12.  A slightly higher percentage of unnecessary maneuvers 
occurred onboard Aircraft A when Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
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difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between Both 
aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A equipped.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.536) between 
equipage levels for Aircraft B. 
Table 12.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During Arrival 
with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 49,707 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 49,707 2,080,    4.2 N/A 
Aircraft B 49,707 N/A   884,    1.8 
Both 49,707 2,753,    5.5   911,    1.8 
 
Collision avoidance – By the design of the scenarios, in the absence of CD&R, approximately 20% of 
the runs resulted in a near collision (NC) and approximately 10% resulted in collisions (C), as shown in 
Table 13.  Collision avoidance was affected by the CD&R system equipage level.  The most collisions were 
avoided when Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  In some instances, CD&R was more effective 
depending on which aircraft was equipped.  For this scenario, more collisions were avoided when the 
crossing Aircraft B was equipped.  However, when only the approach Aircraft A was equipped, collision 
avoidance was less effective, but better than when Neither aircraft were equipped.  When Neither aircraft 
was equipped with CD&R, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near 
collisions and collisions occurred between position accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft A were equipped 
with CD&R, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.029) 
and collisions (p = 0.106) occurred between position accuracy levels.  When Aircraft B was equipped, there 
was a significant difference (p = 0.003) in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred between 
NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was also a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in number of runs in which collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R, there was a significant difference (p = 0.007) 
in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred between NACp 9 vs. NACp 8, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  There was also a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which collisions 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 13.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs 
per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 16,569 3,194, 19.3 1,540, 9.3 2,522, 15.2 1,065, 6.4 2,616, 15.8 519, 3.1 1,745, 10.5 432, 2.6
9 14,202 2,741, 19.3 1,319, 9.3 2,314, 16.3    992, 7.0 2,360, 16.6 114, 0.8 1,334,   9.4   75, 0.5
10 9,468 1,828, 19.3    880, 9.3 1,552, 16.4    676, 7.1 1,629, 17.2   53, 0.6    963, 10.2   18, 0.2
11 7,101 1,367, 19.3    660, 9.3 1,166, 16.4    506, 7.1 1,245, 17.5   21, 0.3   752, 10.6     5, 0.1
Truth 2,367    456, 19.3    220, 9.3    390, 16.5    171, 7.2    414, 17.5     6, 0.3   256, 10.8     0, 0.0
 
A more detailed investigation was conducted for the collisions that occurred when transmitting truth 
position data.  The initial location of Aircraft A and Aircraft B for each run that resulted in a collision are 
indicated in Figures 23, 24, and 25.  For example, in Figure 23, collisions resulted when Aircraft A was on 
approach and 2.5 NM prior to the runway threshold when Aircraft B began to taxi toward the runway from 
two different locations, (1) 1,600 ft back from the runway centerline and in line with the runway threshold 
(0 ft from the runway threshold) and (2) 1,600 ft back from the runway centerline and 1,000 ft from the 
runway threshold. 
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Many collisions were unavoidable for the approach aircraft.  The most frequent causes were the WA 
occurred during high speed rollout or when the aircraft was too low to go around.  Other times the collision 
occurred after the maneuver was initiated, but before aircraft climb, during climb-out, or during runway 
taxi.  In some instances, the approach aircraft came to a full stop after clearing the runway, but then was hit 
by the taxiing aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 23.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Neither Aircraft Maneuvers For Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft A Maneuvers For Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
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Figure 25.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft B Maneuvers For Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
Unwanted alert – As defined above (Section 4.5.4), an alert was considered unwanted if the true 
position of Aircraft B was behind the hold line but the detected position indicated that the aircraft was over 
the hold line.  The frequency of unwanted alerts increased as the position accuracy decreased, particularly 
with NACp 8 accuracy, as shown in Table 14.  Also, a larger buffer between the hold line and alerting zone 
is required as the position accuracy decreases in order to reduce the number of unwanted alerts.  For the 
arrival with taxi crossing scenario, 99% of unwanted alerts could have been avoided by placing the alert 
zone 390 ft past the hold line for NACp 8 accuracy, 135 ft past the hold line for NACp 9 accuracy, and 55 
ft past the hold line for NACp 10 accuracy.  The maximum standard for separation between the hold line 
and runway centerline is 280 ft [FAA, 2009b] to accommodate the largest aircraft.  A 390 ft alerting zone 
buffer is not practical for even the largest airports. 
Table 14.  Unwanted Alert Data Using ATCAM for Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
 
NACp 
 
 
Total # 
Runs 
Unwanted CA Unwanted WA 
 
 
# Runs, % Runs 
Max Distance Nose 
Over Hold Line (ft) 
(mean, SD) 
 
 
# Runs, % Runs 
Max Distance Nose 
Over Hold Line (ft) 
(mean, SD) 
8 66,276 5,909,    8.9 126.4,   75.3 11,506,    17.4 147.5,   80.7 
9 56,808 1,169,    2.1   50.5,   26.4   3,809,      6.7   55.4,   26.0 
10 37,872      12,    0.1   16.6,   11.2      134,      0.4   24.7,     9.5 
11 28,404        0,    0.0     0.0,     0.0          0,      0.0     0.0,     0.0 
Truth 9,468        0,    0.0     0.0,     0.0          0,      0.0     0.0,     0.0 
5.1.3 Runway Scenario – Departure with Taxi Crossing 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 1,077 combinations of the initiation delay and initial position 
for Aircraft B (taxiing aircraft) were evaluated, for a total of 90,468 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, CAs were generated on approximately 12% of the runs 
when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, but were issued on 3% or less of the runs for accuracy levels 
of NACp 9 and higher (Table 15).  For Aircraft A (departing aircraft), WAs were generated on 
approximately 53% of the runs when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, but were issued on 
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approximately 40% of the runs for accuracy levels of NACp 9 and higher.  For Aircraft B (taxiing aircraft), 
WAs were generated on approximately 58% of the runs when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, but 
were issued on approximately 62% of the runs for accuracy levels of NACp 9 and higher.  For both aircraft, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, all the CAs that were issued 
onboard the departing aircraft occurred after the aircraft had received a WA and aborted the departure.  
WAs were issued onboard the departing aircraft from when the aircraft was approximately 38 ft from the 
runway threshold and 15 kt until it was approximately 8,490 ft from the threshold and 360 ft AGL.  The 
aircraft lifted off when it was approximately 5,070 ft from the threshold.  For the taxiing aircraft, CAs 
occurred approximately 470 ft before reaching the runway centerline (245 ft before the runway hold line) 
until approximately 125 ft before the runway centerline (100 ft over the runway hold line).  WAs occurred 
from approximately 470 ft before reaching the runway centerline (245 ft before the runway hold line) until 
approximately 185 ft before the runway centerline (40 ft over the runway hold line). 
Toggling of CAs occurred on less than 1% of the runs for both aircraft for all position accuracy levels.  
For the WAs, as the position accuracy was reduced, the toggling occurred more frequently, particularly for 
NACp 8 accuracy (Table 15).  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number 
of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, 
and truth accuracies. 
Table 15.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 30,156 3,392,    11.2 130,    0.4 15,862,    52.6 3,548,    11.8 
9 25,848    233,      0.9   11,    0.0 10,806,    41.8    821,      3.2 
10 17,232      40,      0.2     0,    0.0   6,915,    40.1    233,      1.4 
11 12,924      28,      0.2     0,    0.0   5,164,    40.0      74,      0.6 
Truth 4,308      10,      0.2     0,    0.0   1,730,    40.2        5,      0.1 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 30,156 3,799,    12.6 264,    0.9 17,469,    57.9   4,575,    15.2 
9 25,848    804,      3.1   28,    0.1 16,144,    62.5   1,129,      4.4 
10 17,232    300,      1.7   10,    0.1 10,676,    62.0      190,      1.1 
11 12,924    190,      1.5   11,    0.1   7,974,    61.7        49,      0.4 
Truth 4,308      67,      1.6     4,    0.1   2,655,    61.6          3,      0.1 
 
The alert toggling included gaps between alerts when transmitting data with lower position accuracy 
(NACp 8 and 9).  Multiple alerts also occurred as a result of aircraft maneuvering, Aircraft A conducting a 
rejected takeoff and Aircraft B accelerated braking.  For both aircraft, alert toggling occurred when truth 
position data was transmitted.  For Aircraft B, a multiple CA occurred after Aircraft A rejected the takeoff 
and was close to stopping.  For Aircraft A and B, a multiple WA occurred after Aircraft A rejected the 
takeoff and was almost at a complete stop. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 16), CAs were issued on approximately 4% of the 
runs for Aircraft A and on approximately 6% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  WAs were 
generated on approximately 37% or 53% of the runs for Aircraft A, depending on the equipage level, and 
on approximately 60% of the runs for all equipage levels for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.132) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between equipage 
levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft 
B, there was a significant difference (p = 0.011) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between 
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Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  There was also a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and 
Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
The rate of alert toggling for CAs was low (less than 1%) for both aircraft for all equipage levels.  Alert 
toggling occurred more frequently for WAs for both aircraft (Table 16).  For Aircraft A, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated between 
Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Aircraft B equipped and in the number of runs 
in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and 
Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped 
vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 16.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617    975,    4.3   22,    0.1 11,931,    52.8 1,272,    5.6 
Aircraft A 22,617    877,    3.9   32,    0.1 11,907,    52.6        716,    3.2 
Aircraft B 22,617    916,    4.0   23,    0.1   8,312,    36.8 1,701,    7.5 
Both 22,617    935,    4.1   64,    0.3   8,327,    36.8    992,    4.4 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 1,386,    6.1   31,    0.1 13,941,    61.6 1,686,    7.5 
Aircraft A 22,617 1,273,    5.6 120,    0.5 13,523,    59.8 1,163,    5.1 
Aircraft B 22,617 1,273,    5.6   38,    0.2 13,973,    61.8 1,909,    8.4 
Both 22,617 1,228,    5.4 128,    0.6 13,481,    59.6 1,188,    5.2 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 17).  CAs were issued on 0.5% or less of the runs for Aircraft A and on less than 2% of the runs for 
Aircraft B depending on the equipage level.  WAs were generated on approximately 30% or 50% of the 
runs for Aircraft A depending on the equipage level and on approximately 60% of the runs for Aircraft B 
for all equipage levels.  The rate of multiple alerts was very low for both aircraft and only occurred when 
either Aircraft A or Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped 
vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped, in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped, and in the number of 
runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft 
A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in 
which CAs (p = 0.006), multiple CAs (p < 0.001), and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  There was also a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
The SURF IA SPR [RTCA, 2010] specifies that IAs must be inhibited above 80 kts.  As currently 
implemented, the ATCAM algorithm calculates alerts throughout the departure when the aircraft ground 
speed is greater than 80 kts (the mean ground speed when a WA was generated on Aircraft A was 108 kts, 
standard deviation 47.5 kts for truth accuracy).  These data were included in the analyses even though these 
alerts would not be displayed in the cockpit as per the SPR.  For the test runs in which the departing aircraft 
was to take action (Aircraft A only and Both equipped), WAs were generated when the aircraft’s ground 
speed was less than 80 kts in 13% to 30% of the test runs; without this restriction, WAs were generated on 
40% to 64% of the test runs (Table 18).  More research is necessary to determine the collision avoidance 
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benefits of providing alerts to the flight crew after reaching 80 kts versus the risk of pilots making 
inappropriate responses at high speed. 
Table 17.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departure with 
Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 11,532,    51.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617 123,    0.5     0,    0.0 11,125,    49.2 42,    0.2 
Aircraft B 22,617     0,    0.0     0,    0.0   6,990,    30.9   0,    0.0 
Both 22,617   79,    0.4     0,    0.0   6,819,    30.1 24,    0.1 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 315,    1.4     0,    0.0 13,983,    61.8   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617 390,    1.7   10,    0.0 13,598,    60.1 30,    0.1 
Aircraft B 22,617 309,    1.4     0,    0.0 13,236,    58.5   0,    0.0 
Both 22,617 352,    1.6   29,    0.1 13,129,    58.0 14,    0.1 
 
Table 18.  SURF IA WA Alert Data for Departure Aircraft. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WAs when < 80 kts 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 15,078 9,594,    63.6 4,509,    29.9 
9 12,924 5,797,    44.9 2,105,    16.3 
10 8,616 3,553,    41.2 1,191,    13.8 
11 6,462 2,616,    40.5    863,    13.4 
Truth 2,154    871,    40.4    288,    13.4 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries varied greatly based on the position accuracy level transmitted, as shown in Table 19.  
The number of times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft 
were within the boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 19).  For the departing 
Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs the aircraft entered the 
missed boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For the taxiing Aircraft B, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies and the number of runs in which 
the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The departing aircraft entered the missed boundary along its entire departure path.  Since the aircraft 
tracked the runway centerline on departure and after liftoff, it was not possible for it to enter the nuisance 
boundary. 
The taxiing aircraft entered the missed boundary at least once for a high percentage of the test runs for 
NACp 8 to 11.  This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  The aircraft was counted as 
entering the missed boundary when the true position of any part of the aircraft was determined to be between 
the runway shoulder edges, but the detected nose position when entering or tail position when exiting was 
outside of the runway shoulder edges.  As such, there was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside 
or outside the missed boundary so a measurable difference between the true and detected position could 
cause a missed boundary to be counted. 
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Table 19.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Departure with Taxi Crossing 
Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 22,639,  75.1 4.0,    2.9 8.3,    8.6 23.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9       41,    0.2 1.8,    1.3 1.7,    2.0 4.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10         0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11         0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth         0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 10,230,  33.9 1.7,    1.0 3.8,    3.1 10.5 5,286,   17.5 2.5,    2.1 4.4,    6.0 12.6 
9   6,094,  23.6 1.2,    0.5 1.5,    1.9 4.2        7,     0.0 1.1,    0.4 0.6,    0.7 1.8 
10   3,343,  19.4 1.1,    0.4 0.7,    1.5 1.9        0,     0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
11   1,504,  11.6 1.1,    0.4 0.4,    1.5 1.1        0,     0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth         0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0        0,     0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Missed alerts occurred for most position accuracy levels for both aircraft, as shown in Table 20.  
Nuisance alerts did not occur for Aircraft A and only occurred when transmitting NACp 8 data for Aircraft 
B.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed 
CAs and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft 
B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies and in the number of runs in 
which missed WAs, nuisance CAs, and nuisance WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies. 
Both aircraft experienced missed WAs when transmitting truth position data.  This was due to the 
transmission delay of the ADS-B model as described in Section 5.1.2.  For Aircraft A, four of the missed 
WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was 284 ft from the threshold and 40 kts and four should have 
occurred when the aircraft was 623 ft from the threshold and 60 kts.  For Aircraft B, the 11 missed WAs 
should have occurred when the aircraft was 280 ft from the runway threshold and 291 ft to 387 ft from the 
runway centerline. 
Table 20.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 30,156   51,    0.2 2,444,      8.1     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
9 25,848   11,    0.0    661,      2.6     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
10 17,232     5,    0.0    185,      1.1     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
11 12,924     0,    0.0      67,      0.5     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308     0,    0.0        8,      0.2     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 30,156 140,    0.5 3,245,    10.8 167,    0.6 892,    3.0 
9 25,848   82,    0.3    504,      1.9     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
10 17,232   32,    0.2    114,      0.7     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
11 12,924   16,    0.1      49,      0.4     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308     0,    0.0      11,      0.3     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
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When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 21), for Aircraft A, missed CAs only occurred when 
Aircraft A or Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  Missed CAs occurred at similar rates across 
equipage levels for Aircraft B.  Missed WAs occurred on approximately 4% of the runs for all equipage 
levels.  The rate of nuisance alerts was also similar across equipage levels for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped and the number of runs 
in which missed WAs occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both 
aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed 
CAs (p = 0.041) and nuisance CAs (p = 0.919) occurred between equipage levels.  There was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed WAs and nuisance WAs occurred between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 21.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617   0,    0.0    768,    3.4   0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617 47,    0.2    779,    3.4   0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 22,617   0,    0.0    905,    4.0   0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Both 22,617 20,    0.1    913,    4.0   0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 68,    0.3    915,    4.0 42,    0.2 264,    1.2 
Aircraft A 22,617 86,    0.4 1,069,    4.7 43,    0.2 164,    0.7 
Aircraft B 22,617 54,    0.2    878,    3.9 38,    0.2 277,    1.2 
Both 22,617 62,    0.3 1,061,    4.7 44,    0.2 187,    0.8 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with various accuracy levels is shown in Table 22.  Only the test runs in which 
maneuvering was possible were evaluated for unnecessary maneuvers.  For Aircraft A, unnecessary 
maneuvering was only evaluated when Aircraft A or Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft 
B, unnecessary maneuvering was evaluated when Aircraft B or Both aircraft were equipped.  There were 
no unnecessary maneuvers for the departing aircraft (Aircraft A).  As the accuracy decreased, the frequency 
of occurrences of unnecessary maneuvers increased for the taxiing aircraft (Aircraft B).  With NACp 8, 
5.4% of the maneuvers were unnecessary.  With NACp 11, there was only 1 occurrence of an unnecessary 
maneuver.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
unnecessary maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 22.  Unnecessary Maneuvers Using ATCAM During Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 15,078 0,      0.0 808,      5.4 
9 12,924 0,      0.0 333,      2.6 
10 8,616 0,      0.0   35,      0.4 
11 6,462 0,      0.0     1,      0.0 
Truth 2,154 0,      0.0     0,      0.0 
 
When evaluating by CD&R equipage level, during 614 (2.7%) test runs Aircraft B maneuvered 
unnecessarily when only Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R.  When Both aircraft were equipped, 
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unnecessary maneuvers occurred on 563 (2.5%) of the test runs.  There was no significant difference (p = 
0.140) in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels. 
Collision avoidance –Approximately 31% of the runs resulted in a near collision and approximately 
15% resulted in collisions in the absence of CD&R, as shown in Table 23.  Collision avoidance was affected 
by the CD&R system equipage level.  The most collisions were avoided when Both aircraft were equipped 
with CD&R.  In some instances, CD&R was more effective depending on which aircraft was equipped.  
For this scenario, more collisions were avoided when the crossing Aircraft B was equipped.  However, 
when only the departing Aircraft A was equipped, collision avoidance was less effective, but better than 
when neither aircraft were equipped.  When neither aircraft were equipped, there was no significant 
difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between position 
accuracy levels.  When Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.179) in the 
number of runs in which near collisions occurred between position accuracy levels.  There was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 
10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Aircraft B was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.643) 
in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred between position accuracy levels.  There was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. 
NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 23.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs 
per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 7,539 2,349, 31.2 1,088, 14.4 1,739, 23.1 771, 10.2 1,908, 25.3 547, 7.3 1,447, 19.2 431, 5.7
9 6,462 2,013, 31.1    931, 14.4 1,391, 21.5 524,   8.1 1,564, 24.2   98, 1.5    939, 14.5   43, 0.7
10 4,308 1,341, 31.1    622, 14.4    936, 21.7 344,   8.0 1,074, 24.9     8, 0.2    639, 14.8     5, 0.1
11 3,231 1,007, 31.2    467, 14.4    698, 21.6 257,   8.0    813, 25.2     1, 0.0    481, 14.9     3, 0.1
Truth 1,077    335, 31.1    156, 14.5    233, 21.6   85,   7.9    271, 25.2     0, 0.0    163, 15.1     1, 0.1
 
A more detailed investigation was conducted for the collisions that occurred when transmitting truth 
position data.  The initial location of Aircraft A and Aircraft B for each run that resulted in a collision when 
neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R and when only Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R are indicated 
in Figures 26 and 27.  For example, in Figure 26, a collision resulted when Aircraft A was at the runway 
threshold, initiating departure, when Aircraft B began to taxi toward the runway from a starting position 
1,000 ft back from the runway centerline and 6,800 ft from the runway threshold.  There were no collisions 
when transmitting accurate position data and only Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R.  There was one 
collision, however, when Both aircraft were equipped.  This collision occurred when Aircraft A was at the 
threshold and Aircraft B was located 300 ft back from the runway centerline and 60 ft from the runway 
threshold at the start of the run.  For this run, both aircraft received WAs, however, not soon enough for 
Aircraft B to stop before reaching the runway.  As defined previously, a collision was counted if the aircraft 
CGs were < 150 ft apart laterally and vertical separation was < 100 ft.  By the time Aircraft A was 8,000 ft 
from the runway threshold, it had lifted off and was over 260 ft AGL, well above the defined collision 
vertical separation bound.  Therefore, no collisions occurred when Aircraft B was located 8,000 ft or 9,000 
ft from the runway threshold.  If a WA was issued onboard the departing aircraft, the departure would be 
aborted provided the ground speed was below the takeoff decision speed of 131 kts, otherwise the departure 
would continue.  For the 85 collisions that occurred when only the departing aircraft (Aircraft A) was 
equipped with CD&R (Figure 27), WAs were issued on all of these runs.  On 46 of the runs, the WA was 
issued when the aircraft’s ground speed was 135 kts or higher, therefore, the departure was not aborted, 
resulting in collision.  The departure was aborted on 39 of the runs.  The departing aircraft came to a stop 
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on five of the runs but was within the 150 ft lateral criteria of a collision.  On the other 34 runs, there was 
not enough time for the aircraft to stop before the collision. 
 
Figure 26.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Neither Aircraft Maneuvers For Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 27.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft A Maneuvers For Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
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Unwanted alert – As defined above, an alert was considered unwanted if the true position of Aircraft 
B was behind the hold line but the detected position indicated that the aircraft was over the hold line, causing 
an alert.  The frequency of unwanted alerts increased as the position accuracy decreased, particularly when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, as shown in Table 24.  Also, a larger buffer between the hold line 
and alerting zone is required as the position accuracy decreases in order to reduce the number of unwanted 
alerts.  For the departure with taxi crossing scenario, 99% of unwanted alerts could have been avoided by 
placing the alert zone 328 ft past the hold line for NACp 8 accuracy, 118 ft past the hold line for NACp 9 
accuracy, and 48 ft past the hold line for NACp 10 accuracy.  The maximum standard for separation between 
the hold line and runway centerline is 280 ft [FAA, 2009b] to accommodate the largest aircraft.  A 328 ft 
alerting zone buffer is not practical for even the largest airports. 
Table 24.  Unwanted Alert Data Using ATCAM for Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
 
NACp 
 
 
Total # 
Runs 
Unwanted CA Unwanted WA 
 
 
# Runs, % Runs 
Max Distance Nose 
Over Hold Line (ft) 
(mean, SD) 
 
 
# Runs, % Runs 
Max Distance Nose 
Over Hold Line (ft) 
(mean, SD) 
8 30,156 869,    2.9 79.5,   66.6 7,675,    25.5 124.5,   67.9 
9 25,848   44,    0.2 29.0,   18.3 2,174,      8.4   52.1,   22.0 
10 17,232     0,    0.0   0.0,     0.0      62,      0.4   22.9,     8.2 
11 12,924     0,    0.0   0.0,     0.0        0,      0.0     0.0,     0.0 
Truth 4,308     0,    0.0   0.0,     0.0        0,      0.0     0.0,     0.0 
5.1.4 Runway Scenario – Arrival with Departure from Same Runway 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B (departure aircraft) was 
evaluated at 9 levels, for a total of 756 test runs.  
Algorithm performance –For the approach aircraft (Aircraft A), CAs were issued on approximately 
55% of the runs almost independent of the position accuracy levels (Table 25).  For the departure aircraft 
(Aircraft B), CAs were generated on 78% to 84% of the runs, depending on the position accuracy level.  
WAs were generated on 44% to approximately 53% of the runs for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.984) and WAs (p = 0.590) were 
generated between position accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the 
number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.481) and WAs (p = 0.375) were generated between position accuracy 
levels. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, CAs were issued on 
approach when the aircraft was approximately 8,000 ft to 7,700 ft prior to the runway threshold and 454 ft 
to 439 ft AGL.  WAs were issued when the aircraft was approximately 5,850 ft prior to the threshold and 
343 ft AGL.  For the departing aircraft, on 24 runs the CA occurred while the aircraft was still in position 
and holding; on four of the runs the CA occurred when the aircraft was 63 ft from the runway threshold and 
19 kt.  All of the WAs occurred while the aircraft was in position and holding. 
As the position accuracy was reduced, alert toggling occurred more frequently, particularly when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 
9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts when transmitting less accurate position data (NACp 8 and 
9).  In addition to position accuracy, the toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Sometimes 
multiple alerts occurred after Aircraft A conducted a go-around maneuver and after Aircraft B began its 
takeoff roll or aborted the takeoff.  For both aircraft when truth position data was transmitted, WA toggling 
occurred after Aircraft A had conducted a go-around and then Aircraft B began its takeoff roll. 
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Table 25.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Departure 
from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 252 134,    53.2 30,    11.9 131,    52.0 71,    28.2 
9 216 120,    55.6   4,      1.8 105,    48.6 12,    5.6 
10 144   80,    55.6   0,      0.0   65,    45.1   8,    5.6 
11 108   60,    55.6   0,      0.0   48,    44.4   6,    5.6 
Truth 36   20,    55.6   0,      0.0   16,    44.4   2,    5.6 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 252 212,    84.1 121,    48.0 135,    53.6 108,    42.9 
9 216 174,    80.6   12,      5.6 108,    50.0   13,      6.0 
10 144 112,    77.8     0,      0.0   65,    45.1     8,      5.6 
11 108   84,    77.8     0,      0.0   48,    44.4     6,      5.6 
Truth 36   28,    77.8     0,      0.0   16,    44.4     2,      5.6 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 26), for both aircraft, CAs were issued on a similar 
number of runs almost independent of the equipage level and WAs were generated on approximately 49% 
of the runs.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 
0.991) and WAs (p = 0.894) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.992) and WAs (p = 0.998) were generated 
between equipage levels. 
WA toggling occurred more frequently when Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R (Table 26).  There 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs occurred between equipage 
levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.893) and Aircraft B (p = 0.860).  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which multiple WAs occurred between Aircraft A equipped vs. Neither aircraft, 
Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 26.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Departure 
from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 103,    54.5     8,      4.2 91,    48.1 15,      7.9 
Aircraft A 189 102,    54.0   10,      5.3 87,    46.0 51,    27.0 
Aircraft B 189 104,    55.0     7,      3.7 94,    49.7 16,      8.5 
Both 189 105,    55.6     9,      4.8 93,    49.2 17,      9.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 152,    80.4   31,    16.4 93,    49.2   28,    14.8 
Aircraft A 189 152,    80.4   31,    16.4 92,    48.7   54,    28.6 
Aircraft B 189 154,    81.5   35,    18.5 94,    49.7   29,    15.3 
Both 189 152,    80.4   36,    19.1 93,    49.2   26,    13.8 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 27).  The frequency of alert generation was similar to that which occurred across all position 
accuracy levels (Table 26).  In contrast, however, no multiple CAs occurred while transmitting truth 
position data.  Multiple WAs mostly occurred when only Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R.  For both 
aircraft, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 1.0) and WAs (p = 
0.632) were generated between the equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
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number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Aircraft A equipped vs. Neither aircraft, 
Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 27.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with 
Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 105,    55.6     0,    0.0 84,    44.4   1,      0.5 
Aircraft A 189 105,    55.6     0,    0.0 84,    44.4 40,    21.2 
Aircraft B 189 105,    55.6     0,    0.0 93,    49.2   0,      0.0 
Both 189 105,    55.6     0,    0.0 93,    49.2   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 84,    44.4     1,      0.5 
Aircraft A 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 84,    44.4   33,    17.5 
Aircraft B 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 93,    49.2     0,      0.0 
Both 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 93,    49.2     0,      0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance boundary count – The aircraft entered the defined missed boundary mainly when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 position accuracy, as shown in Table 28.  Only the departing Aircraft B 
entered the nuisance boundary.  The number of times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage 
of run length) that the aircraft were within the boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data 
(Table 28).  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs that the aircraft entered 
the missed boundary for both Aircraft A and Aircraft B between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.027) in the number of runs that the aircraft entered 
the nuisance boundary for Aircraft B. 
For the approach Aircraft A, the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the 
aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while 
on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 1.2% of the test runs when transmitting data with 
NACp 8 accuracy.  Since Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline on approach and centerline after 
landing, the nuisance boundary was not entered. 
The departing Aircraft B entered the missed boundary at least once for 97% of the test runs when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy. This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  
The aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the aircraft’s true position was within one 
runway width of the runway centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway width from 
the centerline.  As such, there was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed 
boundary so a measurable difference between the true and detected position could cause a missed boundary 
to be counted. 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance alerts was low for both aircraft, and mainly 
occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 position accuracy, as shown in Table 29.  There was a 
significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 
10, 11, and truth accuracies for Aircraft A (p = 0.001) and Aircraft B (p < 0.001).  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred for Aircraft A (p = 0.125), but there was a 
significant difference for Aircraft B (p = 0.002) between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  
There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which nuisance CAs (p = 0.333) and nuisance 
WAs (p = 0.111) occurred for Aircraft B. 
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Table 28.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival with Departure from 
Same Runway Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 78,    30.9 3.6,    2.6 5.4,    4.9 5.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0.0 
9   0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0.0 
10   0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0.0 
11   0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0.0 
Truth   0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0, 0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 245,    97.2 8.8,    5.8 18.2,    14.3 25.5 4,    1.6 3.0,    2.7 5.4,    2.6 5.0 
9     2,      0.9 5.5,    3.5   2.6,      2.5 2.4 4,    1.8 1.0,    0.0 1.6,    0.9 1.4 
10     0,      0.0   0,    0.0      0,     0.0 0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0   0,    0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0   0,    0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Table 29.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 252   6,    2.4 5,    2.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 216   0,    0.0 2,    0.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 144   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 108   0,    0.0 1,    0.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 36   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 252 10,    4.0 7,    2.8 1,    0.4 2,    0.8 
9 216   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 144   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 108   0,    0.0 1,    0.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 36   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
For Aircraft A, all of the missed CAs should have occurred when the aircraft was on approach and 
approximately 1.3 NM prior to the runway threshold.  All of the missed WAs should have occurred after 
the aircraft conducted a missed approach and the departing aircraft had begun its takeoff roll, except for 
one run.  When the aircraft was transmitting data with NACp 11 position accuracy, the missed WA would 
have happened after a collision occurred, but the aircraft was to continue the departure since this was the 
condition when neither aircraft were to take action.  For Aircraft B, two of the missed CAs should have 
occurred after the aircraft had begun its takeoff roll.  The remaining missed CAs should have occurred 
while the aircraft was still in position and holding.  Six of the missed WAs should have occurred while in 
position and holding, one should have occurred after Aircraft A had conducted a missed approach and 
Aircraft B had begun its departure roll, and the NACp 11 occurrence was on the same run as describe above 
for Aircraft A.  All of the nuisance alerts occurred as the aircraft was exiting the runway, after rejecting the 
departure. 
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When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 30), missed CAs occurred when Neither aircraft, 
Aircraft A, and Aircraft B were equipped.  For Aircraft A, missed WAs occurred when Neither aircraft and 
Aircraft A were equipped.  For Aircraft B, missed WAs occurred for all CD&R equipage levels.  Nuisance 
alerts only occurred for Aircraft B, when Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R.  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p 
= 0.217) and Aircraft B (p = 0.074).  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft A equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft 
B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which missed WAs (p = 0.420), nuisance CAs (p = 0.250), and nuisance WAs (p = 0.062) occurred between 
the equipage levels. 
Table 30.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 2,    1.1 1,    0.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 189 3,    1.6 7,    3.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 189 1,    0.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 189 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 3,    1.6 3,    1.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 189 3,    1.6 1,    0.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 189 4,    2.1 2,    1.1 1,    0.5 2,    1.1 
Both 189 0,    0.0 2,    1.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered 
unnecessarily when transmitting data with various levels of position accuracy is shown in Table 31.  As the 
accuracy decreased, the frequency of occurrences of unnecessary maneuvers increased.  With NACp 8, 
approximately 2% of the maneuvers were unnecessary for Aircraft A and 10% for Aircraft B.  There were 
no unnecessary maneuvers with NACp 11 and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference in the 
number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred for Aircraft A (p = 0.291), but there was a 
significant difference between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies for Aircraft B (p = 0.003). 
Table 31.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During 
Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 126 2,    1.6 12,    9.5 
9 108 1,    0.9   5,    4.6 
10 72 0,    0.0   1,    1.4 
11 54 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 18 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 32.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number 
of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred for Aircraft A and Aircraft B between equipage levels. 
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Table 32.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During Arrival 
with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 189 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 189 2,    1.1 N/A 
Aircraft B 189 N/A   9,    4.8 
Both 189 1,    0.5   9,    4.8 
 
Collision avoidance – The rate of near collisions and collisions was highest (44% to 52% over all 
position accuracy levels) when only the departing Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R.  The rate was also 
high (33% for all position accuracy levels) when Neither aircraft was equipped (Table 33).  Collision 
avoidance was very effective when Aircraft A and Both aircraft were equipped.  For all CD&R equipage 
levels, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions 
occurred between the position accuracy levels: 
• Neither aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 1.0), 
• Aircraft A equipped: near collisions (p = 0.036) and collisions (p = 0.333), 
• Aircraft B equipped: near collisions (p = 0.924) and collisions (p = 0.954), and 
• Both aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 0.036) and collisions (p = 0.110). 
Table 33.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs 
per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 63 21,  33.3 21,  33.3 3,  4.8 1,  1.6 33,  52.4 32,  50.8 3,  4.8 2,  3.2 
9 54 18,  33.3 18,  33.3 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 25,  46.3 24,  44.4 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
10 36 12,  33.3 12,  33.3 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 16,  44.4 16,  44.4 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
11 27   9,  33.3   9,  33.3 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 12,  44.4 12,  44.4 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 9   3,  33.3   3,  33.3 0,  0.0 0,  0.0   4,  44.4   4,  44.4 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
 
For the 154 runs in which a collision occurred, the approach aircraft was either 1.5 NM (3.2% of 
collision runs), 1.0 NM (14.3%), or 0.5 NM (27.3%) prior to the runway threshold, at the threshold (27.3%), 
or at the glide-path aim-point (1,000 ft past threshold) (27.9%) when the other aircraft began its departure.  
Many of the collisions occurred when the approach aircraft was landing, before the departure aircraft started 
its takeoff.  Other times the departure aircraft had begun its roll but the approach aircraft landed and 
overtook the departing aircraft.  When the departing aircraft was equipped with CD&R, the collision was 
sometimes caused by the aircraft aborting the departure, as was the case for the two collisions when Both 
aircraft were equipped.  In practice, a pilot would most likely continue the departure under these conditions. 
For the condition when truth position data was used and neither aircraft maneuvered, the scenario was 
designed such that a collision occurred when Aircraft A (arrival aircraft) was located 0.5 NM prior to the 
runway threshold, crossing the threshold, and 1,000 ft past the threshold when Aircraft B began its departure 
roll.  For one collision, Aircraft A had landed and Aircraft B had begun its departure roll.  For the other two 
collisions, Aircraft B was still holding in position. 
For the one collision when Aircraft A was equipped, the aircraft received a WA but too late to take 
action before the collision.  For the 88 collisions that occurred when Aircraft B was equipped, the aircraft 
received a WA but was in position and holding on 82 (93.2%) of these runs and did not take any action.  
On six (6.8%) of the runs, the departing aircraft aborted its departure but since the arrival aircraft continued 
its landing, collisions occurred.  When Both aircraft were equipped, on one run both aircraft maneuvered 
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and the collision occurred as the approach aircraft began to climb out.  On the other collision run, the 
departure aircraft aborted but the approach aircraft continued its landing and the aircraft collided. 
5.1.5 Runway Scenario – Departures from Intersecting Runways  
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on either Aircraft A or B was evaluated at 
16 levels, for a total of 1,344 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, CAs were generated on less than 2% of the runs when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy only (Table 34).  CAs are generally inhibited during departure 
since the workload is high and the flight crew does not have time for assessment.  WAs were generated on 
approximately 36% to 39% of the runs when traffic was transmitting less accurate NACp 8 data, but were 
issued on approximately 60% of the runs when transmitting data with NACp 9 accuracy and higher.  For 
both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs 
were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth position accuracies. 
Table 34.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
8 448 8,    1.8 0,    0.0 178,    39.7 43,    9.6 
9 384 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 230,    59.9 24,    6.2 
10 256 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 159,    62.1   0,    0.0 
11 192 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 120,    62.5   0,    0.0 
Truth 64 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   40,    62.5   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R)) 
8 448 7,    1.6 0,    0.0 160,    35.7 37,    8.3 
9 384 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 226,    58.9 18,    4.7 
10 256 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 159,    62.1   0,    0.0 
11 192 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 120,    62.5   0,    0.0 
Truth 64 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   40,    62.5   0,    0.0 
 
Alert toggling did not occur for CAs for either aircraft.  For WAs, alert toggling only occurred when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which multiple WAs occurred between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies for Aircraft A and Aircraft B. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts.  In addition to position accuracy, the toggling was also a 
result of aircraft maneuvering.  Most multiple WAs occurred after both aircraft had initiated their takeoffs.  
Sometimes multiple alerts occurred after either aircraft aborted the takeoff. 
The minimum and maximum distance from the runway threshold and ground speed when a WA was 
issued when transmitting truth position data is presented in Table 35.  For Aircraft A, WAs were generated 
after the aircraft began its takeoff roll when the aircraft was approximately 10 ft to 436 ft from the runway 
threshold when Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R; however, the alert range was 10 ft to approximately 
5,355 ft from the runway threshold (5 ft AGL) when Aircraft B was not equipped.  For Aircraft B, WAs 
were generated when the aircraft was 4 ft to 280 ft from the runway threshold when Aircraft A was equipped 
with CD&R; however, the alert range was 4 ft to approximately 1,066 ft from the runway threshold when 
Aircraft A was not equipped. 
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Table 35.  Aircraft Location When WA Issued When Transmitting Truth Position Accuracy Using 
ATCAM for Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Aircraft A Aircraft B 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Distance 
from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kt) 
Distance 
from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS (kt) Distance 
from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kt) 
Distance 
from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kt) 
Neither 10 7 5358 140 4 7 1066 78 
Aircraft A 10 7 5353 172 4 7 280 40 
Aircraft B 10 7 436 50 4 7 1067 78 
Both 10 7 437 50 4 7 280 40 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 36), for both aircraft, CA generation was low 
regardless of the equipage level.  For Aircraft A, WAs were generated on approximately 68% of the runs 
when Neither aircraft or Aircraft A were equipped and on approximately 40% of the runs when Aircraft B 
or Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft B, WAs were generated on approximately 47% to 57% of the 
runs depending on the equipage level.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.288) in the 
number of runs in which CAs were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between Neither and Aircraft A equipped 
vs. Aircraft B and Both equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.376) in the 
number of runs in which CAs were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference 
(p = 0.021) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between Neither and Aircraft B equipped 
vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 36.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336 3,    0.9   0,    0.0 229,    68.2 37,    11.0 
Aircraft A 336 3,    0.9   0,    0.0 225,    67.0 14,      4.2 
Aircraft B 336 1,    0.3   0,    0.0 134,    39.9 11,      3.3 
Both 336 1,    0.3   0,    0.0 139,    41.4   5,      1.5 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336 3,    0.9   0,    0.0 193,    57.4   23,    6.8 
Aircraft A 336 1,    0.3   0,    0.0 158,    47.0   17,    5.1 
Aircraft B 336 2,    0.6   0,    0.0 187,    55.6     8,    2.4 
Both 336 1,    0.3   0,    0.0 167,    49.7     7,    2.1 
 
CA toggling did not occur for either aircraft.  WA toggling occurred more frequently when Neither 
aircraft was equipped with CD&R (Table 36).  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft 
A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p = 0.004) in 
the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither and Aircraft A equipped vs. 
Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 37).  CAs were not generated when transmitting accurate data.  The frequency of WA generation 
was higher than that which occurred across all position accuracy levels (Table 36); however, there were no 
multiple WAs when transmitting data with truth position accuracy.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
difference (p = 0.002) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and 
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Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between equipage levels. 
Table 37.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 273,    81.2     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 273,    81.2     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 244,    72.6     0,    0.0 
Both 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 242,    72.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Both 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The aircraft entered the defined missed boundary mainly when 
transmitting NACp 8 position data, as shown in Table 38.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies for both aircraft.  The nuisance boundary was never entered for this scenario because the 
aircraft tracked the runway centerline.   
The aircraft entered the missed boundary for a high percentage of the test runs when transmitting NACp 
8 data. This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  The aircraft was counted as entering 
the missed boundary when the aircraft’s true position was within one runway width of the runway 
centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway width from the centerline.  As such, there 
was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so a measurable 
difference between the true and detected position could cause a missed boundary to be counted. 
Table 38.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Departures from Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
8 339,    75.7 3.8,    2.4 6.9,    6.6 22.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
8 273,    60.9 2.9,    1.9 5.4,    5.8 17.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9     1,      0.3 1.0,    0.0 0.3,    0.0  0.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0  0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0  0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0  0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Missed CAs did not occur during any test runs (Table 39).  Missed WAs occurred for all position 
accuracy levels.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
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which missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  No nuisance alerts 
occurred for this scenario. 
When analyzing missed WAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for both aircraft, an 
alert should have been issued onboard the aircraft as the other aircraft aborted its departure.  For these 12 
runs, no alerts were issued.  The missed alerts were due to the transmission delay of the ADS-B model as 
described in Section 5.1.2. 
Table 39.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
8 448 0,    0.0 181,    40.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 384 0,    0.0   59,    15.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 256 0,    0.0   33,    12.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 192 0,    0.0   24,    12.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 64 0,    0.0     8,    12.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
8 448 0,    0.0 148,    33.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 384 0,    0.0   38,      9.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 256 0,    0.0   17,      6.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 192 0,    0.0   12,      6.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 64 0,    0.0     4,      6.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 40), for Aircraft A, the most missed WAs occurred 
when Aircraft B and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft B, the most missed WAs occurred when 
Aircraft A and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped vs. 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft A aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped 
vs. Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped. 
Table 40.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336 0,    0.0   44,    13.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336 0,    0.0   48,    14.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336 0,    0.0 110,    32.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 336 0,    0.0 103,    30.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336 0,    0.0   38,    11.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336 0,    0.0   73,    21.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336 0,    0.0   44,    13.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 336 0,    0.0   64,    19.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
Collision avoidance – The highest rate of near collisions and collisions occurred in the absence of 
CD&R, approximately 6% of the runs, as shown in Table 41.  The addition of CD&R eliminated near 
collisions and collisions when transmitting data with NACp 10, 11, and truth position accuracies and 
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reduced the occurrence when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies (less than 5% of the runs).  
When neither aircraft was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in 
which near collisions and collisions occurred between accuracy levels.  When Aircraft A was equipped, 
there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.086) and collisions 
(p = 0.044) occurred between accuracy levels.  When Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R, there was a 
significant difference (p = 0.004) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11 and truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there was 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.044) and collisions occurred 
(p = 0.036) between accuracy levels. 
Table 41.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 112 7,  6.2 7,  6.2 4,  3.6 4,  3.6 5,  4.5 5,  4.5 4,  3.6 3,  2.7 
9 96 6,  6.2 6,  6.2 2,  2.1 1,  1.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 1,  1.0 0,  0.0 
10 64 4,  6.2 4,  6.2 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
11 48 3,  6.2 3,  6.2 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 16 1,  6.2 1,  6.2 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
 
For the 34 runs in which a collision occurred, except one, Aircraft A’s (departing Runway 14L) ground 
speed was approximately 50 kts when Aircraft B began its departure from Runway 22R.  For the other run, 
Aircraft A’s ground speed was approximately 70 kts when Aircraft B began its departure.  Most of the 
collisions occurred when Aircraft A had just lifted off and Aircraft B was on departure roll at approximately 
125 kts. 
There were five collisions that occurred when Aircraft A was equipped, one where no WA was 
generated and the aircraft did not take action, one where the aircraft received a WA and took delayed action 
but did not have time to avoid the collision, and three where WAs were issued too late to take action before 
the collision.  Five collisions occurred when Aircraft B was equipped.  No action was taken on two runs 
because no WA was issued.  On the other three runs, WAs were issued too late for the aircraft to maneuver.  
Three collisions occurred when Both aircraft were equipped.  Aircraft A did not make any maneuvers 
because the WAs were issued too late.  For Aircraft B, the WA was issued too late on two runs to be 
effective.  On the other run, the WA was issued 24 seconds before the collision but no maneuvering was 
initiated. 
5.1.6 Runway Scenario – Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 13 levels, 
for a total of 1,092 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – CAs were generated on a higher percentage of runs when the aircraft were 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy (Aircraft A, approximately 7%; Aircraft B, approximately 14%) 
(Table 42).  WAs were generated on 23% to 30% of the runs for Aircraft A and on 54% of runs when 
transmitting NACp 8 data and 69% of runs for each of the other position accuracy levels for Aircraft B.  
For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.199) and 
WAs (p = 0.369) were generated between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 
10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
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Table 42.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival and Departure 
from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 364 27,      7.4 2,      0.6 108,      29.7 29,      8.0 
9 312 13,      4.2 1,      0.3   80,      25.6 19,      6.1 
10 208   8,      3.8 0,      0.0   49,      23.6   4,      1.9 
11 156   6,      3.8 0,      0.0   36,      23.1   3,      1.9 
Truth 52   2,      3.8 0,      0.0   12,      23.1   1,      1.9 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 364 52,    14.3 0,      0.0 198,      54.4 65,    17.9 
9 312   3,      1.0 0,      0.0 216,      69.2 25,      8.0 
10 208   0,      0.0 0,      0.0 144,      69.2   0,      0.0 
11 156   0,      0.0 0,      0.0 108,      69.2   0,      0.0 
Truth 52   0,      0.0 0,      0.0   36,      69.2   0,      0.0 
 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, only two CAs were issued 
onboard the approach aircraft when approximately 1,320 ft prior to the runway threshold and 106 ft AGL.  
WAs were issued when the aircraft was between approximately 190 ft prior to the runway threshold and 47 
ft AGL until approximately 4,090 ft past the runway threshold after landing with a ground speed of 71 kts.  
For the departing aircraft, WAs were issued when 4 ft from the runway threshold and 7 kts until 141 ft from 
the threshold and 29 kts. 
CA toggling did not occur for Aircraft B and occurred on 0.6% of the runs and less when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies for Aircraft A.  WA toggling occurred more frequently when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
difference (p = 0.291) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated but there was a 
significant difference (p = 0.004) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between 
NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. 
NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts when transmitting lower position accuracy (NACp 8 and 9).  
In addition to position accuracy, the toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Multiple alerts 
mainly occurred after Aircraft B began its takeoff roll.  Occasionally multiple alerts occurred after Aircraft 
A had landed and conducted accelerated braking and after Aircraft B aborted the takeoff.  For Aircraft A, 
WA toggling occurred on one run when truth position data was transmitted.  It was determined that this 
multiple alert was generated after Aircraft A had landed and was taxiing down the runway and was already 
past the intersecting runway.  Aircraft B was in its takeoff roll and was located in the intersection.  In this 
case, an alert should not have occurred onboard Aircraft A since it had passed and was taxiing away from 
the intersection. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 43), for Aircraft A, alert generation was higher when 
Neither aircraft or Aircraft A were equipped.  The rate of alert generation was more evenly distributed 
across equipage levels for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped 
vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number 
of runs in which CAs (p = 0.340) and WAs (p = 0.992) were generated between equipage levels. 
The CA toggling rate was low for Aircraft A and did not occur for Aircraft B.  WA toggling occurred 
more frequently when Neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R (Table 43).  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.249) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated but there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated 
between Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, 
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there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 43.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival and Departure 
from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 21,      7.7   2,      0.7 117,      42.9   37,    13.6 
Aircraft A 273 22,      8.1   1,      0.4 114,      41.8   10,      3.7 
Aircraft B 273   4,      1.5   0,      0.0   26,        9.5     5,      1.8 
Both 273   9,      3.3   0,      0.0   28,      10.3     4,      1.5 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273 18,      6.6   0,      0.0 176,      64.5   42,    15.4 
Aircraft A 273 16,      5.9   0,      0.0 174,      63.7   28,    10.3 
Aircraft B 273 11,      4.0   0,      0.0 177,      64.8   11,      4.0 
Both 273 10,      3.7   0,      0.0 175,      64.1     9,      3.3 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 44).  The CA rate for Aircraft A was similar to that which occurred when transmitting data of various 
position accuracy levels (Table 43).  CAs were not generated for the departing aircraft (Aircraft B) when 
transmitting accurate data.  The frequency of WA generation was higher than that which occurred when 
transmitting data of various position accuracy levels.  Multiple WAs only occurred for Aircraft A when 
transmitting data with truth position accuracy.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A 
equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped and in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were 
generated between Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For 
Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.997) in the number of runs in which WAs were 
generated between equipage levels. 
Table 44.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 21,    7.7   0,    0.0 126,    46.1 21,    7.7 
Aircraft A 273 21,    7.7   0,    0.0 126,    46.1   3,    1.1 
Aircraft B 273   4,    1.5   0,    0.0   93,    34.1   2,    0.7 
Both 273   4,    1.5   0,    0.0   91,    33.3   3,    1.1 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   0,    0.0 
Both 273   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The arrival Aircraft A entered the missed boundary only when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 position accuracy and did not enter the nuisance boundary during any 
of the runs (Table 45).  The departure Aircraft B entered the missed and nuisance boundary when 
transmitting data for all position accuracy levels except truth, with more occurrences as the position 
accuracy was reduced.  The number of times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run 
length) that the aircraft were within the boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 
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45).  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft 
entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, 
there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
(p < 0.001) between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies and entered the nuisance boundary 
(p = 0.009) between NACp 8 and 10 accuracies vs. NACp 9, 11, and truth accuracies. 
For the approach aircraft (Aircraft A), the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was 
after the aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed 
boundary while on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 1.9% of the test runs when 
transmitting NACp 8 data.  Since Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline on approach and centerline 
after landing, the nuisance boundary was not entered. 
The departing aircraft (Aircraft B) entered the missed boundary for a high percentage of the test runs 
when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  This was due to the criteria for entering the missed 
boundary.  The aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the aircraft’s true position was 
within one runway width of the runway centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway 
width from the centerline.  As such, there was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside 
the missed boundary so a measurable difference between the true and detected position could cause a missed 
boundary to be counted.  After the aircraft lifted off and was over 600 ft AGL, the aircraft started drifting 
from the runway centerline.  Since there was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the 
nuisance boundary, a measurable difference between the true and detected position near the boundary could 
cause a nuisance boundary to be counted. 
Table 45.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival and Departure from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 234,    64.3 4.4,    2.9 7.0,    6.7 6.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9     1,      0.3 1.0,    0.0 6.2,    0.0 5.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0     0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0     0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0     0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 305,    83.8 5.7,    4.0 11.5,    10.8 14.2 38,    10.4 1.3,    0.6 3.1,    2.5 6.1 
9   36,    11.5 1.0,    0.2   1.6,      1.1 3.0 21,      6.7 1.3,    0.5 1.8,    1.2 3.5 
10   14,      6.7 1.1,    0.3   0.8,      0.4 1.4 18,      8.7 1.1,    0.2 0.7,    0.4 1.4 
11    9,      5.8 1.0,    0.0   0.3,      0.1 0.7   5,      3.2 1.0,    0.0 0.3,    0.0 0.5 
Truth    0,      0.0   0,    0.0      0,      0.0 0.0   0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed CAs was low, as shown in Table 46.  The rate of missed 
WAs was approximately 15% for Aircraft A at all position accuracy levels and for Aircraft B when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Nuisance alerts did not occur during this scenario.  For Aircraft 
A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.963) 
in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was 
a significant difference in (p < 0.001) the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 
vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
When analyzing missed WAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for Aircraft A, an 
alert should have been issued onboard the aircraft as the other aircraft aborted its departure.  The missed 
alerts were due to the transmission delay of the ADS-B model as described in Section 5.1.2. 
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Table 46.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp Arrival 
and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 364 11,    3.0 52,    14.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312   0,    0.0 41,    13.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,    0.0 31,    14.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0 24,    15.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0   8,    15.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 364   0,    0.0 54,    14.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 47), for Aircraft A, the missed CAs occurred fairly 
evenly across equipage levels; however, missed WAs occurred much more often when Aircraft B and Both 
aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft B, slightly more missed WAs occurred when Aircraft A and Both 
aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.544) in the number of 
runs in which missed CAs occurred but there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft and 
Aircraft A equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.942) in the number of runs 
in which missed WAs occurred between equipage levels. 
Table 47.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 4,    1.5   12,      4.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 2,    0.7   12,      4.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 3,    1.1   67,    24.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 2,    0.7   65,    23.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273 0,    0.0   13,      4.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 0,    0.0   15,      5.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 0,    0.0   12,      4.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 0,    0.0   14,      5.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
Collision avoidance – The rate of near collisions and collisions was relatively low for this scenario 
(Table 48).  Approximately 8% of the runs resulted in near collisions and collisions in the absence of 
CD&R.  When Both aircraft were equipped, the rate was cut in half when transmitting data with NACp 8 
accuracy and near collisions and collisions were eliminated when transmitting data with NACp 9 and higher 
accuracy.  When neither aircraft were equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.999) in the 
number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between accuracy levels.  When only 
Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.095) in the number of runs in which 
near collisions occurred but there was a significant difference (p = 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When only Aircraft B was 
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equipped, there was a significant difference (p = 0.016) in the number of runs in which near collisions 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies but there was no significant difference 
(p = 0.042) in the number of runs in which collisions occurred between equipage levels.  When Both aircraft 
were equipped, there was a significant difference (p = 0.011) in the number of runs in which near collisions 
and collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
All of the collisions occurred on runs in which the arrival Aircraft A landed and was approximately 
0.25 NM past the runway threshold when the departing Aircraft B began its takeoff roll.  Six collisions 
occurred when Aircraft A was equipped.  One of the collisions occurred because a WA was not issued and 
the aircraft did not take action to avoid the collision.  For the other five collisions, Aircraft A did receive a 
WA but too late to take action before the collision.  For the four collisions that occurred when Aircraft B 
was equipped and the traffic was transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, WAs were issued too late for 
maneuvering to be effective.  For the one collision that occurred when the traffic was transmitting data with 
NACp 9 accuracy, the aircraft received a WA 13 seconds before the collision but did not take action until 
1 second before the collision.  For the four collisions that occurred when Both aircraft were equipped, no 
action was taken by either aircraft because either no WAs were issued or any WAs that were issued were 
too late for maneuvering to occur before the collision. 
Table 48.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 91 7,  7.7 7,  7.7 6,  6.6 6,  6.6 5,  5.5 4,  4.4 4,  4.4 4,  4.4 
9 78 6,  7.7 6,  7.7 3,  3.8 0,  0.0 1,  1.3 1,  1.3 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
10 52 4,  7.7 4,  7.7 1,  1.9 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
11 39 3,  7.7 3,  7.7 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 13 1,  7.7 1,  7.7 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
5.1.7 Runway Scenario – Head-On Arrivals 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 14 levels, 
for a total of 1,176 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For Aircraft A, CAs were generated on 21% of the runs when transmitting 
data with NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies, while the percentage of CAs generated increased when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 (84%) and 9 (33%) accuracies (Table 49).  For Aircraft B, CAs were 
generated on 50% to 70% of the runs, with a higher percentage of CAs generated when transmitting less 
accurate position accuracy.  WAs were generated on approximately 86% of the runs for either aircraft, 
almost independent of the position accuracy levels.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.908) in the number of runs in which WAs were 
generated between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which CAs were generated between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.878) in the number of runs in which WAs were 
generated between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, CAs were issued onboard 
Aircraft A when approximately 2,680 ft prior to the runway threshold and 177 ft AGL, 1,325 ft prior to the 
threshold and 106 ft AGL, or 9,848 ft past the threshold after landing and 5 kts.  WAs were issued when 
approximately 870 ft prior to the runway threshold and 82 ft AGL until approximately 8,565 ft past the 
threshold after landing and 30 kts.  For Aircraft B, six of the CAs occurred after the aircraft had conducted 
a go-around maneuver.  The remainder of the CAs occurred when the aircraft was between 7,768 ft and 
2,680 ft prior to the runway threshold and 443 ft and 177 ft AGL.  WAs occurred when the aircraft was 2.3 
NM prior to the runway threshold and 764 ft AGL and 872 ft prior to the threshold and 82 ft AGL. 
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Table 49.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 392 328,    83.7 206,    52.5 345,    88.0 249,    63.5 
9 336 111,    33.0     8,      2.4 288,    85.7   29,      8.6 
10 224   48,    21.4     2,      0.9 192,    85.7     8,      3.6 
11 168   36,    21.4     0,      0.0 144,    85.7     5,      3.0 
Truth 56   12,    21.4     0,      0.0   48,    85.7     2,      3.6 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 392 273,    69.6   38,      9.7 354,    90.3 246,    62.8 
9 336 207,    61.6     5,      1.5 283,    84.2 117,    34.8 
10 224 121,    54.0     2,      0.9 192,    85.7   43,    19.2 
11 168   83,    49.4     0,      0.0 144,    85.7   24,    14.3 
Truth 56   28,    50.0     0,      0.0   48,    85.7     8,    14.3 
 
CA toggling was prevalent for both aircraft when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For Aircraft 
B, CA toggling occurred on 10% or less of the runs.  WA toggling occurred on 63% or less of the runs, 
with toggling occurring on 14% of the runs when transmitting data with NACp 11 and truth accuracies for 
Aircraft B.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts when transmitting data with lower position accuracy (NACp 
8 and 9).  In addition to position accuracy, the toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Multiple 
alerts occurred after Aircraft B conducted a go-around maneuver, when both aircraft conducted accelerated 
braking, and when they exited the runway.  WA toggling occurred for both aircraft when transmitting truth 
position data.  For Aircraft A, these multiple alerts occurred after aircraft landing while taxiing down the 
runway and when the aircraft had exited the runway after Aircraft B had conducted a go-around maneuver.  
For Aircraft B while transmitting accurate position data, all of the multiple alerts occurred after Aircraft A 
had exited the runway. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 50), for both aircraft, alert generation was similar 
across all equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which CAs (p = 0.936) and WAs (p = 0.934) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there 
was also no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.306) and WAs (p = 0.694) 
were generated between equipage levels. 
Table 50.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294 135,    45.9   54,    18.4 255,    86.7   72,    24.5 
Aircraft A 294 135,    45.9   66,    22.4 257,    87.4   68,    23.1 
Aircraft B 294 129,    43.9   51,    17.4 252,    85.7   88,    29.9 
Both 294 136,    46.3   45,    15.3 253,    86.0   65,    22.1 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 174,    59.2     6,      2.0 260,    88.4   93,    31.6 
Aircraft A 294 187,    63.6     9,      3.1 257,    87.4 140,    47.6 
Aircraft B 294 167,    56.8   19,      6.5 253,    86.0   95,    32.3 
Both 294 184,    62.6   11,      3.7 251,    85.4 110,    37.4 
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The CA toggling rate was between 15% and 22% for Aircraft A and between 2% and 7% for Aircraft 
B (Table 50).  The WA toggling rate was high for all equipage levels for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs (p = 0.151) and multiple WAs 
(p = 0.126) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p 
= 0.036) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated but there was a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither and Aircraft B 
equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position accuracy was 
transmitted (Table 51).  The CA rate was lower when transmitting accurate data, but the WA rate was 
similar to the rate of generation when transmitting data with various accuracy levels (Table 50).  The rate 
of multiple alerts was low when transmitting truth position data, except for the rate of multiple WAs 
onboard Aircraft B when Aircraft A and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 1.0), WAs (p = 1.0), and multiple CAs (p = 
0.250) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p = 0.016) in the 
number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft, 
Aircraft A, and Aircraft B equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of 
runs in which WAs (p = 1.0) and multiple CAs (p = 0.250) were generated between equipage levels.  There 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and multiple WAs were 
generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 51.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294     63,    21.4   0,    0.0 252,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Aircraft A 294     64,    21.8   0,    0.0 252,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B 294     63,    21.4   0,    0.0 252,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Both 294     63,    21.4   1,    0.3 252,    85.7   3,      1.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294   126,    42.9   0,    0.0 252,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Aircraft A 294   167,    56.8   0,    0.0 252,    85.7 78,    26.5 
Aircraft B 294   126,    42.9   0,    0.0 252,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Both 294   167,    56.8   1,    0.3 252,    85.7 60,    20.4 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries generally increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 52.  The 
number of times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were 
within the boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 52).  For both aircraft, there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between NACp 8 
and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B there was no significant difference 
(p = 1.0) in the number of runs the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between accuracy levels. 
The majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the aircraft had crossed the 
runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while on approach before 
crossing the runway threshold during 1.3% of the test runs for Aircraft A and 3.8% of the test runs for 
Aircraft B when transmitting NACp 8 data.  Since the aircraft tracked the extended centerline on approach 
and centerline after landing, the nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft exited the runway. 
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Table 52.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 382,    97.5 8.4,    5.1 15.9,    12.1 15.5 120,    30.6 2.5,    2.2 5.1,    7.7 5.2 
9   90,    26.8 1.2,    0.6   1.6,      1.3 1.6 102,    30.4 1.1,    0.4 1.3,    1.1 1.2 
10   68,    30.4 1.0,    0.0   0.6,      0.4 0.6   50,    22.3 1.0,    0.0 0.5,    0.3 0.5 
11   34,    20.2 1.0,    0.0   0.3,      0.1 0.2   22,    13.1 1.0,    0.0 0.2,    0.1 0.2 
Truth     0,      0.0    0,    0.0      0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 276,    70.4 3.6,    2.6 6.6,    6.4 5.8 7,    1.8 2.1,    1.2 4.4,    2.2 3.1 
9   11,      3.3 1.2,    0.4 1.6,    2.0 1.2 4,    1.2  1.0,    0.0 2.5,    2.6 1.7 
10     3,      1.3 1.0,    0.0 0.7,    0.3 0.5 3,    1.3 1.0,    0.0 0.7,    0.6 0.5 
11     1,      0.6 1.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.0 0.3 3,    1.8 1.0,    0.0 0.3,    0.1 0.2 
Truth     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance alerts was low and mainly occurred when 
transmitting NACp 8 data, as shown in Table 53.  For Aircraft B, there were no nuisance CAs or WAs.  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.111) and 
missed WAs (p = 0.037) occurred between accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which nuisance CAs and nuisance WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 
10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.051) in the number 
of runs in which missed CAs occurred but there was a significant difference (p = 0.003) in the number of 
runs in which missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies. 
For Aircraft A, the missed CAs should have occurred after the aircraft landed and exited the runway.  
The missed WAs should have occurred after the aircraft landed and was taxiing down the runway at 30 kts.  
For Aircraft B, all of the missed alerts should have occurred while on approach, prior to crossing the runway 
threshold.  An alert was considered a nuisance if it was generated at the same time the aircraft was 
determined to be within the nuisance boundary.  Therefore, nuisance alerts for Aircraft A only occurred 
after the aircraft landed and exited the runway. 
Table 53.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 392 2,    0.5   3,    0.8 20,    5.1 18,    4.6 
9 336 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   1,    0.3 
10 224 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 168 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 56 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 392 3,    0.8 10,    2.6   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 336 0,    0.0   9,    2.7   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 224 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 168 1,    0.6   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 56 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
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When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 54), in general, more missed alerts occurred when 
Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  Nuisance alerts occurred more often when only Aircraft A was 
equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs 
(p = 0.50), missed WAs (p = 0.156), and nuisance CAs (p = 0.30) occurred between equipage levels.  There 
was a significant difference (p = 0.006) in the number of runs in which nuisance WAs occurred between 
Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped.  For Aircraft B, there 
was a significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.004) occurred between Both 
aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Aircraft B equipped and in the number of runs in 
which missed WAs (p < 0.001) occurred between Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft B equipped. 
Table 54.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Head-
On Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294 0,    0.0   1,    0.3 3,    1.0   3,    1.0 
Aircraft A 294 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 8,    2.7 10,    3.4 
Aircraft B 294 1,    0.3   0,    0.0 3,    1.0   0,    0.0 
Both 294 1,    0.3   2,    0.7 6,    2.0   6,    2.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 294 0,    0.0   8,    2.7 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 294 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 294 4,    1.4 11,    3.7 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various accuracy levels is shown in Table 55.  Unnecessary maneuvers 
only occurred when transmitting NACp 8 data on less than 2% of the test runs.  There were no unnecessary 
maneuvers when transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between accuracy levels for 
Aircraft A (p = 0.037) and Aircraft B (p= 0.111). 
Table 55.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During Head-
On Arrivals Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28)
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 196 3,    1.5 2,    1.0 
9 168 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 112 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 84 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 28 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 56.  There were no significant differences in the number of runs 
in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p= 0.249) and Aircraft 
B (p = 0.499). 
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Table 56.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During Head-
On Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 294 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 294 3,    1.0 N/A 
Aircraft B 294 N/A   0,    0.0 
Both 294 0,    0.0   2,    0.7 
 
Collision avoidance – When neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R, 100% of the runs resulted in a 
near collision and approximately 79% resulted in collisions, as shown in Table 57.  The addition of CD&R 
eliminated collisions when transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth position accuracy levels and 
reduced the occurrence when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy (3% of the runs).  Collision 
avoidance was affected by the CD&R system equipage level.  In some instances, CD&R was more effective 
depending on which aircraft was equipped.  For this scenario, more collisions were avoided when Aircraft 
B was equipped.  When Aircraft A was equipped, collision avoidance was less effective, but better than 
when neither aircraft were equipped.  When neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (near collisions on all test runs) and 
collisions (p = 1.0) occurred between accuracy levels.  When Aircraft A was equipped, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Aircraft B was equipped, there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.675) in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred but there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. 
NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.663) and collisions (p = 0.036) occurred 
between accuracy levels. 
When truth position data was used and neither aircraft took action, 11 collisions occurred.  The scenario 
was designed such that when Aircraft B began its approach to Runway 28, 3.5 NM prior to the runway 
threshold, a collision occurred when Aircraft A (arrival to Runway 10) was located from 3.5 NM to the 
threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals, crossing the runway threshold, and 1,400 ft, 3,700 ft, and 5,500 ft past the 
threshold.  For nine of these collisions, both aircraft had landed and were decelerating or taxiing down the 
runway when the collision occurred.  For one collision, Aircraft A was taxiing down the runway and 
Aircraft B was just about to touchdown.  For one collision, Aircraft A was exiting the runway as Aircraft 
B was about to touchdown. 
Table 57.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 98 98,  100 77,  78.6 58,  59.2 34,  34.7 36,  36.7 16,  16.3 21,  21.4 3,  3.1 
9 84 84,  100 66,  78.6 26,  30.9   3,    3.6 23,  27.4   0,    0.0 12,  14.3 0,  0.0 
10 56 56,  100 44,  78.6 12,  21.4   0,    0.0 16,  28.6   0,    0.0   8,  14.3 0,  0.0 
11 42 42,  100 33,  78.6   9,  21.4   0,    0.0 12,  28.6   0,    0.0   6,  14.3 0,  0.0 
Truth 14 14,  100 11,  78.6   3,  21.4   0,    0.0   4,  28.6   0,    0.0   2,  14.3 0,  0.0 
 
For all runs resulting in collision, WAs were issued and occurred just prior to touchdown, during high 
speed rollout, or when the aircraft was taxiing down the runway.  When equipped with CD&R, 
maneuvering, which consisted of accelerated braking to exit the runway, was conducted on all but six runs.  
For the 37 collisions that occurred when Aircraft A was equipped, one occurred when both aircraft were 
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taxiing on the runway; four occurred when Aircraft A was taxiing on the runway and Aircraft B had just 
touched down; seven occurred when Aircraft A was taxiing on the runway and Aircraft B was just prior to 
touchdown; 11 occurred when Aircraft A was exiting the runway; nine occurred when Aircraft A had exited 
the runway; and five occurred when Aircraft A had exited the runway and stopped.  These last five collisions 
may not have occurred if the scenario was designed such that the aircraft taxied further from the runway 
before it came to a complete stop.  For the 16 collisions that occurred when Aircraft B was equipped, nine 
occurred when both aircraft were taxiing on the runway; five occurred when Aircraft B was exiting the 
runway; and two occurred when Aircraft B had exited the runway and stopped.  For the three collisions that 
occurred when Both aircraft were equipped, two occurred when Aircraft A was taxiing on the runway and 
Aircraft B was just about to touch down and one occurred when Aircraft A was exiting the runway. 
5.1.8 Runway Scenario – Arrivals to Intersecting Runways 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 13 levels, 
for a total of 1,092 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – The data (Table 58) shows that, for Aircraft A, CAs were generated on 23% 
to 43% of the runs and WAs were generated on 56% to 71% of the runs.  For Aircraft B, CAs were generated 
on approximately 38% of the runs and WAs were generated on approximately 32% of runs, almost 
independent of the position accuracy levels.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p 
= 0.946) and WAs (p = 0.707) were generated between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, CAs were issued onboard 
Aircraft A when 1.3 NM prior to the runway threshold and 454 ft AGL.  WAs were issued when Aircraft 
A was on approach from 5,937 ft to 5,767 ft prior to the runway threshold and 348 ft to 339 ft AGL and 
then again when crossing Aircraft B’s runway, from 2,060 ft to 5,245 ft past the threshold and 129 kts to 
40 kts.  For Aircraft B, CAs occurred when the aircraft was between approximately 7,967 ft to 7,757 ft prior 
to the runway threshold and 454 ft to 443 ft AGL.  WAs occurred when the aircraft was 5,942 ft prior to 
the runway threshold and 348 ft AGL and approximately 5,490 ft prior to the threshold and 324 ft AGL. 
Alert toggling occurred similarly for both aircraft, with toggling occurring mainly when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies, with a much higher percentage occurring when transmitting data with 
NACp 8 accuracy.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies. 
Table 58.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 155,    42.6  39,    10.7 203,    55.8 100,    27.5 
9 312   77,    24.7    2,      0.6 222,    71.2   18,      5.8 
10 208   48,    23.1    0,      0.0 146,    70.2     1,      0.5 
11 156   36,    23.1    0,      0.0 108,    69.2     0,      0.0 
Truth 52   12,    23.1    0,      0.0   36,    69.2     0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 135,    37.1 17,      4.7 132,    36.3   78,    21.4 
9 312 125,    40.1   3,      1.0 105,    33.6   16,      5.1 
10 208   80,    38.5   0,      0.0   66,    31.7     0,      0.0 
11 156   60,    38.5   0,      0.0   48,    30.8     0,      0.0 
Truth 52   20,    38.5   0,      0.0   16,    30.8     0,      0.0 
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The toggling included gaps between alerts when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  In 
addition to position accuracy, the toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Multiple alerts 
occurred after Aircraft A or Aircraft B conducted a go-around maneuver, when Aircraft A conducted 
accelerated braking, and when the aircraft stopped on the runway.  Sometimes a multiple alert occurred 
onboard Aircraft A after the aircraft was past the intersecting runway, which is not necessary since the 
aircraft is moving away from the intersection. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 59), for Aircraft A, alert generation was similar across 
all equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, more alerts were generated when Neither aircraft and only Aircraft B 
was equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which CAs (p = 0.951) and WAs (p = 0.919) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there 
was a significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.002) and WAs (p = 0.013) were 
generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
The CA toggling rate was similar between equipage levels for both aircraft (Table 59).  The WA 
toggling rate was high for all equipage levels for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
difference (p = 0.683) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated but there was a 
significant difference (p = 0.013) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between 
Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was 
no significant difference (p = 0.565) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated but there 
was a significant difference (p = 0.011) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated 
between Neither and Aircraft B equipped vs Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 59.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrivals to Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273   83,    30.4     9,    3.3 180,    65.9   44,    16.1 
Aircraft A 273   79,    28.9     8,    2.9 181,    66.3   26,      9.5 
Aircraft B 273   85,    31.1   11,    4.0 174,    63.7   27,      9.9 
Both 273   81,    29.7   13,    4.8 180,    65.9   22,      8.1 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273 120,    44.0     3,    1.1 104,    38.1   32,    11.7 
Aircraft A 273   92,    33.7     6,    2.2   78,    28.6   21,      7.7 
Aircraft B 273 121,    44.3     4,    1.5 105,    38.5   29,    10.6 
Both 273   87,    31.9     7,    2.6   80,    29.3   12,      4.4 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 60).  The CA rate was lower for Aircraft A when transmitting accurate data, but the WA rate was 
slightly higher.  For Aircraft B, the alerts rates were similar to the rate of generation when transmitting data 
with various accuracy levels (Table 59).  The multiple alerts occurred mainly when transmitting NACp 8 
data for Aircraft A.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in 
which CAs and WAs were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft equipped vs. 
Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference in the 
number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.003) and WAs (p = 0.014) were generated between Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 60.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273     63,    23.1   0,    0.0 189,    69.2 10,    3.7 
Aircraft A 273     63,    23.1   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273     63,    23.1   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   1,    0.4 
Both 273     63,    23.1   0,    0.0 189,    69.2   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273   126,    46.1   0,    0.0 105,    38.5   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273     96,    35.2   0,    0.0   79,    28.9   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   126,    46.1   0,    0.0 105,    38.5   0,    0.0 
Both 273     96,    35.2   0,    0.0   80,    29.3   0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 61.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the 
boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 61).  For Aircraft A, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
and nuisance boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed 
boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  The nuisance boundary was not 
entered with Aircraft B. 
The majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the aircraft had crossed the 
runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while on approach before 
crossing the runway threshold during 1.9% of the test runs for Aircraft A and 3.0% of the test runs for 
Aircraft B when transmitting NACp 8 data.  Since the aircraft tracked the extended centerline on approach 
and centerline after landing, the nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft exited the runway. 
Table 61.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrivals to Intersecting Runways 
Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 356,    97.8 7.8,    4.7 14.3,    10.8 13.3 135,    37.1 4.0,    3.1 6.7,    6.4 6.1 
9   84,    26.9 1.3,    0.6   1.4,      1.1 1.3   77,    24.7 1.2,    0.4 1.6,    1.1 1.4 
10   52,    25.0 1.0,    0.0   0.6,      0.4 0.6   37,    17.8 1.0,    0.0 0.6,    0.4 0.5 
11   28,    17.9 1.0,    0.0   0.3,      0.1 0.2   21,    13.5 1.0,    0.0 0.3,    0.1 0.2 
Truth     0,      0.0    0,    0.0      0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 276,    75.8 3.4,    2.2   5.3,      4.7 4.9     0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
9     0,      0.0   0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0   0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0   0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0   0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance alerts was low, in general, as shown in 
Table 62.  There were no missed CAs for Aircraft A and no nuisance alerts for either aircraft.  For Aircraft 
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A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p < 0.001) and missed WAs (p = 0.004) occurred between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
For Aircraft A, all of the missed WAs should have occurred after the aircraft landed.  For Aircraft B, 
all of the missed CAs and missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was on approach. 
Table 62.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Arrivals to Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 0,    0.0 52,    14.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312 0,    0.0   5,      1.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208 0,    0.0   1,      0.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 0,    0.0   2,      1.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 23,    6.3   5,      1.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312   2,    0.6   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 63), the rate of missed WAs was highest for Aircraft 
A, when only Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft B, the missed CA rate was highest when 
Both aircraft were equipped; while the missed WA rate was very low.  Nuisance alerts did not occur for 
either aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.283) in the number of runs in 
which missed WAs occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.334) and missed WAs (p = 0.604) occurred between 
equipage levels. 
Table 63.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Arrivals to Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273   0,    0.0   17,    6.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273   0,    0.0   11,    4.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   0,    0.0   20,    7.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273   0,    0.0   12,    4.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273   6,    2.2     1,    0.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273   4,    1.5     2,    0.7 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   5,    1.8     1,    0.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 273 10,    3.7    1,    0.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
Collision avoidance – There were no collisions for this scenario.  The rate of near collisions was low 
(Table 64) and were affected by the CD&R equipage level.  Interestingly, near collisions occurred when 
Both aircraft and only one aircraft (either A or B) were equipped but not when CD&R was absent.  When 
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Aircraft B was equipped, the near collisions occurred after Aircraft B initiated a go-around maneuver.  In 
all other instances, the near collision occurred after Aircraft A received a WA, maneuvered, and stopped 
on the runway.  When Aircraft A was equipped, there was a significant difference (p = 0.007) in the number 
of runs in which near collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When 
Aircraft B was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.036) in the number of runs in which 
near collisions occurred between accuracy levels.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there was a 
significant difference (p = 0.025) in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred between NACp 
9 vs. NACp 8, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 64.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrivals to Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 91 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 7,  7.7 0,  0.0 3,  3.3 0,  0.0 1,  1.1 0,  0.0 
9 78 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 2,  2.6 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 4,  5.1 0,  0.0 
10 52 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
11 39 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 13 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
5.1.9 Taxi Scenario – Taxi Following 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, Aircraft A taxi speed was evaluated at 7 levels, for a total of 
588 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, CAs were generated on 86% to 100% of the test runs and 
WAs were generated on 96% to 100% of the runs, with a lower percentage of alerts being generated when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy (Table 65).  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, 
and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs 
(p < 0.001) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies and the number of 
runs in which WAs (p = 0.016) were generated between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies. 
Table 65.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Taxi Following Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
8 196   173,      88.3 83,    42.4 188,       95.9 66,    33.7 
9 168   166,      98.8 58,    34.5 168,    100.0 37,    22.0 
10 112  112,    100.0 22,    19.6 112,    100.0   7,      6.3 
11 84    84,    100.0   2,      2.4   84,    100.0   0,      0.0 
Truth 28    28,    100.0   0,      0.0   28,    100.0   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
8 196 168,     85.7 89,   45.4 189,     96.4 74,   37.8 
9 168 166,     98.8 57,   33.9 165,     98.2 37,   22.0 
10 112 112,   100.0 25,   22.3 112,   100.0   6,     5.4 
11 84   84,   100.0   1,     1.2   84,   100.0   1,     1.2 
Truth 28   28,   100.0   0,     0.0   28,   100.0   0,     0.0 
 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, alerts were issued sooner, 
with more distance between the aircraft, the faster Aircraft A was taxiing.  This would give the flight crew 
more time to react when traveling at faster speeds.  CAs were issued onboard both aircraft when the aircraft 
were approximately 597 ft apart (Aircraft A 24 kts) until they were 385 ft apart (Aircraft A 12 kts) (Table 
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66).  WAs were issued onboard both aircraft when they were approximately 473 apart until they were 
approximately 322 ft apart.  Aircraft B was always taxiing at 10 kts. 
Table 66.  Distance Between Aircraft at Alert Generation for Taxi Following Scenario. 
Aircraft A 
(Taxi Behind) 
Ground Speed (kts) 
Distance Between Aircraft 
When CA Generated (ft) 
(mean, SD) 
Distance Between Aircraft 
When WA Generated (ft) 
(mean, SD) 
24 597.2,   0.0 472.5,   0.9 
22 562.9,   1.0 453.5,   1.9 
20 538.4,   0.9 430.8,   0.9 
18 495.2,   0.0 399.3,   0.9 
16 461.8,   1.5 374.7,   4.3 
14 422.9,   0.0 346.8,   0.0 
12 385.3,   1.0 321.8,   1.9 
 
As the position accuracy was reduced, alert toggling occurred more frequently, especially when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies (Table 65).  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts and was mainly the result of the effect of position accuracy.  
For this scenario, the aircraft did not stop taxiing in the event that criteria for a collision was met; the run 
continued until the aircraft reached their closest point of approach, which was after a defined collision (on 
those runs that resulted in collision).  Alerts and alert multiples were generated after the criteria for a 
collision was met, particularly when transmitting data with NACp 8 position accuracy; these alerts are 
included in Table 65. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 67), for both aircraft, CAs were issued on 
approximately 95% of the runs and WAs were issued on over 95% of the runs for all equipage levels.  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.928) and WAs (p 
= 0.026) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 
0.672) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated but there was a significant difference (p = 0.003) 
in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft, 
Aircraft A, and Aircraft B equipped. 
Table 67.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi Following Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
Neither 147  142,    96.6   53,    36.0 146,      99.3 68,    46.3 
Aircraft A 147  141,    95.9   43,    29.2 147,    100.0       12,      8.2 
Aircraft B 147  140,    95.2   41,    27.9 145,      98.6 25,    17.0 
Both 147  140,    95.2   28,    19.1 142,      96.6   5,      3.4 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
Neither 147 142,    96.6   53,    36.0 146,      99.3 69,    46.9 
Aircraft A 147 138,    93.9   45,    30.6 145,      98.6 22,    15.0 
Aircraft B 147 140,    95.2   38,    25.9 147,    100.0 18,    12.2 
Both 147 138,    93.9   36,    24.5 140,      95.2   9,      6.1 
 
The rate of alert toggling was high for CAs (greater than 19%) for all equipage levels.  WA toggling 
occurred more frequently when Neither aircraft were equipped with CD&R (Table 67).  For Aircraft A, 
there was a significant difference (p = 0.014) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated 
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between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  There was also 
a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between 
Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was 
no significant difference (p = 0.119) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated but there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated 
between Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped. 
Alert statistics were compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position accuracy was transmitted 
(Table 68).  Alerts were issued at a slightly lower rate than when transmitting data with various accuracy 
levels (Table 67).  No multiple alerts occurred when transmitting truth data.  For both aircraft, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 68.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Taxi Following 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
Neither 147 147,    100.0   0,    0.0 147,    100.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 147 129,      87.8   0,    0.0 110,      74.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 147 134,      91.2   0,    0.0 123,      83.7 0,    0.0 
Both 147 122,      83.0   0,    0.0 110,      74.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
Neither 147 147,    100.0   0,    0.0 147,    100.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 147 129,      87.8   0,    0.0 110,      74.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 147 134,      91.2   0,    0.0 123,      83.7 0,    0.0 
Both 147 122,      83.0   0,    0.0 110,      74.8 0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed 
boundary increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 69.  The rate in which the aircraft 
entered the nuisance boundary was relatively low for all position accuracy levels.  For both aircraft, there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between accuracy 
levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.136) and Aircraft B (p = 1.0). 
As previously discussed, the high rate of entering the missed boundary was due to the missed boundary 
definition.  There was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary; 
therefore, a very small difference between the true and detected position caused a missed boundary to be 
counted.  The aircraft entered the nuisance boundary only for a small percentage of the test runs.  Since the 
test run did not terminate when a collision occurred and the aircraft continued along their paths, all instances 
of entering the nuisance boundary were after a collision when the aircraft were exiting the taxiway. 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance alerts was low for this scenario, as shown 
in Table 70.  Missed alerts for both aircraft were highest when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  
For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p < 0.001) 
and missed WAs (p = 0.004) occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For 
Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference 
(p = 0.088) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between accuracy levels.  For both aircraft, 
there was no significant difference (p = 0.333) in the number of runs in which nuisance WAs occurred 
between accuracy levels.  No nuisance CAs occurred. 
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The rate of missed alerts was similar for both aircraft since the aircraft conducted identical operations, 
traveling along a taxiway.  The only nuisance alerts occurred on one test run after a collision when the 
aircraft were exiting the taxiway. 
Table 69.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Taxi Following Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
8 196,  100.0 23.9,    18.9 67.6,    54.0 57.6 4,    2.0 1.0,    0.0 3.9,    2.8 1.0 
9 112,    66.7   7.9,      8.4 13.8,    18.4 9.2 5,    3.0 1.2,    0.4 1.9,    0.7 0.5 
10     2,      1.8   1.0,      0.0   1.1,      0.9 0.3 2,    1.8 1.0,    0.0 0.8,    0.0 0.2 
11     2,      2.4   1.0,      0.0   0.3,      0.0 0.1 0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0      0,      0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
8 196, 100.0 23.1,    18.1 66.4,    57.4 54.9 3,    1.5 2.3,    2.3 4.9,    1.4 1.3 
9 115,   68.5   7.4,      6.0 13.3,    15.7 9.0 2,    1.2 1.0,    0.0 2.9,    0.2 0.7 
10     2,     1.8   1.0,      0.0   1.1,      1.2 0.3 2,    1.8 1.0,    0.0 1.9,    0.5 0.5 
11     1,     1.2   1.0,      0.0   0.5,      0.0 0.1 1,    1.2 1.0,    0.0 0.8,    0.0 0.2 
Truth     0,     0.0     0,      0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Table 70.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Taxi 
Following Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
8 196 16,    8.2 5,    2.6 0,    0.0 1,    0.5 
9 168   2,    1.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 112   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 84   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 28   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
8 196 14,    7.1 4,    2.0 0,    0.0 1,    0.5 
9 168   2,    1.2 2,    1.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 112   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 84   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 28   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 71) shows missed alerts occurred on 3.4% or less of 
the test runs, depending on the equipage level.  Only one nuisance WA occurred for each aircraft when 
Neither aircraft was equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which missed CAs (p = 0.811) and nuisance WAs (p = 0.250) occurred between equipage levels.  For 
Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.138) 
and nuisance WAs (p = 0.250) occurred between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the 
number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft 
A, and Aircraft B equipped for Aircraft A (p = 0.015) and Aircraft B (p = 0.004). 
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Table 71.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi 
Following Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
Neither 147 5,    3.4 1,    0.7 0,    0.0   1,    0.7 
Aircraft A 147 4,    2.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 147 5,    3.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 147 4,    2.7 4,    2.7 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
Neither 147 5,    3.4 1,    0.7 0,    0.0   1,    0.7 
Aircraft A 147 5,    3.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 147 5,    3.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 147 1,    0.7 5,    3.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various accuracy levels is shown in Table 72.  As the accuracy decreased, 
the frequency of occurrences of unnecessary maneuvers increased.  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 
vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 72.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During Taxi 
Following Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 98 50,    51.0 43,    43.9 
9 84 21,    25.0 18,    21.4 
10 56   4,      7.1   6,    10.7 
11 42   0,      0.0   1,      2.4 
Truth 14   0,      0.0   0,      0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 73.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 1.0) and Aircraft B (p 
= 0.333). 
Table 73.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During Taxi 
Following Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Taxi behind) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi ahead) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 147 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 147 37,    25.2 N/A 
Aircraft B 147 N/A   30,    20.4 
Both 147 38,    25.9   38,    25.9 
 
Collision avoidance – For this scenario, CD&R equipage was effective for collision avoidance, as 
shown in Table 74.  When neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R, all of the runs resulted in near collision 
and collision.  There were no near collisions or collisions when transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracy levels when Aircraft B (taxiing ahead) or Both aircraft were equipped.  There were some 
near collisions and collisions when transmitting data with NACp 9 accuracy when only Aircraft A (taxi 
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following) was equipped.  When neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R, there were no significant 
differences in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between accuracy levels 
since they occurred on the same percentage of runs (100%) for each accuracy level.  When Aircraft A was 
equipped, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p < 0.001) and 
collisions (p = 0.002) occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Aircraft 
B was equipped, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which near collisions 
and collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft 
were equipped, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which near collisions 
and collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 74.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Taxi Following Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 49 49,  100 49,  100 10,  20.4 7,  14.3 11,  22.4 8,  16.3 8,  16.3 7,  14.3 
9 42 42,  100 42,  100   2,    4.8 1,  2.4   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 28 28,  100 28,  100   0,    0.0 0,  0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 21 21,  100 21,  100   0,    0.0 0,  0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 7   7,  100   7,  100   0,    0.0 0,  0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
On all collision runs in which a WA was issued, maneuvering was initiated but not with enough time 
to avoid the collision.  A WA was generated on the eight collision runs when Aircraft A was equipped with 
CD&R; however, on four runs the alert occurred after the collision and on the other four runs the alert 
occurred four seconds or less before the collision.  For the eight collisions that occurred when Aircraft B 
was equipped, on four runs the WA occurred after the collision and on the other four runs the alert occurred 
five seconds or less before the collision.  When Both aircraft were equipped, WAs were not issued on either 
aircraft for three collision runs and no maneuvering was conducted.  On two runs the WA occurred after 
the collision and on two runs the WA occurred four seconds or less before the collision. 
5.1.10 Taxi Scenario – Taxi Intersection 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay and initial location for Aircraft B were 
evaluated at 76 levels, for a total of 6,384 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – CAs were generated for 55% to 76% of the test runs and WAs were generated 
for 50% to 66% of the runs (Table 75).  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 
11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.758) in the number of 
runs in which CAs were generated but there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which WAs were generated between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for Aircraft A, CAs were 
issued when the aircraft was approximately 217 ft to 719 ft from Aircraft B and WAs were issued when 
approximately 198 ft to 399 ft from Aircraft B.  For Aircraft B, CAs were issued when approximately 229 
ft to 719 ft from Aircraft A and WAs were issued when approximately 217 ft to 399 ft from Aircraft A. 
As the position accuracy was reduced, alert toggling occurred more frequently, especially when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies (Table 75).  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts when transmitting less accurate position data.  In addition to 
position accuracy, the toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Multiple alerts occurred after 
Aircraft A or Aircraft B conducted accelerated braking and when the aircraft stopped on the taxiway. 
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Table 75.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A  
8 2,128 1,629,    76.5 776,    36.5 1,421,    66.8 448,    21.1 
9 1,824 1,286,    70.5 298,    16.3 1,116,    61.2   72,     4.0 
10 1,216    707,    58.1   39,      3.2    653,    53.7     1,      0.1 
11 912    514,    56.4     1,      0.1    469,    51.4     0,      0.0 
Truth 304    169,    55.6     0,      0.0    152,    50.0     0,      0.0 
Aircraft B  
8 2,128 1,220,    57.3 309,    14.5  1,358,    63.8 329,   15.5 
9 1,824 1,030,    56.5   32,      1.8  1,053,    57.7   38,     2.1 
10 1,216    672,    55.3     0,      0.0     650,    53.5     0,     0.0 
11 912    513,    56.2     0,      0.0     468,    51.3     0,     0.0 
Truth 304    178,    58.5     0,      0.0     152,    50.0     0,     0.0 
 
When analyzing by equipage level (Table 76), CAs were issued on approximately 67% of the runs for 
Aircraft A and approximately 56% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  For both aircraft, WAs 
were issued on approximately 59% of the runs for all equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p= 0.927) and WAs (p = 0.807) were generated 
between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which CAs (p = 0.221) and WAs (p = 0.760) were generated between equipage levels. 
The rate of alert toggling was high for CAs (approximately 17% for Aircraft A and 3% to 7% for 
Aircraft B) and WAs (3% to 9%) for all equipage levels (Table 76).  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs (p= 0.575) and multiple WAs (p= 0.226) were 
generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p<0.001) in the 
number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and 
Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 76.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Neither 1,596  1,087,    68.1   273,    17.1 956,    59.9  123,    7.7 
Aircraft A 1,596  1,071,    67.1   272,    17.0 967,    60.6       124,    7.8 
Aircraft B 1,596  1,075,    67.4   297,    18.6 946,    59.3  150,    9.4 
Both 1,596  1,072,    67.2   272,    17.0 942,    59.0  124,    7.8 
Aircraft B 
Neither 1,596    893,    56.0     73,      4.6 922,    57.8    68,    4.3 
Aircraft A 1,596    929,    58.2   107,      6.7 937,    58.7  138,    8.7 
Aircraft B 1,596    875,    54.8     51,      3.2 912,    57.1    52,    3.3 
Both 1,596    916,    57.4   110,      6.9 910,    57.0  109,    6.8 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 77).  In general, alerts were issued at a slightly lower rate than when transmitting data with various 
accuracy levels (Table 76).  Multiple alerts did not occur when transmitting truth data.  For both aircraft, 
there was no significant difference (p = 0.077) in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between 
equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs were 
generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 77.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Taxi Intersection 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Neither 1,596 924,    57.9   0,    0.0 798,    50.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 1,596 867,    54.3   0,    0.0 691,    43.3 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 1,596 899,    56.3   0,    0.0 741,    46.4 0,    0.0 
Both 1,596 859,    53.8   0,    0.0 687,    43.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
Neither 1,596 924,    57.9   0,    0.0 798,    50.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 1,596 867,    54.3   0,    0.0 691,    43.3 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 1,596 899,    56.3   0,    0.0 741,    46.4 0,    0.0 
Both 1,596 859,    53.8   0,    0.0 687,    43.0 0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – For a large percentage of test runs for all accuracy levels except truth, the 
aircraft entered the defined missed boundary, as shown in Table 78.  The aircraft entered the missed 
boundary during all test runs when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  The aircraft entered the 
nuisance boundary only when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  The number of times 
(count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the missed 
and nuisance boundary was greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 78).  This was particularly 
true when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which both aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracy vs. 
NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which both aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies. 
The aircraft entered the missed boundary when crossing the intersecting taxiway and when traveling 
along the taxiway.  The high rate of entering the missed boundary was due to the missed boundary 
definition.  There was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary; 
therefore, a very small difference between the true and detected position caused a missed boundary to be 
counted.  The aircraft entered the nuisance boundary only when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 
accuracies.  Since the aircraft’s true taxi path was along the taxiway centerline, it was only possible to enter 
the nuisance boundary when crossing the intersecting taxiway. 
Table 78.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A 
8 2127,  100.0   8.1,    3.8  20.8,    11.4 61.2   702,  33.0    1.8,    1.6   3.4,    5.2   9.7 
9 1334,    73.1   2.2,    2.0    3.5,      4.7  10.3 62,    3.4    1.1,    0.4   1.0,    1.8   2.8 
10   663,    54.5   1.1,    0.3    0.5,      0.3  7.1   0,    0.0       0,    0.0      0,    0.0   0.0 
11   327,    35.9   1.0,    0.1    0.3,      0.1  0.9   0,    0.0       0,    0.0      0,    0.0   0.0 
Truth       0,      0.0   0.0,    0.0    0.0,      0.0  0.0   0,    0.0       0,    0.0      0,    0.0   0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 2128,  100.0   8.0,    3.8  20.2,    11.3 59.2   669,  31.4    1.9,    1.5   3.8,    5.2 11.1 
9 1106,    60.6   2.2,    1.9    2.9,      4.0   9.1     52,    2.8    1.2,    0.6   0.9,    0.9   2.7 
10   415,    34.1   1.0,    0.2    0.5,      0.3  1.6       0,    0.0       0,    0.0      0,    0.0   0.0 
11   190,    20.8   1.0,    0.1    0.3,      0.1  0.8       0,    0.0       0,    0.0      0,    0.0   0.0 
Truth       0,      0.0   0.0,    0.0    0.0,      0.0  0.0       0,    0.0       0,    0.0      0,    0.0   0.0 
 71 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed alerts increased as the position accuracy decreased, as 
shown in Table 79.  Missed alerts for both aircraft were highest when transmitting data with NACp 8 
accuracy (approximately 8% of the runs for Aircraft A; 13% for Aircraft B).  For both aircraft, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs and missed WAs occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  It was only possible for a nuisance alert to be 
generated when taxiing across a taxiway; however, no nuisance alerts occurred for this scenario. 
When analyzing missed CAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for Aircraft A, three 
of the alerts should have occurred when Aircraft A was 579 ft down the taxiway and Aircraft B was crossing 
604 ft down the taxiway.  Four of the alerts should have occurred when Aircraft A was 712 ft down the 
taxiway and Aircraft B was crossing 803 ft down the taxiway. 
Table 79.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Taxi 
Intersection Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
8 2,128 163,      7.7 152,    7.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 1,824   62,      3.4   38,    2.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 1,216   42,      3.5     9,    0.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 912   23,      2.5     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 304     7,      2.3     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 2,128 276,    13.0 174,    8.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 1,824 130,      7.1   42,    2.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 1,216   55,      4.5     7,    0.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 912   22,      2.4     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 304     0,      0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 80) shows that, missed CAs occurred on 
approximately 5% of the test runs for Aircraft A and 6% to 9% of the runs for Aircraft B.  Missed WAs 
occurred on approximately 3% of the runs for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.611) and missed WAs (p = 0.778) occurred 
between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p = 0.023) in the number of 
runs in which missed CAs occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and 
Both aircraft equipped.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.797) in the number of runs in which 
missed WAs occurred between equipage levels. 
Table 80.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi 
Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Neither 1,596   70,    4.4 47,    2.9 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 1,596   72,    4.5 48,    3.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 1,596   84,    5.3 48,    3.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 1,596   71,    4.4 56,    3.5 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
Neither 1,596 131,    8.2 54,    3.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 1,596 107,    6.7 51,    3.2 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 1,596 142,    8.9 61,    3.8 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 1,596 103,    6.5 57,    3.6 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
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Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data of various accuracy levels is shown in Table 81.  As the data accuracy decreased, 
the frequency of occurrences of unnecessary maneuvering increased.  For both aircraft, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 81.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During Taxi 
Intersection Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 1,064 248,    23.3 174,    16.4 
9 912   94,    10.3   53,      5.8 
10 608     3,      0.5     7,      1.2 
11 456     0,      0.0     0,      0.0 
Truth 152     0,      0.0     0,      0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 82.  There were no significant differences in the number of runs 
in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p= 0.362) and Aircraft 
B (p= 0.067). 
Table 82.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During Taxi 
Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 1,596 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 1,596 181,    11.3 N/A 
Aircraft B 1,596 N/A   103,    6.5 
Both 1,596 164,    10.3   131,    8.2 
 
Collision avoidance – For this scenario, CD&R equipage was effective for collision avoidance, as 
shown in Table 83.  Equipage for either aircraft dropped the near collision and collision rates in half, and 
with Both aircraft equipped, the near collision rate was reduced by an order of magnitude and the collision 
rate was reduced to 1% when transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy.  The effectiveness of collision 
avoidance increased when both aircraft were equipped with CD&R; however, collisions still occurred 
except when transmitting very accurate data.  Since both aircraft conducted identical operations, it was 
expected that collision avoidance would be similar for both aircraft.  However, collision avoidance was 
slightly more effective when Aircraft B was equipped than when Aircraft A was equipped, except when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Position accuracy did not have much effect on collision 
avoidance, except when Both aircraft were equipped.  When neither aircraft were equipped with CD&R, 
there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions 
occurred between accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.996) and collisions (p = 0.979) occurred between 
accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft B was equipped, there was a significant difference in the number of 
runs in which near collisions (p = 0.002) occurred between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies and in the number of runs in which collisions (p < 0.001) occurred between NACp 8 vs. 
NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there was a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. 
NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
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Investigation was performed on the test runs that resulted in collision for the truth data condition.  It 
was determined that for these test runs, WAs were generated; however, by the time the pilot reaction delay 
(2 seconds) was over, the aircraft was projected to stop closer than 100 ft from the intersecting taxiway 
centerline.  As a result, the aircraft continued taxi and a collision occurred. 
Table 83.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 532 266,  50.0 231,  43.4 156,  29.3 107,  20.1 168,  31.6 126,  23.7 123,  23.1 90,  16.9
9 456 228,  50.0 198,  43.4 130,  28.5   89,  19.5 120,  26.3   77,  16.9   49,  10.8 20,    4.4
10 304 152,  50.0 132,  43.4   90,  29.6   57,  18.8   66,  21.7   42,  13.8   16,    5.3   3,    1.0
11 228 114,  50.0   99,  43.4   67,  29.4   42,  18.4   46,  20.2   32,  14.0     5,    2.2   0,    0.0
Truth 76   38,  50.0   33,  43.4   23,  30.3   14,  18.4   15,  19.7   10,  13.2     2,    2.6   0,    0.0
5.1.11 Taxi Scenario – Taxi Head-On 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on either Aircraft A or B was evaluated at 
13 levels, for a total of 1,092 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – CAs were generated for 84% to 100% of the test runs for Aircraft A and for 
84% to 96% of the test runs for Aircraft B (Table 84).  WAs were generated for 85% to 95% of the runs for 
both aircraft.  A lower alert rate occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For both aircraft, 
there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p < 0.001) and WAs (Aircraft A: p 
= 0.016; Aircraft B: p < 0.001) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
On 44 of the 52 test runs that used truth position accuracy, CAs occurred when the aircraft were a mean 
distance of 1027 ft apart (10.8 ft standard deviation) and WAs occurred when a mean distance of 635 ft 
apart (21.7 ft standard deviation).  For the four test runs in which Aircraft A was located 3,100 ft from 
Taxiway T1 when Aircraft B began to taxi, the alert timing for the aircraft were different.  For Aircraft A, 
a CA was issued when the aircraft were a mean distance of 679 ft apart (0.7 ft standard deviation) and a 
WA was issued when 424 ft apart (0.0 ft standard deviation).  For Aircraft B, a CA was issued when the 
aircraft were a mean distance of 667 ft apart (22.2 ft standard deviation) and a WA was issued when a mean 
distance of 388 ft apart (0.4 ft standard deviation).  For the four test runs in which Aircraft A was located 
1,500 ft from Taxiway T1 when Aircraft B began to taxi, only a CA was issued onboard Aircraft A when 
391 ft (0.0 ft standard deviation) from Aircraft B.  No alerts were issued on Aircraft B for these four runs. 
Table 84.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Taxi Head-On Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A  
8 364 305,      83.8 74,    20.3 317,    87.1 113,    31.0 
9 312 296,      94.9 10,      3.2 294,    94.2   51,    16.4 
10 208 195,      93.8   3,      1.4 193,    92.8   29,    13.9 
11 156 147,      94.2   2,      1.3 144,    92.3   24,    15.4 
Truth 52   52,    100.0   1,      1.9   48,    92.3   12,    23.1 
Aircraft B  
8 364 304,    83.5 84,    23.1 309,    84.9 118,    32.4 
9 312 297,    95.2 26,      8.3 295,    94.5   48,    15.4 
10 208 199,    95.7   5,      2.4 192,    92.3   23,    11.1 
11 156 145,    93.0   2,      1.3 144,    92.3   20,    12.8 
Truth 52   48,    92.3   0,      0.0   48,    92.3   12,    23.1 
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As the position accuracy was reduced, CA toggling occurred more frequently, especially when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy (Table 84).  WA toggling occurred most frequently when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy and least frequently when transmitting data with NACp 10 
accuracy.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
CAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies and WAs were generated 
between NACp 8 and truth accuracies vs. NACp 9, 10, and 11 accuracies. 
When analyzing the multiple alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, the multiple CA 
occurred on a test run where Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R and both aircraft had braked and 
began exiting the runway.  For each test run in which multiple WAs occurred, either Aircraft A or Aircraft 
B was equipped with CD&R and a multiple WA occurred for each aircraft after the equipped aircraft 
conducted accelerated braking and stopped.  On the majority of the test runs that contained multiple WAs 
in which NACp 9 to 11 position accuracy was used, each run only contained a multiple WA for either 
Aircraft A or Aircraft B but not both, which resulted in less multiple WAs per aircraft than when 
transmitting truth position data. 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 85) shows alerts were issued on approximately 91% 
of the runs for both aircraft for all equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in 
the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.975) and WAs (p = 0.844) were generated between equipage levels.  
For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p= 0.884) and 
WAs (p = 0.952) were generated between equipage levels. 
The rate of CA toggling was highest when Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R (Table 85).  The 
rate of WA toggling was high for all equipage levels but was lowest when Neither aircraft were equipped.  
For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs 
were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped 
and when multiple WAs were generated between Aircraft A equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft B, and 
Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which multiple CAs were generated between Both aircraft equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and 
Aircraft B equipped and when multiple WAs were generated between Aircraft B equipped vs. Neither 
aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 85.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi Head-On Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Neither 273  247,    90.5   11,      4.0 252,    92.3    15,      5.5 
Aircraft A 273  249,    91.2   13,      4.8 246,    90.1      124,    45.4 
Aircraft B 273  249,    91.2   26,      9.5 249,    91.2    46,    16.9 
Both 273  250,    91.6   40,    14.7 249,    91.2    44,    16.1 
Aircraft B 
Neither 273  251,    91.9   14,      5.1 247,    90.5    14,      5.1 
Aircraft A 273  247,    90.5   24,      8.8 245,    89.7    45,    16.5 
Aircraft B 273  249,    91.2   16,      5.9 247,    90.5  110,    40.3 
Both 273  246,    90.1   63,    23.1 249,    91.2    52,    19.1 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 86).  The alert generation rate was slightly higher than when transmitting data with various accuracy 
levels (Table 85).  The multiple CA rate was much lower when transmitting accurate data.  The multiple 
WA rate was lower when transmitting accurate data but was still very high.  For both aircraft, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p= 0.998), WAs (Aircraft A: p= 0.666; Aircraft 
B: p= 0.562), and multiple CAs (Aircraft A: p = 0.5; Aircraft B: p = 0.25) were generated between equipage 
levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were 
generated between Neither aircraft and Both aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A and Aircraft B equipped. 
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Table 86.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Taxi Head-On 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Neither 273 253,    92.7   0,    0.0 256,    93.8     0,      0.0 
Aircraft A 273 252,    92.3   0,    0.0 253,    92.7 113,    41.4 
Aircraft B 273 252,    92.3   1,    0.4 255,    93.4   72,    26.4 
Both 273 252,    92.3   1,    0.4 249,    91.2     4,      1.5 
Aircraft B 
Neither 273 252,    92.3   0,    0.0 256,    93.8     0,      0.0 
Aircraft A 273 252,    92.3   0,    0.0 253,    92.7 106,    38.8 
Aircraft B 273 251,    91.9   1,    0.4 255,    93.4   88,    32.2 
Both 273 252,    92.3   0,    0.0 248,    90.8     3,      1.1 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The highest rate of entering the missed boundary occurred when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 position accuracies, as shown in Table 87.  The number of times 
(count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the missed 
boundary was greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 87).  This was particularly true when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs that the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. 
NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 87.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Taxi Head-On Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A 
8 337,    92.6 35.6,    22.0 97.1,    61.2 34.6 1,    0.3 3.0,    0.0 13.5,    0.0 4.7 
9 234,    75.0   9.6,      7.3 14.9,    15.9 5.3 1,    0.3 2.0,    0.0   1.3,    0.0 0.4 
10     0,      0.0      0,      0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 1,    0.5 1.0,    0.0   0.5,    0.0 0.2 
11     0,      0.0      0,      0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0    0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0      0,      0.0      0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0    0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 364,  100.0  60.0,   13.2 167.3,    43.9 57.0 22,    6.0 2.1,    1.1   5.7,    4.2 1.7 
9 308,    98.7 12.2,     7.6   18.2,    15.2 6.2 24,    7.7 2.5,    2.2   5.4,    5.0 1.5 
10   17,      8.2   2.2,     1.6     2.7,      2.6 0.8 19,    9.1 2.0,    1.0   4.2,    3.9 1.2 
11   15,      9.6   2.4,     1.6     1.4,      1.6 0.4 10,    6.4 2.6,    1.4   1.4,    1.0 0.4 
Truth     0,      0.0     0,     0.0        0,      0.0 0.0   0,    0.0    0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The aircraft entered the nuisance boundary for a very small percentage runs for Aircraft A.  For Aircraft 
B, the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary on 9% or less of the runs.  There was no significant difference 
in the number of runs that the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between equipage levels for Aircraft 
A (p = 1.0) and Aircraft B (p = 0.180). 
As with previous scenarios, the high rate of entering the missed boundary was due to the missed 
boundary definition.  There was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed 
boundary; therefore, a very small difference between the true and detected position caused a missed 
boundary to be counted.  Since the aircraft’s true taxi path was along the taxiway centerline, it was only 
possible to enter the nuisance boundary when exiting the taxiway.  For this scenario, it was possible for 
either aircraft to exit the taxiway after taking action to avoid a collision if equipped with CD&R.  Aircraft 
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B would also exit the taxiway after crossing Taxiway M and Runway 10 as part of its standard taxi 
operation. 
Missed CAs only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 position accuracies, while missed 
WAs occurred for all position accuracies except truth, as shown in Table 88.  The rate of missed alerts was 
similar for both aircraft since the aircraft conducted identical operations, traveling along a taxiway.  For 
both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between accuracy levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.084) 
and Aircraft B (p = 0.049). 
There were no nuisance alerts for Aircraft A and only minimal nuisance alerting for Aircraft B (with 
NACp 8 accuracy only) that occurred when exiting the taxiway.  There was no significant difference in the 
number of runs in which nuisance CAs (p = 0.037) and nuisance WAs (p = 0.111) occurred between 
accuracy levels. 
Table 88.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Taxi 
Head-On Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
8 364 44,    12.1 43,    11.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312   1,      0.3 30,      9.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,      0.0 20,      9.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,      0.0 12,      7.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,      0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
8 364 46,    12.6 51,    14.0 3,    0.8 2,    0.6 
9 312   1,      0.3 35,    11.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,      0.0 29,    13.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,      0.0 17,    10.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,      0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Table 89.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi 
Head-On Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Neither 273 13,    4.8   8,      2.9 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 12,    4.4 18,      6.6 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 11,    4.0 67,    24.5 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 273   9,    3.3 12,      4.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
Neither 273   8,    2.9 13,      4.8 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 15,    5.5 95,    34.8 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 10,    3.7 13,      4.8 1,    0.4   1,    0.4 
Both 273 14,    5.1 11,      4.0 2,    0.7   1,    0.4 
 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 89) shows that, the missed CA rate was similar 
across equipage levels.  The missed WA rate was much higher onboard Aircraft A when only Aircraft B 
was equipped with CD&R and onboard Aircraft B when only Aircraft A was equipped.  There was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred between equipage levels for 
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Aircraft A (p = 0.847) and Aircraft B (p = 0.405).  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft B equipped vs. Neither 
aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft A equipped vs. Neither 
aircraft, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped. 
The nuisance alerts for Aircraft B occurred when only Aircraft B or when Both aircraft were equipped.  
There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which nuisance CAs (p = 0.156) and nuisance 
WAs (p = 0.50) occurred between equipage levels. 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various data accuracy levels is shown in Table 90.  Unnecessary maneuvers 
only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  With NACp 8, approximately 6% to 
9% of the maneuvers were unnecessary.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in 
the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies. 
Table 90.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During Taxi 
Head-On Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 182 10,    5.5 16,    8.8 
9 156   1,    0.6   1,    0.6 
10 104   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 78   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 26   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 91.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.068) and Aircraft B 
(p = 0.139). 
Table 91.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During Taxi 
Head-On Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 273 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 273 2,    0.7 N/A 
Aircraft B 273 N/A   5,    1.8 
Both 273 9,    3.3 12,    4.4 
 
Collision avoidance – For this scenario, CD&R equipage was not extremely effective for collision 
avoidance, as shown in Table 92.  The rate of near collisions and collisions was approximately 93% over 
all position accuracy levels when Neither aircraft or only one aircraft (either A or B) was equipped with 
CD&R capability.  Therefore, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near 
collisions or collisions occurred between accuracy levels: 
• Neither aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 0.831) and collisions (p = 1.0), 
• Aircraft A equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 0.937), and 
• Aircraft B equipped: near collisions (p = 0.625) and collisions (p = 0.937). 
When Both aircraft were equipped, the rate of near collisions ranged from 23% to 47% and the rate of 
collisions ranged from 0% to 34%, depending on the position accuracy level.  There was a significant 
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difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.012) and collisions (p < 0.001) occurred 
between NACp 8 accuracy vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The rate of near collisions and collisions was similar when Neither aircraft or one aircraft was equipped 
with CD&R capability because a collision is inevitable if neither or only one aircraft stops when in a head-
on situation.  When Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R capability and transmitting data with NACp 
9, 10, and 11 position accuracies, on 83% (10 of 12) of the runs the WA occurred when Aircraft A was 
turning onto Taxiway T and the collision occurred just after the aircraft turned onto the taxiway.  On the 
other 17% (2 of 12) of the runs, the collisions occurred when Aircraft B had stopped on the taxiway and 
Aircraft A was exiting the taxiway.  
Table 92.  Number/Percentage Of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Taxi Head-On Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 91 85,  93.4 84,  92.3 84,  92.3 83,  91.2 84,  92.3 83,  91.2 43,  47.3 31,  34.1
9 78 74,  94.9 72,  92.3 72,  92.3 72,  92.3 74,  94.9 72,  92.3 21,  26.9   7,    9.0
10 52 49,  94.2 48,  92.3 48,  92.3 48,  92.3 48,  92.3 48,  92.3 14,  26.9   3,    5.8
11 39 36,  92.3 36,  92.3 36,  92.3 36,  92.3 36,  92.3 36,  92.3   9,  23.1   2,    5.1
Truth 13 12,  92.3 12,  92.3 12,  92.3 12,  92.3 12,  92.3 12,  92.3   3,  23.1   0,    0.0
5.1.12 Air-To-Air Scenario – Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 1,372 combinations of the initiation delay and initial location 
for Aircraft B (crossing airborne aircraft) were evaluated, for a total of 115,248 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – CAs were generated on 22% to 28% of test runs (Table 93).  WAs were 
generated on approximately 20% of the test runs for both aircraft, almost independent of the NACp levels.  
For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs were 
generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.926) in the number of runs in which WAs generated.  For Aircraft B, there was 
a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between NACp 8 
vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 93.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Crossing 
Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
 (# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 38,416 10,890,    28.4 1,668,    4.3 7,606,    19.8 339,    0.9 
9 32,928   8,073,    24.5   569,    1.7 6,292,    19.1 173,    0.5 
10 21,952   5,310,    24.2   250,    1.1 4,198,    19.1 113,    0.5 
11 16,464   3,980,    24.2   187,    1.1 3,150,    19.1   84,    0.5 
Truth 5,488   1,327,    24.2     63,    1.1 1,048,    19.1   28,    0.5 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
8 38,416 9,837,    25.6 1,413,    3.7 7,151,    18.6 285,    0.7 
9 32,928 7,378,    22.4   504,    1.5 6,410,    19.5 179,    0.5 
10 21,952 4,811,    21.9   259,    1.2 4,297,    19.6 108,    0.5 
11 16,464 3,603,    21.9   189,    1.1 3,223,    19.6   82,    0.5 
Truth 5,488 1,197,    21.8     65,    1.2 1,073,    19.6   28,    0.5 
 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for approach Aircraft A, 
CAs were issued onboard when approximately 3.9 NM to 230 ft prior to the runway threshold and 1,270 ft 
to 50 ft AGL; approximately 988 ft to 8,886 ft slant range distance from the crossing airborne traffic 
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(Aircraft B) depending on the test run conditions.  WAs were issued onboard when approximately 3.8 NM 
to 230 ft prior to the runway threshold and 1,270 ft to 50 ft AGL; approximately 260 ft to 5,940 ft slant 
range distance from the crossing airborne traffic depending on the test run conditions.  As defined 
previously, Aircraft B flew perpendicular across Aircraft A’s path at seven different altitudes (100, 250, 
400, 550, 700, 850, and 1,000 ft AFE).  When Aircraft B was at 1,000 ft AFE, CAs were issued when the 
aircraft was approximately 4,745 ft from the extended runway centerline until approximately 772 ft past 
the extended centerline.  For all other altitude levels, CAs were issued when the aircraft was approximately 
4,060 ft from the extended centerline until approximately 730 ft past the extended centerline.  For all altitude 
levels, WAs were issued when the aircraft was approximately 2,675 ft from the extended centerline until 
334 ft to 1,146 ft past the extended centerline, depending on the test run conditions. 
The rate of alert toggling was low for this scenario (Table 93), but was slightly higher when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Position accuracy had minimal effect on the occurrence of multiple WAs.  For 
both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs 
and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The alert toggling included gaps between alerts for the lower position accuracy levels (NACp 8 and 9).  
For both aircraft, multiple alerts were generated when truth position data was transmitted.  In most cases, 
these multiple alerts were generated after Aircraft B had crossed the extended runway centerline.  On test 
runs in which Aircraft B were to take action, these multiple alerts were issued after the aircraft had begun 
a climb maneuver and was at a higher altitude than the approach aircraft, which was still descending.  In 
these situations, alerts are not necessary since the potential collision threat has passed. 
Analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 94), CAs were issued on approximately 26% of the runs 
for Aircraft A and on approximately 23% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  WAs were 
generated on approximately 19% of the runs for all equipage levels for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.925) and WAs (p = 0.986) were 
generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number 
of runs in which CAs (p = 0.956) and WAs (p = 0.996) were generated between equipage levels. 
The rate of CA toggling was similar across all equipage levels (Table 94).  The rate of WA toggling 
was slightly higher when Neither aircraft and Aircraft A were equipped with CD&R.  There was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated between equipage levels 
for Aircraft A (p = 0.503) and Aircraft B (p = 0.321).  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped 
vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 94.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Crossing 
Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 28,812 7,355,    25.5 680,     2.4 5,569,    19.3 234,    0.8 
Aircraft A 28,812 7,418,    25.8 664,     2.3 5,592,    19.4 215,    0.8 
Aircraft B 28,812 7,416,    25.7 717,     2.5 5,576,    19.4 145,    0.5 
Both 28,812 7,391,    25.6 676,     2.4 5,557,    19.3 143,    0.5 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
Neither 28,812 6,681,    23.2 613,    2.1 5,525,    19.2 207,    0.7 
Aircraft A 28,812 6,721,    23.3 593,    2.1 5,545,    19.2 195,    0.7 
Aircraft B 28,812 6,731,    23.4 642,    2.2 5,544,    19.2 137,    0.5 
Both 28,812 6,693,    23.2 582,    2.0 5,540,    19.2 143,    0.5 
 
The rates of alerts and multiple alerts across equipage levels when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 95) was similar to the rates across equipage levels when transmitting data with various position 
accuracy levels (Table 94).  CAs were issued on approximately 24% of the runs for Aircraft A and on 
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approximately 22% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  WAs were generated on 
approximately 19% of the runs for both aircraft for all equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.998), WAs (p = 0.950), and multiple CAs 
(p = 0.983) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.999), WAs (p = 0.955), and multiple CAs (p = 0.923) were 
generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and 
Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 95.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with 
Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 28,812 6,971,    24.2   333,    1.2 5,502,    19.1  189,    0.7 
Aircraft A 28,812 6,964,    24.2   331,    1.1 5,518,    19.1  170,    0.6 
Aircraft B 28,812 6,983,    24.2   333,    1.2 5,479,    19.0    98,    0.3 
Both 28,812 6,981,    24.2   324,    1.1 5,467,    19.0  101,    0.4 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
Neither 28,812 6,285,    21.8   337,    1.2 5,628,    19.5 189,    0.7 
Aircraft A 28,812 6,294,    21.9   324,    1.1 5,643,    19.6 172,    0.6 
Aircraft B 28,812 6,299,    21.9   337,    1.2 5,605,    19.4   99,    0.3 
Both 28,812 6,301,    21.9   325,    1.1 5,594,    19.4 101,    0.4 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 96.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the 
boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  Aircraft A did not enter the nuisance boundary since 
the aircraft tracked the extended centerline on approach.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary and entered the nuisance 
boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 96.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival with Crossing Airborne 
Traffic Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 2,635,   6.9 2.1,    1.4 3.0,    2.9 5.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9        9,   0.0 1.3,    0.5 0.7,    0.6 1.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10        0,   0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11        0,   0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth        0,   0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
8 9,727,    25.3 1.2,    0.4 1.2,    0.8 2.5 9,759,    25.4 1.2,    0.4 1.2,   0.8 2.6 
9 7,110,    21.6  1.1,    0.3 0.5,    0.2 1.0 7,171,    21.8 1.1,    0.3 0.5,   0.2 1.0 
10 2,927,    13.3  1.0,    0.2 0.3,    0.1 0.5 2,932,    13.4 1.0,    0.2 0.2,   0.1 0.5 
11   784,      4.8 1.0,    0.1 0.2,    0.0 0.5   719,      4.4 1.0,    0.1 0.2,   0.0 0.5 
Truth       0,      0.0    0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0       0,      0.0    0,    0.0     0,   0.0 0.0 
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For the approach Aircraft A, the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the 
aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while 
on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 0.4% of the test runs when transmitting data with 
NACp 8 accuracy. 
The crossing airborne Aircraft B entered the missed and nuisance boundaries for accuracy levels of 
NACp 8 to 11 due to the criteria for entering the boundaries.  The aircraft was counted as entering the 
missed boundary when the true position of the aircraft was determined to be within the bounds of the 
approach corridor (Figure 19), but the detected position was outside of the approach corridor.  Similarly, 
the aircraft was counted as entering the nuisance boundary when the true aircraft position was outside of 
the approach corridor, but the detected position was within the approach corridor.  As such, there was no 
buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the boundaries so a measurable difference between 
the true and detected position could cause a missed or nuisance boundary to be counted. 
The percentage of test runs that contained missed and nuisance alerts was low, as shown in Table 97.  
For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed CAs 
occurred between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies and missed WAs 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which nuisance CAs and nuisance WAs occurred between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  No nuisance alerts occurred for Aircraft A. 
Both aircraft did, however, experience missed CAs when transmitting truth position data.  For Aircraft 
A, the CAs should have occurred when the crossing airborne traffic was at a higher altitude (two at 400 ft 
AGL, one at 850 ft AGL) than the arrival aircraft (two at 160 ft AGL, one at 50 ft AGL).  For Aircraft B, 
the CA should have occurred near the beginning of the test run when Aircraft A was at 445 AGL on 
approach and the crossing aircraft was at 700 AGL. 
Table 97.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 38,416 541,    1.4 498,    1.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 32,928 276,    0.8 118,    0.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 21,952   97,    0.4     9,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 16,464   26,    0.2     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 5,488     3,    0.1     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
8 38,416 501,    1.3 678,    1.8 16,    0.0 151,   0.4 
9 32,928 278,    0.8 140,    0.4   0,    0.0   44,   0.1 
10 21,952 113,    0.5   14,    0.1   0,    0.0     2,   0.0 
11 16,464   25,    0.2     2,    0.0   0,    0.0     0,   0.0 
Truth 5,488     1,    0.0     0,    0.0   0,    0.0     0,   0.0 
 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 98) shows that, missed and nuisance alerts occurred 
for less than 1% of the runs for all CD&R equipage levels for both aircraft and also at similar rates per 
aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p 
= 0.641) and missed WAs (p = 0.808) occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.511) and missed WAs (p = 0.619) 
occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs 
in which nuisance CAs (p = 0.567) and nuisance WAs (p = 0.346) occurred between equipage levels. 
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Table 98.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 28,812 250,    0.9 166,    0.6 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 28,812 236,    0.8 151,    0.5 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 28,812 222,    0.8 157,    0.5 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 28,812 235,    0.8 151,    0.5 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
Neither 28,812 240,    0.8 222,    0.8 3,    0.0 58,    0.2 
Aircraft A 28,812 229,    0.8 207,    0.7 4,    0.0 49,    0.2 
Aircraft B 28,812 211,    0.7 210,    0.7 5,    0.0 50,    0.2 
Both 28,812 238,    0.8 195,    0.7 4,    0.0 40,    0.1 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various data accuracy levels is shown in Table 99.  The frequency of 
unnecessary maneuvering was low for this scenario and data accuracy had little effect, although the 
occurrence of unnecessary maneuvers was slightly higher when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  
For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which unnecessary 
maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 99.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During 
Arrival With Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 19,208 296,    1.5 287,    1.5 
9 16,464   75,    0.5 101,    0.6 
10 10,976     8,    0.1   20,    0.2 
11 8,232     2,    0.0     4,    0.0 
Truth 2,744     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 100.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.918) and Aircraft B 
(p = 0.805). 
Table 100.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During 
Arrival With Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Crossing 
airborne) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 28,812 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 28,812 189,    0.7 N/A 
Aircraft B 28,812 N/A   203,    0.7 
Both 28,812 192,    0.7   209,    0.7 
 
Collision avoidance – Overall, the rate of collisions was low for this scenario.  The most collisions 
were avoided when Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R, as shown in Table 101.  Collision avoidance 
was more effective when the crossing aircraft (Aircraft B) was equipped versus the approach aircraft 
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(Aircraft A).  The most collisions occurred when neither aircraft were equipped.  For all CD&R equipage 
levels, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions 
occurred between the position accuracy levels: 
• Neither aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 1.0), 
• Aircraft A equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 0.995), 
• Aircraft B equipped: near collisions (p = 0.999) and collisions (p = 0.996), and 
• Both aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 0.999) and collisions (p = 0.969). 
Table 101.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 9,604 588,  6.1 126,  1.3 589,  6.1 97,  1.0 410,  4.3 32,  0.3 435,  4.5 17,  0.2 
9 8,232 504,  6.1 108,  1.3 504,  6.1 78,  1.0 350,  4.2 30,  0.4 375,  4.6 18,  0.2 
10 5,488 336,  6.1   72,  1.3 336,  6.1 53,  1.0 238,  4.3 20,  0.4 246,  4.5 12,  0.2 
11 4,116 252,  6.1   54,  1.3 252,  6.1 40,  1.0 177,  4.3 15,  0.4 185,  4.5   9,  0.2 
Truth 1,372   84,  6.1   18,  1.3   84,  6.1 13,  1.0   59,  4.3   5,  0.4   61,  4.5   3,  0.2 
 
A more detailed investigation was conducted for the collisions that occurred when transmitting truth 
position data.  The initial location of Aircraft A and Aircraft B for each run that resulted in a collision are 
indicated in Figures 28, 29, 30, and 31.  For example, in Figure 28, a collision resulted when Aircraft A 
was on approach and 4.0 NM prior to the runway threshold when Aircraft B began to fly toward the 
extended runway centerline from a position 8,945 ft back from the runway centerline, in line with the 
runway threshold, and at 100 ft AGL.  When Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R, three collisions 
occurred (Figure 31) near the runway threshold when Aircraft B was flying at 100 ft AGL.  WAs were 
issued but too late for either aircraft to maneuver.  Collisions occurred for these three run conditions for all 
equipage combinations when transmitting truth position data.  Collisions occurred on 13 runs when only 
Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R.  On three of the runs the collision occurred near the runway threshold 
as described above.  On 10 of the runs, Aircraft A initiated a missed approach but the collision occurred at 
the aircraft’s lowest altitude, before the aircraft began ascending.  Collisions occurred on five runs when 
only Aircraft B was equipped.  As with the other two equipage conditions, the collision occurred near the 
runway threshold on three of the runs.  On the other two runs, WAs were issued approximately 20 seconds 
prior to the collision; however, the aircraft did not attempt to maneuver. 
 
Figure 28.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Neither Aircraft Maneuvers For Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
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Figure 29.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft A Maneuvers For Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft B Maneuvers For Arrival with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 31.  Aircraft Starting Locations For Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Both Aircraft Maneuver For Arrival With Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
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5.1.13 Air-To-Air Scenario – Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 1,029 combinations of the initiation delay and initial location 
for Aircraft B (crossing airborne aircraft) were evaluated, for a total of 86,436 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – CAs were generated on approximately 49% of the test runs for Aircraft A 
(departure) and approximately 30% of the test runs for Aircraft B (airborne crossing), almost independent 
of the position levels (Table 102).  WAs were generated on approximately 55% of the test runs for Aircraft 
A and 51% of the test runs for Aircraft B, almost independent of the position accuracy levels.  For Aircraft 
A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.188) and WAs (p = 0.044) 
were generated between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in 
the number of runs in which CAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  
There was no significant difference (p = 0.959) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated 
between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for departure Aircraft A, 
CAs were issued onboard when approximately 5,650 ft to 1.7 NM down the runway from the threshold and 
14 ft to 836 ft AGL; from approximately 609 ft to 6,309 ft slant range distance from the crossing airborne 
traffic (Aircraft B) depending on the test run conditions.  WAs were issued onboard when approximately 
4,793 ft down the runway from the threshold and 166 kt, just about to liftoff, until approximately 1.6 NM 
down the runway from the threshold and 660 ft AGL; from approximately 248 ft to 6,007 ft slant range 
distance from the crossing airborne traffic depending on the test run conditions.  As defined previously, 
Aircraft B crossed orthogonally to the flight path of Aircraft A at seven different altitudes (100, 250, 400, 
550, 700, 850, and 1,000 ft AFE).  For all altitude levels, CAs were issued when the aircraft was from 
approximately 2,850 ft from the runway centerline until approximately 1,430 ft past the centerline, 
depending on the test run conditions.  WAs were issued when the aircraft was from approximately 2,300 ft 
from the centerline until 1,160 ft past the centerline, depending on the test run conditions. 
Table 102.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departure Climb-Out 
with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 28,812 14,369,    49.9 1,115,    3.9 16,156,    56.1 52,    0.2 
9 24,696 12,097,    49.0 1,027,    4.2 13,560,    54.9   5,    0.0 
10 16,464   8,085,    49.1   741,    4.5   9,050,    55.0   0,    0.0 
11 12,348   6,045,    49.0   564,    4.6   6,791,    55.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 4,116   2,005,    48.7   184,    4.5   2,266,    55.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
8 28,812 9,088,    31.5   731,    2.5 14,804,    51.4 254,    0.9 
9 24,696 7,511,    30.4   621,    2.5 12,755,    51.6 110,    0.4 
10 16,464 4,940,    30.0   450,    2.7   8,514,    51.7     1,    0.0 
11 12,348 3,683,    29.8   336,    2.7   6,376,    51.6     0,    0.0 
Truth 4,116 1,231,    29.9   113,    2.8   2,125,    51.6     0,    0.0 
 
The rate of alert toggling was low for this scenario (Table 102).  CA toggling occurred on less than 5% 
of the test runs for Aircraft A and on less than 3% of the test runs for Aircraft B, almost independent of the 
position accuracy levels.  There was minimal WA toggling for both aircraft, mostly when transmitting data 
with NACp 8 accuracy.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which 
multiple CAs (p = 0.002) were generated between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies and multiple WAs (p <0.001	) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.499) in the number of runs in which 
multiple CAs were generated between accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in 
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the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 
10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
For both aircraft, multiple CAs were generated when truth position data was transmitted.  For Aircraft 
A, a CA was issued just after liftoff and a second CA was issued when the aircraft was approximately 200 
ft to 845 ft AGL, 5 to 16 seconds after the first alert.  For Aircraft B, on 85 of the test runs, a CA was issued 
when the aircraft was 2,567.9 ft mean distance (228.1 ft SD) from the runway centerline and a second CA 
was issued when 1,820.6 ft mean distance (22.0 ft SD) from the runway centerline.  On 28 of the runs, a 
CA was issued when the aircraft was 544.4 ft mean distance (33.3 ft SD) past the runway centerline and a 
second CA was issued when 1,401.1 ft mean distance (21.0 ft SD) past the runway centerline.  For these 
runs, an alert was not necessary since the potential collision threat had passed. 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 103) shows that, CAs were issued on approximately 
49% of the runs for Aircraft A and on approximately 30% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  
WAs were generated on approximately 55% of the runs for Aircraft A and 51% of the runs for Aircraft B 
for all equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which 
CAs (p = 0.993) and WAs (p = 0.988) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was 
also no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.998) and WAs (p = 0.969) were 
generated between equipage levels. 
The rate of alert toggling was similar across all equipage levels for each aircraft (Table 103).  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs (p = 0.941) and 
multiple WAs (p = 0.461) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs (p = 0.452) and multiple WAs (p = 
0.460) were generated between equipage levels. 
Table 103.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departure Climb-Out with 
Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 21,609 10,637,    49.2 916,     4.2 11,969,    55.4   13,    0.1 
Aircraft A 21,609 10,654,    49.3 898,     4.2 11,944,    55.3   18,    0.1 
Aircraft B 21,609 10,666,    49.4 918,     4.2 11,941,    55.3   16,    0.1 
Both 21,609 10,644,    49.3 899,     4.2 11,969,    55.4   10,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
Neither 21,609   6,603,    30.6 595,    2.8 11,165,    51.7   92,    0.4 
Aircraft A 21,609   6,622,    30.6 555,    2.6 11,116,    51.4 100,    0.5 
Aircraft B 21,609   6,614,    30.6 555,    2.6 11,139,    51.5   79,    0.4 
Both 21,609   6,614,    30.6 546,    2.5 11,154,    51.6   94,    0.4 
 
The rates of alerts and multiple alerts across equipage levels when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 104) was similar to the rates across equipage levels when transmitting data with various position 
accuracy levels (Table 103).  CAs were issued on approximately 48% of the runs for Aircraft A and on 
approximately 29% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  WAs were generated on 
approximately 55% of the runs for Aircraft A and 51% of the runs for Aircraft B for all equipage levels.  
The rate of multiple CAs was similar to the rates when transmitting data with various position accuracy 
levels; however, there were no multiple WAs for either aircraft when transmitting truth position data.  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.988), WAs (p = 
1.0), and multiple CAs (p = 0.999) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 1.0), WAs (p = 0.991), and multiple CAs 
(p = 0.998) were generated between equipage levels. 
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Table 104.  ATCAM Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departure Climb-
Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 21,609 10,486,    48.5 979,     4.5 11,885,    55.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 21,609 10,503,    48.6 985,     4.6 11,879,    55.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 21,609 10,522,    48.7 982,     4.5 11,888,    55.0 0,    0.0 
Both 21,609 10,494,    48.6 984,     4.5 11,883,    55.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
Neither 21,609   6,348,    29.4 582,    2.7 11,196,    51.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 21,609   6,349,    29.4 582,    2.7 11,176,    51.7 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 21,609   6,348,    29.4 588,    2.7 11,199,    51.8 0,    0.0 
Both 21,609   6,350,    29.4 584,    2.7 11,171,    51.7 0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed 
boundary and nuisance boundary (Aircraft B only) increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown 
in Table 105.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11 and truth accuracies.  For 
Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered 
the missed boundary and nuisance boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies. 
Table 105.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Departure Climb-Out with 
Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 23,322,   81.0 4.2,    2.9 10.3,    9.7 28.8 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9       55,      0.2 2.0,    1.4   2.7,    3.9 7.1 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10         0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11         0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth         0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0      0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
8 15,177,   52.7 1.1,    0.3 1.2,   0.8 2.9 15,098,   52.4 1.1,    0.3 1.2,    0.8 2.9 
9 10,966,   44.4 1.0,    0.2 0.5,    0.2 1.1 10,811,   43.8 1.0,    0.2 0.5,    0.2 1.1 
10   4,178,   25.4 1.0,    0.1 0.3,    0.1 0.6   4,170,   25.3 1.0,    0.1 0.3,    0.1 0.7 
11     995,     8.1 1.0,    0.0 0.3,    0.0 0.6   1,085,     8.8 1.0,    0.1 0.3,    0.0 0.6 
Truth         0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0          0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The departing aircraft entered the missed boundary along its entire departure path.  Since the aircraft 
tracked the runway centerline on departure and after liftoff, it was not possible for it to enter the nuisance 
boundary. 
The crossing airborne Aircraft B entered the missed and nuisance boundaries for accuracy levels of 
NACp 8 to 11.  This was due to the criteria for entering the boundaries.  The aircraft was counted as entering 
the missed boundary when the true position of the aircraft was determined to be within the bounds of the 
approach corridor (Figure 19), but the detected position was outside of the approach corridor.  Similarly, 
the aircraft was counted as entering the nuisance boundary when the true aircraft position was outside of 
the approach corridor, but the detected position was within the approach corridor.  As such, there was no 
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buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the boundaries so a measurable difference between 
the true and detected position could cause a missed or nuisance boundary to be counted. 
The rate of missed and nuisance alerts was relatively low, as shown in Table 106, but was highest when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  There were no nuisance alerts for Aircraft A since the departing 
aircraft tracked the runway centerline.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in 
the number of runs in which missed CAs and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, 
and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which nuisance CAs and nuisance WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies. 
Table 106.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 28,812 1,394,    4.8 552,    1.9 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
9 24,696    364,    1.5   76,    0.3 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
10 16,464      50,    0.3     4,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
11 12,348        4,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Truth 4,116        3,    0.1     0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
8 28,812    974,    3.4 718,    2.5 45,    0.2 498,    1.7 
9 24,696    248,    1.0 134,    0.5 10,    0.0 211,    0.8 
10 16,464      56,    0.3   28,    0.2   0,    0.0   61,    0.4 
11 12,348      22,    0.2   19,    0.2   0,    0.0   20,    0.2 
Truth 4,116        1,    0.0     7,    0.2   0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
 
Both aircraft did, however, experience missed CAs when transmitting truth position data.  For Aircraft 
A, the CAs should have occurred when the crossing airborne traffic was at a higher altitude (two at 850 ft 
AGL, one at 1,000 ft AGL) than the departing aircraft (361 ft, 576 ft, and 355 ft AGL respectively).  For 
Aircraft B, the CA should have occurred when Aircraft A was at 108 AGL on departure and the crossing 
aircraft was at 850 AGL.  All of these alerts would be necessary since the crossing traffic was further down 
the runway than the departing aircraft. 
Table 107.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 21,609 450,    2.1 154,    0.7 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 21,609 453,    2.1 166,    0.8 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 21,609 441,    2.0 160,    0.7 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Both 21,609 471,    2.2 152,    0.7 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Crossing airborne) 
Neither 21,609 313,    1.4 227,    1.1 21,    0.1 185,    0.9 
Aircraft A 21,609 325,    1.5 239,    1.1   8    0.0 193,    0.9 
Aircraft B 21,609 333,    1.5 228,    1.1 10,    0.0 189,    0.9 
Both 21,609 330,    1.5 212,    1.0 16,    0.1 223,    1.0 
 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 107) shows that, the rate of missed and nuisance 
alerts was similar for all CD&R equipage levels per aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
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difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.785) and missed WAs (p = 0.858) occurred 
between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which missed CAs (p = 0.867) and missed WAs (p = 0.649) occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft 
B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which nuisance CAs (p = 0.054) and nuisance 
WAs (p = 0.204) occurred between equipage levels. 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various data accuracy levels is shown in Table 108.  The frequency of 
unnecessary maneuvering was low for this scenario and data accuracy had little effect, although the 
occurrence of unnecessary maneuvers was slightly higher when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  
For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which unnecessary 
maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 108.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using ATCAM During 
Departure Climb-Out With Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Crossing Airborne) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 14,406 60,    0.4 207,    1.4 
9 12,348   0,    0.0   23,    0.2 
10   8,232   0,    0.0     1,    0.0 
11   6,174   0,    0.0     1,    0.0 
Truth   2,058   0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 109.  The rate of unnecessary maneuvers was the same for each 
equipage level for each aircraft  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which 
unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.897) and Aircraft B (p = 
0.948). 
Table 109.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using ATCAM During 
Departure Climb-Out With Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Crossing 
airborne) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 21,609 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 21,609 31,    0.1 N/A 
Aircraft B 21,609 N/A 117,    0.5 
Both 21,609 29,    0.1 115,    0.5 
 
Collision avoidance – The rate of near collisions and the rate of collisions was similar across all CD&R 
system equipage and position accuracy levels, with slightly less collisions occurring when the departing 
aircraft (Aircraft A) was equipped, as shown in Table 110.  For all CD&R equipage levels, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between the 
position accuracy levels: 
• Neither aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 1.0), 
• Aircraft A equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 0.981), 
• Aircraft B equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 0.983), and 
• Both aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 0.995) and collisions (p = 0.882). 
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Table 110.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs 
per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 7,203 1,400,  19.4 107,  1.5 1,351,  18.8 54,  0.8 1,394,  19.4 110,  1.5 1,237,  17.2 91,  1.3
9 6,174 1,206,  19.5   91,  1.5 1,165,  18.9 41,  0.7 1,194,  19.3 102,  1.6 1,050,  17.0 88,  1.4
10 4,116    802,  19.5   60,  1.5    775,  18.8 28,  0.7    795,  19.3   67,  1.6    697,  16.9 60,  1.5
11 3,087    601,  19.5   45,  1.5    580,  18.8 21,  0.7    594,  19.2   50,  1.6    522,  16.9 45,  1.5
Truth 1,029    201,  19.5   15,  1.5    192,  18.7   7,  0.7    200,  19.4   17,  1.6    173,  16.8 15,  1.5
 
A more detailed investigation was conducted for the collisions that occurred when transmitting truth 
position data.  The initial location of Aircraft A and Aircraft B for each run that resulted in a collision are 
indicated in Figures 32, 33, 34, and 35.  For example, in Figure 32, a collision occurred when Aircraft A 
was at the runway threshold initiating departure when Aircraft B began to fly toward the runway from a 
position of 4,800 ft back from the runway centerline, 11,000 ft from the runway threshold, and 1,000 ft 
AGL.  There was seven collisions when only Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R.  These collisions 
occurred between when Aircraft A had just lifted off (approximately 5,000 ft from the runway threshold) 
until it was approximately 450 ft AGL (9,000 ft from the runway threshold).  For all runs in which Aircraft 
A was equipped with CD&R, the WA occurred when the aircraft was above the takeoff decision speed (131 
kts); therefore, the departure was not aborted.  When Aircraft B was equipped with CD&R, both aircraft 
were climbing for all collisions that occurred when Aircraft B was 10,000 ft or 11,000 ft from the runway 
threshold. 
 
 
Figure 32.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Neither Aircraft Maneuvers for Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic 
Scenario. 
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Figure 33.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft A Maneuvers for Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic 
Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 34.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Only Aircraft B Maneuvers for Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic 
Scenario. 
 
Figure 35.  Aircraft Starting Locations for Collision Runs When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
When Both Aircraft Maneuver for Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Airborne Traffic Scenario. 
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5.2 SURF IA Algorithm Results 
5.2.1 Position Data Analysis 
An analysis was conducted to determine the difference between the true aircraft position and the 
detected aircraft position for each position accuracy category for all test runs conducted during the SURF 
IA algorithm evaluation (Table 111) in order to validate the surveillance simulation against the NACp 95% 
horizontal accuracy bounds specifications (Table 1).  The prediction interval is an estimate of an interval in 
which future observations will fall, with a certain probability, given what has already been observed.  The 
95% prediction interval means there is a 95% probability that a future observation will be contained within 
the prediction interval.  These values fall within the defined NACp 95% horizontal accuracy bounds. 
Table 111.  Position Data Analysis During SURF IA Evaluation. 
NACp Mean (ft) 
Standard 
Deviation (ft) 
95% Upper Prediction 
Interval (ft) 
8 145.0 78.1 298.2 
9 46.9 25.5 96.8 
10 15.8 8.5 32.5 
11 4.7 2.6 9.9 
5.2.2 Runway Scenario – Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 2,367 combinations of the initiation delay and initial position 
for Aircraft B (taxiing aircraft) were evaluated, for a total of 198,828 test runs. 
The SURF IA algorithm issues indications in addition to alerts.  Indications identify operational 
conditions that are generally normal, yet relevant for runway safety and could be a precursor to a non-
normal situation (see Section 3.1.4).  A traffic indication (TI) highlights a potential runway traffic 
collision/hazard that could emerge in the near future.  TIs are intended to increase the flight crews’ 
awareness of the relevant runway traffic.  A runway status indication (RSI) identifies whether the runway 
that the ownship is approaching or using is in-use by other traffic and is not suitable for entering, takeoff, 
or landing. 
Algorithm performance – For Aircraft A, TIs were generated on approximately 21% to 57% of the test 
runs and RSIs were issued on approximately 30% of runs (Table 112).  For Aircraft B, TIs were generated 
on approximately 62% to 81% of runs and RSIs were issued on approximately 79% of runs.  For Aircraft 
A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which TIs and RSIs were generated 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which TIs (p < 0.001) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies and RSIs (p = 0.004) were generated between NACp 9 and 10 accuracies vs. NACp 8, 11, 
and truth accuracies. 
For both aircraft, CAs were generated on approximately 24% of the runs and WAs were issued on 
approximately 37% of the runs, almost independent of the NACp levels (Table 113).  For both aircraft, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs were generated 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The location range of the approach Aircraft A and the taxi crossing Aircraft B when an indication or 
alert was issued when transmitting truth position data is presented in Table 114.  Indications were issued 
when the approach aircraft was 2.8 NM to 1.2 NM prior to the runway threshold and alerts were issued 
when the aircraft was 1.2 NM to 184 ft prior to the runway threshold.  For this study, the runway was 150 
ft wide and the runway hold line was 225 ft from the runway centerline.  Onboard the taxiing aircraft, 
indications were issued approximately 500 ft before reaching the runway centerline (275 ft before the 
runway hold line) and alerts were issued approximately 149 ft before reaching the centerline (76 ft after 
crossing the hold line).  The data presented is in reference to the aircraft CG.  The nose of the aircraft used 
in this simulation was 72.8 ft from the aircraft CG; therefore, the nose of the aircraft crossed the hold line 
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approximately 73 ft earlier than indicated.  This means that an alert did not occur until the nose of the 
aircraft had reached the runway edge. 
Table 112.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 66,276 37,748,    57.0 11,682,    17.6 21,515,    32.5   3,840,      5.8 
9 56,808 15,882,    28.0      736,      1.3 17,780,    31.3      645,      1.1 
10 37,872   8,011,    21.1          0,      0.0 11,931,    31.5          0,      0.0 
11 28,404   6,002,    21.1          0,      0.0   8,987,    31.6          0,      0.0 
Truth  9,468   1,998,    21.1          0,      0.0   3,004,    31.7          0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 66,276 53,689,    81.0 27,266,    41.1 52,089,    78.6 24,301,    36.7 
9 56,808 38,550,    67.9   7,429,    13.1 45,149,    79.5   6,232,    11.0 
10 37,872 23,960,    63.3   2,590,      6.8 29,939,    79.0   1,377,      3.6 
11 28,404 17,688,    62.3   1,757,      6.2 22,383,    78.8      762,      2.7 
Truth  9,468   5,844,    61.7     546,      5.8   7,460,    78.8      200,      2.1 
 
Table 113.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 66,276 17,216,    26.0  1,677,    2.5 22,141,    33.4  6,471,      9.8 
9 56,808 13,618,    24.0         4,    0.0 21,261,    37.4     995,      1.8 
10 37,872   9,118,    24.1         0,    0.0 14,211,    37.5         0,      0.0 
11 28,404   6,817,    24.0         0,    0.0 10,594,    37.3         0,      0.0 
Truth  9,468   2,268,    23.9         0,    0.0   3,529,    37.3         0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 66,276 17,244,    26.0 3,353,    5.1 22,241,    33.6 7,662,    11.6 
9 56,808 13,640,    24.0      47,    0.1 21,380,    37.6 1,167,      2.0 
10 37,872   9,169,    24.2        0,    0.0 14,356,    37.9        0,      0.0 
11 28,404   6,865,    24.2        0,    0.0 10,748,    37.8        0,      0.0 
Truth  9,468   2,278,    24.1        0,    0.0   3,578,    37.8        0,      0.0 
 
Table 114.  Aircraft Location When IAs Issued When Transmitting Truth Position Accuracy Using 
SURF IA for Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
Indication or 
Alert Type 
Aircraft A (Arrival) Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Maximum Distance 
prior to Threshold (ft) 
AGL 
(ft) 
Minimum Distance 
prior to Threshold (ft) 
AGL 
(ft) 
Distance Before 
Centerline (ft) 
Distance Past 
Centerline (ft)
TI 17,069 (2.8 NM) 928 11,573 (1.9 NM) 642 500 176 
RSI 11,287 (1.9 NM) 626  7,477 (1.2 NM) 427 499 136 
CA  7,477 (1.2 NM) 427  3,352 (0.5 NM) 212 149 153 
WA  3,139 (0.5 NM) 200 184 46 146 129 
 
Toggling occurred when multiple instances of IAs were generated during a test run.  Toggling is 
undesirable because it is a distraction to the flight crew and could cause mistrust in the technology.  
Toggling occurred frequently when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy (Tables 112 and 113).  For 
both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs, 
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multiple RSIs, multiple CAs, and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between IAs for less accurate position accuracy.  The toggling was also a 
result of collision avoidance maneuvering; accelerated braking and conducting a go-around maneuver.  For 
Aircraft B, toggling occurred for indications when transmitting truth position data.  In some instances this 
occurred by design.  Some situations warrant a multiple TI; as the situation progresses, an RSI or alert is 
generated, then, if the situation changes, the indication may be degraded back to a less severe TI.  It was 
determined that some of the multiple indications occurred as Aircraft B taxied across an intersecting runway 
prior to crossing Runway 10.  A TI was issued as the aircraft was taxiing toward Runway 10; however, 
before reaching Runway 10, the aircraft crossed an intersecting runway.  Since indications are not required 
in that situation, the indication was no longer issued.  After crossing the intersecting runway, however, the 
TI was issued again as the aircraft approached Runway 10.  The SURF IA algorithm does not have any 
mechanisms in place to address toggling between aircraft states. 
Table 115.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 17,431,    35.1 3,083,       6.2 15,510,    31.2 1,032,      2.1 
Aircraft A 49,707 17,458,    35.1 3,082,       6.2 16,046,    32.3 1,165,      2.3 
Aircraft B 49,707 17,429,    35.1 3,196,       6.4 15,631,    31.4 1,133,      2.3 
Both 49,707 17,323,    34.9 3,057,       6.2 16,030,    32.2 1,155,      2.3 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 34,768,    70.0 9,773,    19.7 39,251,    79.0 8,204,    16.5 
Aircraft A 49,707 35,058,    70.5 9,913,    19.9 39,234,    78.9 8,185,    16.5 
Aircraft B 49,707 34,842,    70.1 9,979,    20.1 39,265,    79.0 8,256,    16.6 
Both 49,707 35,063,    70.5 9,923,    20.0 39,270,    79.0 8,227,    16.6 
 
Table 116.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 12,283,    24.7 395,     0.8 17,979,    36.2 2,021,    4.1 
Aircraft A 49,707 12,208,    24.6 447,     0.9 17,890,    36.0 1,836,    3.7 
Aircraft B 49,707 12,312,    24.8 443,     0.9 17,912,    36.0 1,911,    3.8 
Both 49,707 12,234,    24.6 396,     0.8 17,955,    36.1 1,698,    3.4 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 12,334,    24.8 846,    1.7 18,115,    36.4 2,333,    4.7 
Aircraft A 49,707 12,265,    24.7 878,    1.8 18,045,    36.3 2,196,    4.4 
Aircraft B 49,707 12,328,    24.8 868,    1.8 18,053,    36.3 2,272,    4.6 
Both 49,707 12,269,    24.7 808,    1.6 18,090,    36.4 2,028,    4.1 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 115 and 116), the rate of IA generation and multiple 
IAs was similar between equipage levels per aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in 
the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.815), multiple TIs (p = 0.263), CAs (p = 0.869), multiple CAs (p = 
0.117), and WAs (p = 0.935) were generated between CD&R equipage levels.  There was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which RSIs and multiple WAs were generated between 
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Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  There was also a 
significant difference (p = 0.017) in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs were generated between 
Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.088), multiple TIs (p = 0.406), RSIs (p 
= 0.992), multiple RSIs (p = 0.938), CAs (p = 0.931), multiple CAs (p = 0.326), and WAs (p = 0.964) were 
generated between CD&R equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number 
of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft 
A and Both aircraft equipped. 
In order to demonstrate the effect of accurate position data on the occurrence of IA and multiple IA 
generation, IA statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position accuracy was 
transmitted (Tables 117 and 118).  Fewer TIs were issued than when less accurate position data was 
transmitted (Table 115).  The RSI, CA, and WA generation rates were similar when transmitting truth 
position data (Tables 117 and 118) and when transmitting data with various (less accurate) position data 
(Tables 115 and 116).  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which 
TIs (p = 0.999) and CAs (p = 1.0) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which RSIs were generated between Neither aircraft and 
Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped and in the number of runs in which WAs 
were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  
For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which RSIs (p = 0.997) and 
CAs (p = 1.0) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number 
of runs in which TIs (p = 0.005) were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. 
Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped and in the number of runs in which WAs (p <0.001) were generated 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Multiple IAs were greatly reduced when transmitting accurate position data (Tables 117 and 118).  
There were virtually no multiple IAs for Aircraft A.  For Aircraft B, the rate of TIs was reduced from 
approximately 20% to 6% and the rate of RSIs was reduced from approximately 16% to 2%.  There were 
virtually no multiple alerts for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.50) in 
the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs (p = 0.990) and multiple WAs 
(p = 0.50) were generated; however, there was a significant difference (p = 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which multiple TIs were generated between Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both 
aircraft equipped. 
Table 117.  SURF IA Indication Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with 
Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 10,519,    21.2        0,    0.0 15,429,    31.0       0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 49,707 10,514,    21.1        0,    0.0 16,022,    32.2       0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 10,498,    21.1        0,    0.0 15,265,    30.7       0,    0.0 
Both 49,707 10,506,    21.1        0,    0.0 15,786,    31.8       0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 30,682,    61.7 2,854,    5.7 39,143,    78.8 1,050,    2.1 
Aircraft A 49,707 31,071,    62.5 3,031,    6.1 39,144,    78.8 1,052,    2.1 
Aircraft B 49,707 30,901,    62.2 3,124,    6.3 39,124,    78.7 1,039,    2.1 
Both 49,707 31,195,    62.8 3,104,    6.2 39,124,    78.7 1,052,    2.1 
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Table 118.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 11,900,    23.9 0,    0.0 18,522,    37.3 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 49,707 11,901,    23.9 0,    0.0 18,411,    37.0 1,    0.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 11,901,    23.9 0,    0.0 17,970,    36.1 0,    0.0 
Both 49,707 11,898,    23.9 0,    0.0 17,963,    36.1 1,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 11,900,    23.9 0,    0.0 18,521,    37.3 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 49,707 11,901,    23.9 0,    0.0 18,411,    37.0 1,    0.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 11,901,    23.9 0,    0.0 17,970,    36.1 0,    0.0 
Both 49,707 11,898,    23.9 0,    0.0 17,963,    36.1 1,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 119.  Aircraft can 
cross into the missed and nuisance boundary multiple times throughout a test run, for varying lengths of 
time.  The number of times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the 
aircraft were within the boundaries was generally greater when transmitting less accurate data (Table 119).  
For Aircraft A there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft 
entered the missed boundary and nuisance boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies and in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between NACp 8 
vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 119.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 54,246,   81.8 6.9,    5.8 11.8,   11.9 8.0     791,    1.2 1.0,    0.2 0.6,    0.2 0.3 
9      738,     1.3 1.5,    2.1   1.5,     1.5 0.8     395,    0.7 1.0,    0.2 0.6,    0.2 0.2 
10      220,     0.6 1.0,    0.0   0.5,     0.3 0.2     231,    0.6 1.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.2 0.2 
11      116,     0.4 1.0,    0.0   0.2,     0.1 0.1     104,    0.4 1.0,    0.0 0.2,    0.1 0.1 
Truth          0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,     0.0 0.0         0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 54,590,   82.4 2.1,    1.2 4.1,   2.8 3.6 19,692,  29.7 3.7,    4.1 6.7,  10.6 5.3 
9 42,294,   74.5 1.3,    0.5 1.5,   1.0 1.3        58,    0.1 1.6,    1.4 1.3,    2.0 1.2 
10 25,003,   66.0 1.1,    0.3 0.6,   0.3 0.5          0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
11 12,221,   43.0 1.1,    0.2 0.3,   0.1 0.2          0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth          0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0          0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
 
For the approach Aircraft A, the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the 
aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while 
on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 2.8% of the test runs when transmitting data with 
NACp 8 accuracy.  Since Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline on approach and centerline after 
landing, the nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft was exiting the runway. 
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The taxiing Aircraft B entered the missed boundary at least once for a high percentage of the test runs 
for accuracy levels of NACp 8 to 11.  This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  The 
aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the true position of any part of the aircraft was 
determined to be between the runway shoulder edges, but the detected nose position when entering or tail 
position when exiting was outside of the runway shoulder edges.  There was no buffer between when the 
aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so measurable difference between the true and detected 
position could cause a missed boundary to be counted. 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance IAs was relatively low, overall, as shown 
in Tables 120 and 121.  IAs for both aircraft were highest when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  
For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed TIs, 
missed RSIs, missed CAs, and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
nuisance TIs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which nuisance TIs, nuisance RSIs, 
nuisance CAs, and nuisance WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 120.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
NACp Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 66,276 1,373,    2.1 3,347,    5.1 2,423,    3.7 5,339,    8.1 
9 56,808    260,    0.5    683,    1.2    758,    1.3    570,    1.0 
10 37,872      76,    0.2    172,    0.5    153,    0.4      58,    0.2 
11 28,404      17,    0.1      54,    0.2      39,    0.1      14,    0.0 
Truth 9,468        4,    0.0        0,    0.0        2,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 66,276 1,688,    2.5 3,056,    4.6 2,410,    3.6 5,274,    8.0 
9 56,808    699,    1.2    819,    1.4    748,    1.3    548,    1.0 
10 37,872    215,    0.6    197,    0.5    125,    0.3      49,    0.1 
11 28,404     68,    0.2      14,    0.0      31,    0.1      17,    0.1 
Truth 9,468     12,    0.1        0,    0.0        1,    0.0        1,    0.0 
 
Table 121.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 66,276     27,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
9 56,808       8,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
10 37,872       2,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
11 28,404       0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Truth 9,468       0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 66,276 3,668,    5.5 3,489,    5.3 2,925,    4.4 2,723,    4.1 
9 56,808        0,    0.0        1,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
10 37,872        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
11 28,404        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Truth 9,468        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
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Both aircraft experienced missed IAs when transmitting truth position data.  These unexpected events 
occurred because even though the aircraft were broadcasting truth position data, the ADS-B transmission 
model was still being used.  The transmission model resulted in a slight delay between one aircraft’s position 
at the time of transmitting the ADS-B message and the position at the time of reception of the ADS-B 
message by the other aircraft.  This delay was present in all scenarios, but this position difference was 
negligible compared to the NACp position uncertainty error.  In these scenarios, the aircraft did not detect 
a conflict with the other aircraft based on the broadcast position, but if instantaneous position information 
were used, a conflict would have been detected.  The small error introduced by the movement of the aircraft 
between transmission and reception of the ADS-B message resulted in just enough difference in relation to 
the other aircraft’s position to result in the missed IAs.  For Aircraft A, the missed TIs should have occurred 
when the aircraft was approximately 1.9 NM prior to the runway threshold and the missed CAs should have 
occurred when approximately 3,360 ft prior to the runway threshold.  For Aircraft B, the missed TIs should 
have occurred when approximately 445 ft from the runway centerline, the missed CA should have occurred 
when 126 ft from the runway centerline, and the missed WAs should have occurred when 121 ft from the 
runway centerline. 
An IA was considered a nuisance if it was generated at the same time the aircraft was determined to be 
within the nuisance boundary.  Therefore, nuisance indications for Aircraft A only occurred as the aircraft 
was exiting the runway. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 122 and 123), missed and nuisance IAs occurred for 
less than 3% of the runs for all CD&R equipage levels for both aircraft.  There were no nuisance RSIs, 
CAs, and WAs for Aircraft A.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which missed TIs (p = 0.976), missed RSIs (p = 0.170), missed CAs (p = 0.724) and missed WAs (p = 
0.480) occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the 
number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 0.593), missed RSIs (p = 0.475), missed CAs (p = 0.924) and 
missed WAs (p = 0.446) occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which nuisance TIs occurred between Aircraft B equipped 
vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which nuisance TIs (p = 0.076), nuisance CAs (p = 0.652), and nuisance 
WAs (p = 0.274) occurred between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p = 0.015) in the 
number of runs in which nuisance RSIs occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. 
Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 122.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707 428,    0.9 1,103,    2.2 853,    1.7 1,473,    3.0 
Aircraft A 49,707 440,    0.9 1,090,    2.2 831,    1.7 1,538,    3.1 
Aircraft B 49,707 433,    0.9 1,010,    2.0 825,    1.7 1,508,    3.0 
Both 49,707 429,    0.9 1,053,    2.1 866,    1.7 1,462,    2.9 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 673,    1.4 1,025,    2.1 840,    1.7 1,434,    2.9 
Aircraft A 49,707 645,    1.3 1,059,    2.1 820,    1.6 1,484,    3.0 
Aircraft B 49,707 669,    1.3    990,    2.0 818,    1.6 1,516,    3.0 
Both 49,707 695,    1.4 1,012,    2.0 837,    1.7 1,455,    2.9 
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Table 123.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 49,707     3,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 49,707     4,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 49,707   22,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Both 49,707     8,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 49,707 877,    1.8 849,    1.7 749,    1.5 721,    1.4 
Aircraft A 49,707 880,    1.8 810,    1.6 704,    1.4 652,    1.3 
Aircraft B 49,707 967,    2.0 935,    1.9 742,    1.5 682,    1.4 
Both 49,707 944,    1.9 896,    1.8 730,    1.5 668,    1.3 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – As defined in Section 4.5.3, maneuvering was considered unnecessary if 
made based on a WA issued when the aircraft were broadcasting NACp accuracy, but for the same test 
conditions, a WA was not issued when broadcasting truth position data.  Only the test runs in which 
maneuvering was possible were evaluated for unnecessary maneuvers.  For Aircraft A, unnecessary 
maneuvering was only evaluated when Aircraft A or Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft 
B, unnecessary maneuvering was evaluated when Aircraft B or Both aircraft were equipped.  This measure 
quantifies untimely nuisance alerts using an algorithm-dependent methodology. 
The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily when transmitting data with 
the various accuracy levels is shown in Table 124.  Unnecessary maneuvers only occurred when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  With a NACp value of 8, approximately 4% or 4 in 100 
of the maneuvers were unnecessary for Aircraft A and 2.5 in 100 were unnecessary for Aircraft B.  With a 
NACp value of 9, approximately 5 in 1,000 maneuvers were unnecessary for Aircraft A and 1 in 1,000 were 
unnecessary for Aircraft B.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
unnecessary maneuvers occurred for both aircraft between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies. 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 125.  The number of unnecessary maneuvers was similar between 
equipage levels per aircraft.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which unnecessary 
maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.042) and Aircraft B (p = 0.467). 
Table 124.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using SURF IA During 
Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 33,138 1,307,    3.9 820,    2.5 
9 28,404    141,    0.5   20,    0.1 
10 18,936        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
11 14,202        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Truth 4,734        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
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Table 125.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using SURF IA During 
Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 49,707 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 49,707 685,    1.4 N/A 
Aircraft B 49,707 N/A   431,    0.9 
Both 49,707 763,    1.5   409,    0.8 
 
Collision avoidance – By the design of the scenarios, approximately 19% of the runs resulted in a near 
collision and approximately 9% resulted in a collision in the absence of CD&R, as shown in Table 126.  
The addition of CD&R did not have much effect on collision avoidance with approximately 18% of the 
runs resulting in near collision and approximately 8% in collisions when Both were equipped.  There was 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred when neither aircraft was 
equipped (p = 1.0), when Aircraft A was equipped (p = 0.961), when Aircraft B was equipped (p = 0.970), 
and when Both aircraft were equipped (p = 0.598) between accuracy levels.  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which collisions occurred when neither aircraft was equipped (p = 1.0), 
when Aircraft A was equipped (p = 0.887), and when Both aircraft were equipped (p = 0.063); however, 
there was a significant difference (p = 0.003) when Aircraft B was equipped between NACp 8 vs. NACp 
9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 126.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs 
per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 16,569 3,197, 19.3 1,543, 9.3 3,106, 18.8 1,467, 8.8 3,136, 18.9 1,304, 7.9 2,959, 17.9 1,320, 8.0
9 14,202 2,737, 19.3 1,318, 9.3 2,705, 19.1 1,301, 9.2 2,657, 18.7 1,273, 9.0 2,632, 18.5 1,242, 8.8
10 9,468 1,826, 19.3    880, 9.3 1,803, 19.0    868, 9.2 1,763, 18.6    845, 8.9 1,741, 18.4    833, 8.8
11 7,101 1,372, 19.3    659, 9.3 1,350, 19.0    642, 9.0 1,325, 18.7    634, 8.9 1,309, 18.4    622, 8.8
Truth 2,367    458, 19.4    220, 9.3    451, 19.1    215, 9.1    440, 18.6    212, 9.0    435, 18.4    205, 8.7
 
For the taxiing aircraft (Aircraft B), a WA was not timely.  The WA generally did not occur until the 
aircraft was on or almost on the runway (i.e., the mean, true position of Aircraft B when it received the WA 
was 107.6 ft, SD 59.9 ft, from the runway centerline).  Since the aircraft was already past the runway 
shoulder, no action was taken and the aircraft continued across the runway (as per the design of the test 
maneuvers). 
Some collisions were also unavoidable since the approach aircraft (Aircraft A) was issued a WA during 
a critical operational phase.  Most often, the WA occurred during high speed rollout without enough 
separation from the traffic to stop in time to avoid a collision.  Other times the WA occurred when the 
aircraft was too close to the ground to go around and the collision occurred as the aircraft continued along 
its predetermined path.  Some collisions also occurred during low speed taxi on the runway (< 40 kts) or as 
the aircraft was exiting the runway – conditions for which the SURF IA CD&R algorithm does not issue 
WAs; therefore, no avoidance action was taken.  
Although collision avoidance was not affected by the horizontal position accuracy level, there were 
slightly less collisions when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, in general.  In some instances, the 
WA was generated when the sensed taxi aircraft was on the runway, but the true location of the aircraft was 
far enough back from the runway that it could come to a complete stop before actually reaching the runway 
shoulder. 
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5.2.3 Runway Scenario – Departure with Taxi Crossing 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, 1,077 combinations of the initiation delay and initial position 
for Aircraft B were evaluated, for a total of 90,468 test runs. 
Algorithm performance – For Aircraft A, TIs were generated on 0% to 50% of the test runs and RSIs 
were issued on approximately 3% or less of runs (Table 127).  For Aircraft B, TIs were generated on 60% 
to 87% of runs and RSIs were issued on approximately 77% of runs.  For both aircraft, WAs were issued 
on approximately 30% of the runs, almost independent of the position accuracy levels (Table 128).  CAs 
were not generated by either aircraft for this scenario.  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference 
(p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which TIs, RSIs, and WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 
9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 127.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 30,156 15,012,    49.8   4,352,    14.4   990,    3.3   305,    1.0 
9 25,848   1,908,      7.4      252,      1.0   282,    1.1     13,    0.0 
10 17,232          0,      0.0          0,      0.0   112,    0.6       0,    0.0 
11 12,924          0,      0.0          0,      0.0     91,    0.7       0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308          0,      0.0          0,      0.0     30,    0.7       0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 30,156 26,251,    87.0 21,307,    70.7 19,894,    66.0 10,524,    34.9 
9 25,848 17,521,    67.8   3,682,    14.2 20,108,    77.8   2,380,      9.2 
10 17,232 10,547,    61.2      143,      0.8 13,404,    77.8     107,      0.6 
11 12,924   7,773,    60.1        97,      0.8 10,038,    77.7         9,      0.1 
Truth 4,308   2,580,    59.9        30,      0.7   3,348,    77.7         0,      0.0 
 
Table 128.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for ALL Evasive Actions by NACp for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 30,156 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,510,    24.9 1,895,    6.3 
9 25,848 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 8,043,    31.1    292,    1.1 
10 17,232 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 5,467,    31.7        0,    0.0 
11 12,924 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 4,106,    31.8        0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 1,366,    31.7        0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 30,156 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,324,    24.3 2,257,    7.5 
9 25,848 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,796,    30.2    260,    1.0 
10 17,232 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 5,309,    30.8         0,    0.0 
11 12,924 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 3,988,    30.9         0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 1,324,    30.7         0,    0.0 
 
The location range of the departing Aircraft A and the taxi crossing Aircraft B when an indication or 
alert was issued when transmitting truth position data is presented in Table 129.  Onboard the departing 
aircraft, TIs and CAs were not issued.  RSIs were issued on only 30 runs when the aircraft was 850 ft to 
1,191 ft from the runway threshold during departure roll.  WAs were issued on departure when the aircraft 
was 434 ft from the threshold and 50 kts until the aircraft had lifted off and was 6,015 ft from the threshold 
and 175 kts (33 ft AGL).  Recall that for this study, the runway was 150 ft wide and the runway hold line 
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was 225 ft from the runway centerline.  Onboard the taxiing aircraft, initial indications were issued 
approximately 500 ft before reaching the runway centerline (275 ft before the runway hold line) until 162 
ft before the runway centerline (63 ft after crossing the runway hold line).  WAs were issued approximately 
147 ft (78 ft after crossing the runway hold line) to 34 ft (41 ft onto the runway) before reaching the runway 
centerline.  Since the data presented is in reference to the aircraft CG and the nose of the aircraft was 72.8 
ft from the aircraft CG, a WA did not occur until the nose of the aircraft had just crossed the runway edge. 
Table 129.  Aircraft Location When IAs Issued When Transmitting Truth Position Accuracy Using 
SURF IA for Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
Indication or 
Alert Type 
Aircraft A (Departure) Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Minimum 
Distance from 
Threshold (ft) 
 
 
GS (kts) 
Maximum 
Distance from 
Threshold (ft) 
 
 
GS (kts) 
Maximum 
Distance Before 
Centerline (ft) 
Minimum 
Distance before 
Centerline (ft) 
TI N/A N/A N/A N/A 500 295 
RSI 850 34  1,191 35 498 162 
WA 434 50 6,015 175 147 34 
 
As the position accuracy was reduced, IA toggling occurred more frequently, particularly when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies (Tables 127 and 128).  For both aircraft, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs, multiple RSIs, and multiple 
WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between IAs for less accurate position data (NACp 8 and 9).  The toggling 
was also a result of collision avoidance maneuvering, accelerated braking and rejected takeoffs.  For 
Aircraft B, TI toggling occurred when truth position data was transmitted.  This toggling occurred by 
design.  A TI was initially issued for Aircraft B and as the situation progressed, an RSI and WA were issued.  
Then, after Aircraft A rejected the departure, a TI was issued again. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 130 and 131), the rate of IA generation and multiple 
IAs was similar between equipage levels per aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in 
the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.516), multiple TIs (p = 0.204), and WAs (p = 0.818) were generated 
between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which RSIs (p < 
0.001), multiple RSIs (p < 0.001), and multiple WAs (p = 0.014) were generated between Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.728), RSIs (p = 0.784), multiple RSIs (p = 0.046), 
WAs (p = 0.950), and multiple WAs (p = 0.028) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a 
significant difference (p = 0.011) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs were generated between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 130.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617    4,286,    18.9 1,107,      4.9      106,      0.5        3,      0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617    4,205,    18.6 1,128,      5.0      625,      2.8    143,      0.6 
Aircraft B 22,617    4,257,    18.8 1,172,      5.2      106,      0.5        2,      0.0 
Both 22,617    4,172,    18.4 1,197,      5.3      668,      3.0    170,      0.8 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 16,201,    71.6 6,197,    27.4 16,657,    73.7 3,196,    14.1 
Aircraft A 22,617 16,167,    71.5 6,415,    28.4 16,741,    74.0 3,173,    14.0 
Aircraft B 22,617 16,199,    71.6 6,208,    27.4 16,721,    73.9 3,358,    14.8 
Both 22,617 16,105,    71.2 6,439,    28.5 16,673,    73.7 3,293,    14.6 
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Table 131.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,627,    29.3 583,    2.6 
Aircraft A 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,624,    29.3 491,    2.2 
Aircraft B 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,574,    29.1 579,    2.6 
Both 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,667,    29.5 534,    2.4 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,427,    28.4 632,    2.8 
Aircraft A 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,435,    28.4 593,    2.6 
Aircraft B 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,412,    28.4 689,    3.0 
Both 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,467,    28.6 603,    2.7 
 
IA statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position accuracy was transmitted 
(Tables 132 and 133).  TIs were not issued for Aircraft A when transmitting data with truth position 
accuracy.  The rate of TI generation was reduced by approximately 10% for Aircraft B and multiple TIs 
were practically eliminated.  The rate of RSI generation transmitting data with truth position accuracy was 
similar to the rate when transmitting data with NACp accuracy (Tables 130 and 131) for both aircraft; 
however, there were no multiple RSIs for Aircraft B.  The rate of WA generation was similar when 
transmitting data with truth position accuracy; however, multiple WAs were virtually eliminated.  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.50) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs 
were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which 
RSIs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both 
aircraft equipped and in the number of runs in which WAs (p = 0.007) were generated between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.897), RSIs (p = 1.0) and multiple WAs (p 
= 0.50) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs 
in which multiple TIs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. 
Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped and in the number of runs in which WAs (p = 0.007) were generated 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 132.  SURF IA Indication Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departure 
with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617          0,      0.0     0,    0.0        0,        0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617          0,      0.0     0,    0.0      735,      3.2 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 22,617          0,      0.0     0,    0.0        0,        0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 22,617          0,      0.0     0,    0.0      482,      2.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 13,545,    59.9     0,    0.0 17,724,    78.4 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617 13,594,    60.1 718,    3.2 17,724,    78.4 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 22,617 13,545,    59.9     0,    0.0 17,724,    78.4 0,    0.0 
Both 22,617 13,608,    60.2 731,    3.2 17,723,    78.4 0,    0.0 
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Table 133.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departure with 
Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,182,    31.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,098,    31.4 1,    0.0 
Aircraft B 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,929,    30.6 0,    0.0 
Both 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,887,    30.4 1,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,182,    31.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 7,098,    31.4 1,    0.0 
Aircraft B 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,929,    30.6 0,    0.0 
Both 22,617 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 6,887,    30.4 1,    0.0 
 
The SURF IA SPR [RTCA, 2010] specifies that IAs must be inhibited above 80 kts.  As currently 
implemented, the SURF IA algorithm calculates alerts throughout the departure when the aircraft’s ground 
speed is greater than 80 kts (the mean ground speed when a WA was generated on Aircraft A was 121.7 
kts, SD 36.6 kts for truth accuracy).  These data were included in Tables 127 and 128 even though these 
alerts would not be displayed in the cockpit as per the SPR.  For the test runs in which the departing aircraft 
was to take action (Aircraft A only and Both equipped), WAs were generated when the aircraft was less 
than 80 kts in only 5% to 7% of the test runs; without this restriction, WAs were generated on 23% to 32% 
of the test runs (Table 134).  More research is necessary to determine the collision avoidance benefits of 
providing alerts to the flight crew after reaching 80 kts versus the risk of pilots making inappropriate 
responses at high speed. 
Table 134.  SURF IA WA Alert Data for Departure Aircraft. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA when < 80 kts 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 15,078 3,528,    23.4 1,048,    7.0 
9 12,924 4,201,    32.5    760,    5.9 
10 8,616 2,734,    31.7    452,    5.3 
11 6,462 2,053,    31.8    340,    5.3 
Truth 2,154    683,    31.7    113,    5.3 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 135.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the 
boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data.  This was particularly true when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number 
of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies and in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between NACp 8 
vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The departing aircraft (Aircraft A) entered the missed boundary along its entire departure path.  Since 
Aircraft A tracked the runway centerline on departure, it was not possible for the aircraft to enter the 
nuisance boundary. 
The taxiing aircraft (Aircraft B) entered the missed boundary at least once for a high percentage of the 
test runs for accuracy levels of NACp 8 to 11.  This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  
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The aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the true position of any part of the aircraft 
was determined to be between the runway shoulder edges, but the detected nose position when entering or 
tail position when exiting was outside of the runway shoulder edges.  As such, there was no buffer between 
when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so a measurable difference between the true 
and detected position could cause a missed boundary to be counted. 
Table 135.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Departure with Taxi Crossing 
Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 24,647,  81.7 4.4,    3.2 9.0,     8.4 23.7        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
9        48,    0.2 2.1,    1.5 2.1,     2.5 5.0        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
10          0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,     0.0 0.0        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
11          0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,     0.0 0.0        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth         0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,     0.0 0.0        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 18,282,  60.6 1.6,    0.9 3.7,     2.6 9.7 5,941,   19.7 2.4,    2.7 4.2,    7.8 9.2 
9 11,368,  44.0 1.1,    0.3 1.3,     0.9 3.8        7,     0.0 1.1,    0.4 0.4,    0.2 1.1 
10   6,360,  36.9 1.0,    0.2 0.5,     0.3 1.5        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
11   2,760,  21.4 1.0,    0.1 0.3,     0.1 0.8        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth          0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,     0.0 0.0        0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance IAs were relatively low, overall, as shown 
in Tables 136 and 137.  Missed IAs for both aircraft were highest when transmitting data with NACp 8 
accuracy.  Nuisance IAs only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy for Aircraft B.  
Nuisance IAs were not issued on Aircraft A because the aircraft tracked the runway centerline during 
departure and liftoff.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which missed RSIs and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  
For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed TIs 
occurred between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was also a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed RSIs, missed WAs, nuisance TIs, 
nuisance RSIs, and nuisance WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 136.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 30,156   0,    0.0    244,      0.8 0,    0.0 3,428,    11.4 
9 25,848   0,    0.0      16,      0.1 0,    0.0    539,      2.1 
10 17,232   0,    0.0        0,      0.0 0,    0.0      90,      0.5 
11 12,924   0,    0.0        0,      0.0 0,    0.0      22,      0.2 
Truth 4,308   0,    0.0        0,      0.0 0,    0.0        2,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 30,156 120,    0.4 4,979,    16.5 0,    0.0 3,542,    11.7  
9 25,848 130,    0.5    663,      2.6 0,    0.0    693,      2.7 
10 17,232   52,    0.3    208,      1.2 0,    0.0    215,      1.2 
11 12,924   15,    0.1    112,      0.9 0,    0.0    129,      1.0 
Truth 4,308     0,    0.0      28,      0.6 0,    0.0      44,      1.0 
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Table 137.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departure with 
Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
8 30,156        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
9 25,848        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
10 17,232        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
11 12,924        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
8 30,156 1,207,    4.0 766,    2.5 0,    0.0 1,285,    4.3 
9 25,848        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
10 17,232        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
11 12,924        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
Truth 4,308        0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0        0,    0.0 
 
Both aircraft experienced missed IAs when transmitting truth position data.  This was due to the 
transmission delay of the ADS-B model as described in Section 5.2.2.  For Aircraft A, the two missed WAs 
should have occurred when the aircraft had lifted off and was approximately 6,000 ft down the runway and 
32 ft AGL.  For Aircraft B, the missed RSIs should have occurred when the aircraft was approximately 488 
ft from the runway centerline and the missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was 
approximately 134 ft from the runway centerline. 
When analyzing the missed (Table 138) and nuisance (Table 139) data by CD&R equipage level, the 
rate of IAs are similar across equipage levels per IA type and aircraft, except for Aircraft A, RSIs were only 
issued when Aircraft A and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference 
(p = 0.828) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between equipage levels.  There was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed RSIs occurred between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which missed RSIs (p = 0.381), missed WAs (p = 0.699), 
nuisance TIs (p = 0.370), nuisance RSIs (p = 0.027), and nuisance WAs (p = 0.969) occurred between 
equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p = 0.011) in the number of runs in which missed TIs 
occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 138.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617   0,    0.0        0,    0.0 0,    0.0 1,029,    4.5 
Aircraft A 22,617   0,    0.0    168,    0.7 0,    0.0 1,012,    4.5 
Aircraft B 22,617   0,    0.0        0,    0.0 0,    0.0 1,039,    4.6 
Both 22,617   0,    0.0      92,    0.4 0,    0.0 1,001,    4.4 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 58,    0.3 1,550,    6.9 0,    0.0 1,174,    5.2 
Aircraft A 22,617 96,    0.4 1,479,    6.5 0,    0.0 1,137,    5.0 
Aircraft B 22,617 73,    0.3 1,463,    6.5 0,    0.0 1,177,    5.2 
Both 22,617 90,    0.4 1,498,    6.6 0,    0.0 1,135,    5.0 
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Table 139.  SURF Nuisance IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departure with Taxi 
Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
Neither 22,617     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 22,617     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 22,617     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Both 22,617     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
Neither 22,617 290,    1.3 172,    0.8 0,    0.0 324,    1.4 
Aircraft A 22,617 296,    1.3 171,    0.8 0,    0.0 327,    1.4 
Aircraft B 22,617 293,    1.3 203,    0.9 0,    0.0 318,    1.4 
Both 22,617 328,    1.4 220,    1.0 0,    0.0 316,    1.4 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various accuracy levels is shown in Table 140.  Unnecessary maneuvers 
only occurred for Aircraft B when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  With NACp 8, 
approximately 4% or 4 in 100 of the maneuvers were unnecessary.  With NACp 9, approximately 3 in 1,000 
of the maneuvers were unnecessary.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 140.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using SURF IA During 
Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 15,078 0,    0.0 580,    3.8 
9 12,924 0,    0.0   44,    0.3 
10 8,616 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
11 6,462 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Truth 2,154 0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
 
The number of unnecessary maneuvers was similar between equipage levels (Table 141).  There was 
no significant difference (p = 0.717	) in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred 
between equipage levels. 
Table 141.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using SURF IA During 
Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Taxi) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 22,617 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 22,617 0,    0.0 N/A 
Aircraft B 22,617 N/A   307,    1.4 
Both 22,617 0,    0.0   317,    1.4 
 
Collision avoidance – Approximately 31% of the runs resulted in a near collision and approximately 
14% resulted in a collision in the absence of CD&R, as shown in Table 142.  The addition of CD&R only 
slightly improved collision avoidance with approximately 28% of the runs resulting in a near collision and 
approximately 12% in a collision when Both were equipped.  For all CD&R equipage levels, there was no 
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significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between the 
position accuracy levels: 
• Neither aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 1.0) and collisions (p = 1.0), 
• Aircraft A equipped: near collisions (p = 0.999) and collisions (p = 1.0), 
• Aircraft B equipped: near collisions (p = 0.925) and collisions (p = 0.175), and 
• Both aircraft equipped: near collisions (p = 0.994) and collisions (p = 0.479). 
Table 142.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Departure with Taxi Crossing Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs 
per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 7,539 2,348, 31.1 1,087, 14.4 2,097, 27.8 950, 12.6 2,281, 30.3 968, 12.8 2,063, 27.4 882, 11.7
9 6,462 2,013, 31.1    931, 14.4 1,785, 27.6 821, 12.7 1,998, 30.9 903, 14.0 1,788, 27.7 810, 12.5
10 4,308 1,341, 31.1    623, 14.5 1,195, 27.7 545, 12.7 1,328, 30.8 608, 14.1 1,193, 27.7 544, 12.6
11 3,231 1,006, 31.1    467, 14.4    897, 27.8 406, 12.6    996, 30.8 456, 14.1    889, 27.5 405, 12.5
Truth 1,077    335, 31.1    155, 14.4    298, 27.7 135, 12.5    332, 30.8 152, 14.1    298, 27.7 135, 12.5
 
For the taxiing Aircraft B, a WA generally did not occur until the aircraft was on the runway (i.e., mean 
position of Aircraft B was 123.6 ft, SD 24.4 ft, from the runway centerline when transmitting data with 
truth accuracy).  Since the aircraft was already past the runway shoulder, no action was taken and the aircraft 
continued across the runway. 
For the departing Aircraft A when transmitting truth position data, 16.6% of the WAs occurred during 
takeoff roll when between 50 and 80 kts, 41.9% occurred when between 80 and 131 kts, and 41.5% occurred 
when greater than 131kts.  The aircraft was unable to abort the departure after reaching takeoff decision 
speed (131 kts); therefore, for 41.5% of the departures in which WAs were issued, the aircraft continued 
along its predefined departure path and collisions were unavoidable.  As described above, alerts were not 
inhibited above 80 kts as specified in the SURF IA SPR. 
Position accuracy had little effect on collision avoidance; however, there were fewer collisions when 
Aircraft B was equipped when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  As in the previous scenario, this 
was because, in some instances, Aircraft B was able to conduct emergency braking and stop before reaching 
the runway shoulder.  Even though the WA was generated when the aircraft was already on the runway 
(according to the data), the actual location of the aircraft was far enough back from the runway that it could 
come to a complete stop before actually reaching the runway shoulder. 
5.2.4 Runway Scenario – Arrival with Departure from Same Runway 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B (departure aircraft) was 
evaluated at 9 levels, for a total of 756 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, TIs were generated on approximately 100% of the test runs 
(Table 143).  RSIs were issued on approximately 89% to 95% of the test runs for Aircraft A and on 5% to 
94% of the test runs for Aircraft B, with higher percentages occurring when transmitting data with NACp 
8 and 9 accuracy levels.  CAs were generated on 78% to 81% of the test runs for Aircraft A and on 50% to 
83% of the test runs for Aircraft B (Table 144).  WAs were issued on 55% to 59% of the runs for Aircraft 
A and on 33% to 55% of the test runs for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in 
the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.333), RSIs (p = 0.175), CAs (p = 0.881), and WAs (p = 0.930) were 
generated between position accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.037) 
in the number of runs in which TIs were generated between position accuracy levels.  There was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which RSIs and CAs were generated between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies and in the number of runs in which WAs were generated 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
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Table 143.  SURF IA Indication Statistics Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with Departure 
from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 252 251,      99.6 131,    52.0 239,    94.8 49,    19.4 
9 216 216,    100.0   21,      9.7 195,    90.3   3,      1.4 
10 144 144,    100.0   12,      8.3 128,    88.9   0,      0.0 
11 108 108,    100.0     9,      8.3   96,    88.9   0,      0.0 
Truth 36   36,    100.0     4,    11.1   32,    88.9   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 252 249,      98.8 224,    88.9 236,    93.7 146,    57.9 
9 216 216,    100.0 101,    46.8   72,    33.3   27,    12.5 
10 144 144,    100.0   33,    22.9     7,      4.9     0,      0.0 
11 108 108,    100.0   25,    23.1     5,      4.6     0,      0.0 
Truth 36   36,    100.0     8,    22.2     2,      5.6     0,      0.0 
 
Table 144.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp Arrival with Departure from 
Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 252 205,    81.3 54,    21.4 149,    59.1 69,    27.4 
9 216 174,    80.6   8,      3.7 127,    58.8   7,      3.2 
10 144 112,    77.8   0,      0.0   80,    55.6   0,      0.0 
11 108   84,    77.8   0,      0.0   60,    55.6   0,      0.0 
Truth 36   28,    77.8   0,      0.0   20,    55.6   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 252 209,    82.9 104,    41.3 139,    55.2 79,    31.4 
9 216 133,    61.6   11,      5.1   96,    44.4 16,      7.4 
10 144   73,    50.7     0,      0.0   48,    33.3   4,      2.8 
11 108   55,    50.9     0,      0.0   36,    33.3   2,      1.8 
Truth 36   18,    50.0     0,      0.0   12,    33.3   1,      2.8 
 
When analyzing IAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, TIs were issued on approach 
when approximately 2.8 NM prior to the runway threshold and 928 ft AGL, RSIs when 1.9 NM prior to the 
threshold and 626 ft AGL, CAs when 1.2 NM prior to the threshold and 420 ft AGL, and WAs when 0.5 
NM prior to the threshold and 200 ft AGL.  For the departing aircraft, the majority of the IAs occurred 
when the aircraft was in position and holding. 
Toggling occurred frequently for TIs and also when transmitting data with NACp 8 position accuracy 
(Tables 143 and 144).  For both Aircraft , there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which multiple TIs, multiple RSIs, multiple CAs, and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 
8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between IAs for less accurate position data (NACp 8 and 9).  The toggling 
was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Sometimes multiple alerts occurred after Aircraft A conducted a 
go-around maneuver and after Aircraft B began its takeoff roll.  For both aircraft, TI toggling occurred 
when truth position data was transmitted.  It was determined that for Aircraft A these multiple TIs were 
generated after the collision had already occurred.  For Aircraft B, the multiple TIs occurred after Aircraft 
B had begun its takeoff roll.  When transmitting accurate position data, one multiple WA occurred onboard 
Aircraft B after the aircraft had begun its takeoff roll and a collision occurred. 
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Analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 145 and 146), for both aircraft, IAs were issued on a 
similar number of runs per IA and aircraft almost independent of the CD&R equipage level.  For Aircraft 
A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.25), RSIs (p = 0.27), CAs 
(p = 0.974) and WAs (p= 0.844) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.249), RSIs (p = 0.425), CAs (p = 0.997) 
and WAs (p = 0.965) were generated between equipage levels. 
Regarding IA toggling, for Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which multiple TIs (p = 0.032), multiple RSIs (p = 0.954), multiple CAs (p= 0.822) and multiple WAs (p= 
0.239) were generated between the levels of equipage.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p = 0.512), multiple RSIs (p= 0.10), multiple CAs 
(p= 0.895) and multiple WAs were generated (p= 0.151) between the levels of equipage. 
Table 145.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with 
Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 189,    100.0   55,    29.1 171,    90.5 14,      7.4 
Aircraft A 189 189,    100.0   31,    16.4 167,    88.4 14,      7.4 
Aircraft B 189 188,      99.5   47,    24.9 177,    93.7 12,      6.3 
Both 189 189,    100.0   44,    23.3 175,    92.6 12,      6.3 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 188,      99.5 103,    54.5   78,    41.3   36,    19.1 
Aircraft A 189 189,    100.0 102,    54.0   90,    47.6   55,    29.1 
Aircraft B 189 187,      98.9   90,    47.6   79,    41.8   43,    22.8 
Both 189 189,    100.0   96,    50.8   75,    39.7   39,    20.6 
 
Table 146.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with Departure 
from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 149,    78.8   18,      9.5 106,    56.1 25,    13.2 
Aircraft A 189 152,    80.4   15,      7.9 111,    58.7 19,    10.1 
Aircraft B 189 152,    80.4   13,      6.9 106,    56.1 19,    10.1 
Both 189 150,    79.4   16,      8.5 113,    59.8 13,      6.9 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 121,    64.0   31,    16.4   81,    42.9   33,    17.5 
Aircraft A 189 123,    65.1   26,    13.8   84,    44.4   27,    14.3 
Aircraft B 189 122,    64.5   30,    15.9   85,    45.0   24,    12.7 
Both 189 122,    64.5   28,    14.8   81,    42.9   18,      9.5 
 
IA statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Tables 147 and 148).  The frequency of IA generation for Aircraft A was similar to that which occurred 
across all position accuracy levels (Tables 145 and 146).  For Aircraft B, the frequency of RSI and alert 
generation was lower.  The frequency of multiple TIs and multiple WAs were lower when transmitting data 
with truth position accuracy and there were no multiple RSIs or multiple CAs.  For Aircraft A, there was 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (100% of runs for each equipage level), RSIs 
(p = 1.0), CAs (p = 0.999), WAs (p= 0.993), and multiple RSIs (p = 0.250) were generated between the 
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equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p < 0.001) 
were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and both aircraft equipped 
and in the number of runs in which multiple WAs (p = 0.010) were generated between Neither aircraft 
equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which TIs (100% of runs for each equipage level), CAs (p = 0.998), 
WAs (p = 0.901), and multiple TIs (p = 0.126) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a 
significant difference in the number of runs in which RSIs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) 
were generated between Neither aircraft and Both aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A and Aircraft B equipped. 
Table 147.  SURF IA Indication Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with 
Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 189,    100.0   35,    18.5 168,    88.9   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 189 189,    100.0     5,      2.6 168,    88.9   1,    0.5 
Aircraft B 189 189,    100.0   47,    24.9 168,    88.9   0,    0.0 
Both 189 189,    100.0   21,    11.1 168,    88.9   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 189,    100.0   49,    25.9   13,      6.9   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 189 189,    100.0   47,    24.9   20,    10.6   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 189 189,    100.0   35,    18.5     0,      0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 189 189,    100.0   34,    18.0     3,      1.6   0,    0.0 
 
Table 148.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival with 
Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 105,    55.6   6,      3.2 
Aircraft A 189 146,    77.2     0,    0.0 105,    55.6   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 107,    56.6   3,      1.6 
Both 189 147,    77.8     0,    0.0 107,    56.6   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189   91,    48.1     0,    0.0   63,    33.3   20,    10.6 
Aircraft A 189   89,    47.1     0,    0.0   63,    33.3     5,      2.6 
Aircraft B 189   90,    47.6     0,    0.0   69,    36.5     5,      2.6 
Both 189   90,    47.6     0,    0.0   66,    34.9   16,      8.5 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The aircraft entered the missed and nuisance boundary mainly when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 position accuracy, as shown in Table 149.  For both aircraft, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference (p = 0.333) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between 
position accuracy levels. 
For the approach Aircraft A, the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the 
aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while 
on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 2.0% of the test runs when transmitting data with 
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NACp 8 accuracy.  Since Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline on approach and centerline after 
landing, the nuisance boundary was not entered. 
The departing Aircraft B entered the missed boundary at least once for 97% of the test runs when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy. This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  
The aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the aircraft’s true position was within one 
runway width of the runway centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway width from 
the centerline.  As such, there was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed 
boundary so a measurable difference between the true and detected position could cause a missed boundary 
to be counted. 
Table 149.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival with Departure from 
Same Runway Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8   98,    38.9 3.4,    2.7 4.8,    4.4 4.6 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
9     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 246,    97.6 9.5,    5.8 17.9,    13.0 20.8 1,    0.4 2.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.0 0.3 
9     1,      0.5 3.0,    0.0   0.6,      0.0 0.6 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
 
There was a low rate of missed IAs, as shown in Table 150, with a higher occurrence when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 position accuracy.  There were no nuisance IAs for either aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there 
was no significant difference (p = 0.210) in the number of runs in which missed TIs occurred between 
position accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which 
missed RSIs, missed CAs, and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 0.118) in the number of runs in which 
missed CAs occurred between position accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference (p= 0.015) in 
the number of runs in which missed TIs occurred between NACp 8 and 10 accuracies vs. NACp 9, 11, and 
truth accuracies.  There was also a significant difference in the number of runs in which missed RSIs (p = 
0.019) and missed WAs (p < 0.001) occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
For Aircraft A when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, three of the missed TIs should have 
occurred approximately 2.8 NM prior to the threshold and 928 ft AGL.  All other missed TIs should have 
occurred when approximately 30 ft prior to the threshold and 25 ft AGL.  All of the missed RSIs should 
have occurred when approximately 1.9 NM prior to the threshold and 626 ft AGL.  The missed CAs should 
have occurred when approximately 1.2 NM prior to the threshold and 418 AGL.  The missed WAs should 
have occurred when approximately 0.5 NM prior to the threshold and 200 ft AGL.  For Aircraft B, the 
missed TIs should have occurred at a variety of locations along the departure; in position prior to beginning 
departure roll until after lifting off and 827 ft AGL.  The RSIs should have occurred when the aircraft had 
just begun its departure roll and at a 3 kt ground speed.  When transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, the 
missed CAs should have occurred while the aircraft was in position and holding; all other missed CAs 
should have occurred after initiating the departure roll and at a 36 kt ground speed.  Five of the missed WAs 
should have occurred after the aircraft initiated the departure roll and was from 35 to 153 kts.  All other 
missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was in position prior to initiating the departure roll. 
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Table 150.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival with 
Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 252 22,    8.7 11,    4.4 9,    3.6 29,    11.5 
9 216 12,    5.6   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   4,      1.9 
10 144   8,    5.6   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   1,      0.7 
11 108   5,    4.6   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
Truth 36   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 252 15,    6.0   8,    3.2 5,    2.0 30,    11.9 
9 216   2,    0.9   1,    0.5 1,    0.5   6,      2.8 
10 144   6,    4.2   1,    0.7 4,    2.8   0,      0.0 
11 108   3,    2.8   1,    0.9 1,    0.9   1,      0.9 
Truth 36   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
 
Analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 151), the rate of indications was higher for some equipage 
levels than others.  For both aircraft, the rate of missed alerts was relatively evenly distributed across all 
CD&R equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which 
missed TIs (p < 0.001) occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both 
aircraft equipped and the number of runs in which missed RSIs (p = 0.015) occurred between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.505) and missed WAs (p = 0.946) occurred 
between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which 
missed TIs (p = 0.077), missed CAs (p = 0.481), and missed WAs (p = 0.994) occurred between equipage 
levels.  There was a significant difference (p = 0.002) in the number of runs in which missed RSIs occurred 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 151.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival with 
Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 189 13,      6.9 4,    2.1 2,    1.1   9,    4.8 
Aircraft A 189   4,      2.1 6,    3.2 3,    1.6   9,    4.8 
Aircraft B 189 27,    14.3 0,    0.0 1,    0.5   9,    4.8 
Both 189   3,      1.6 1,    0.5 3,    1.6   7,    3.7 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 189 12,      6.3 7,    3.7 2,    1.1   9,    4.8 
Aircraft A 189   4,      2.1 4,    2.1 3,    1.6   9,    4.8 
Aircraft B 189   6,      3.2 0,    0.0 2,    1.1   9,    4.8 
Both 189   4,      2.1 0,    0.0 4,    2.1 10,    5.3 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered 
unnecessarily when transmitting data with the various accuracy levels is shown in Table 152.  Unnecessary 
maneuvering only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  For Aircraft A, there 
was no significant difference (p = 0.026) in the number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred 
between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
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Table 152.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using SURF IA During 
Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 126 5,    4.0 8,    6.3 
9 108 3,    2.8 1,    0.9 
10 72 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 54 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 18 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 153.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.284) and Aircraft B 
(p = 0.503). 
Table 153.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using SURF IA During 
Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 189 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 189 6,    3.2 N/A 
Aircraft B 189 N/A   6,    3.2 
Both 189 2,    1.1   3,    1.6 
 
Collision avoidance – The rate of near collisions was similar across all CD&R equipage levels and 
position accuracy levels, as shown in Table 154.  The rate of collisions was similar when Neither aircraft 
or only the departing Aircraft B were equipped with CD&R.  The rates were also similar (much less) when 
both aircraft or only the arriving Aircraft A were equipped, with no collisions occurring for NACp 9, 10, 
11, and truth accuracies.  For this scenario, collision avoidance was much more effective when the arrival 
aircraft was equipped with CD&R.  When neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R, there was no 
significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near collisions or collisions occurred between 
position accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) 
in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred; however, there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  When only Aircraft B was equipped, there was no significant difference in the number of runs 
in which near collisions (p = 0.914) or collisions (p = 0.914) occurred between position accuracy levels.  
When Both aircraft were equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.981) in the number of runs in 
which near collisions occurred; however, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 154.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 63 21,  33.3 21,  33.3 21,  33.3 12,  19.1 26,  41.3 26,  41.3 24,  38.1 8,  12.7 
9 54 18,  33.3 18,  33.3 18,  33.3   0,    0.0 19,  35.2 19,  35.2 18,  33.3 0,    0.0 
10 36 12,  33.3 12,  33.3 12,  33.3   0,    0.0 12,  33.3 12,  33.3 12,  33.3 0,    0.0 
11 27   9,  33.3   9,  33.3   9,  33.3   0,    0.0   9,  33.3   9,  33.3   9,  33.3 0,    0.0 
Truth 9   3,  33.3   3,  33.3   3,  33.3   0,    0.0   3,  33.3   3,  33.3   3,  33.3 0,    0.0 
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For the 152 runs in which a collision occurred, the approach aircraft was either 1.0 NM (4.6% of 
collision runs) or 0.5 NM (30.3%) prior to the runway threshold, at the threshold (33.6%), or at the glide-
path aim-point (1,000 ft past threshold) (31.6%) when the other aircraft began its departure roll.  Many of 
the collisions occurred when the approach aircraft was landing before the departure aircraft started its 
takeoff roll.  Other times the departure aircraft had begun its roll but the approach aircraft landed and 
overtook the departing aircraft.  When the departing aircraft was equipped with CD&R, the collision was 
sometimes caused by the aircraft aborting the departure, as was the case for two collisions when Both 
aircraft were equipped.  In practice, a pilot would most likely continue the departure under these conditions. 
For the twelve collisions when only Aircraft A was equipped, the aircraft received a WA on four of 
these runs but too late to take action before the collision.  On two runs, WAs were not received; therefore, 
the aircraft did not take action.  On these two runs a WA was issued for the truth accuracy condition; 
however, which indicates that the collisions occurred due to reduced data accuracy.  On six runs, the aircraft 
initiated a go-around maneuver but collided with the departing aircraft just as it was beginning to ascend.  
For the 69 collisions that occurred when only Aircraft B was equipped, the aircraft received a WA but was 
in position and holding on 55 (79.7%) of these runs and did not take any action.  On 14 (20.3%) of the runs, 
the departing aircraft aborted its departure but since the arrival aircraft continued its landing, collisions 
occurred.  For the eight collisions that occurred when Both aircraft were equipped, on one run, neither 
aircraft received a WA and did not take action; however, there were WAs issued for the truth accuracy 
condition.  On three runs, neither aircraft took action even though WAs were issued.  The departing aircraft 
was in position and holding so it did not take action.  The approach aircraft received the alerts too late to 
take action before the collision.  On two runs, the approach aircraft initiated a go-around but the departing 
aircraft was in position and holding and did not maneuver.  On two runs, both aircraft took action, on one 
run as the approach aircraft was climbing out and on the other run after the approach aircraft had landed. 
5.2.5 Runway Scenario – Departures from Intersecting Runways 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on either Aircraft A or B was evaluated at 
16 levels, for a total of 1,344 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, TIs were generated on approximately 54% to 81% of the 
test runs (Table 155).  RSIs were issued during NACp 8 and 9 test runs only, for both aircraft.  CAs were 
not generated for either departing aircraft (Table 156).  WAs were issued on approximately 38% to 69% of 
the runs for both aircraft, depending on the position accuracy level.  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which TIs, RSIs, and WAs were generated between NACp 
8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 155.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure Runway 14L) 
8 448 239,    53.4   77,    17.2   37,      8.3 1,    0.2 
9 384 310,    80.7 131,    34.1     6,      1.6 0,    0.0 
10 256 208,    81.2   96,    37.5     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 192 156,    81.2   72,    37.5     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 64   52,    81.2   24,    37.5     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure Runway 22R) 
8 448 248,    55.4   85,    19.0   49,    10.9 2,    0.4 
9 384 306,    79.7 130,    33.9   10,      2.6 0,    0.0 
10 256 208,    81.2   96,    37.5     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 192 156,    81.2   72,    37.5     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 64   52,    81.2   24,    37.5     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
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Table 156.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure Runway 14L) 
8 448 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 169,    37.7 19,    4.2 
9 384 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 256,    66.7   7,    1.8 
10 256 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 176,    68.8   0,    0.0 
11 192 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 132,    68.8   0,    0.0 
Truth 64 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   44,    68.8   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure Runway 22R) 
8 448 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 171,    38.2 27,    6.0 
9 384 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 255,    66.4 10,    2.6 
10 256 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 176,    68.8   0,    0.0 
11 192 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 132,    68.8   0,    0.0 
Truth 64 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   44,    68.8   0,    0.0 
 
The minimum and maximum distance from the runway threshold and ground speed when a TI and WA 
were issued when transmitting truth position data is presented in Table 157.  For Aircraft A, TIs were issued 
from when the aircraft began its departure roll until approximately 3,900 ft from the runway threshold.  
WAs were generated when the aircraft was 292 ft to 5,064 ft from the runway threshold, when just lifting 
off.  For Aircraft B, TIs were issued from when the aircraft began its departure roll until approximately 
1,865 ft from the runway threshold.  WAs were generated when the aircraft was 309 ft to 2,695 ft from the 
runway threshold. 
Table 157.  Aircraft Location When IAs Issued When Transmitting Truth Position Accuracy Using 
SURF IA for Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
Indication or 
Alert Type 
Aircraft A Aircraft B 
Minimum 
Distance from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kts) 
Maximum 
Distance from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kts) 
Minimum 
Distance from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kts) 
Maximum 
Distance from 
Threshold (ft) 
GS 
(kts) 
TI 2 2 3,905 150 -2 3 1,865 104 
WA 292 41 5,064 169 309 42 2,695 125 
 
For TIs, toggling occurred less frequently when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy 
(approximately 17% of the test runs) than when transmitting data with the other NACp accuracy levels 
(Tables 155 and 156).  Minimal toggling occurred for RSIs when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy 
only.  There was also a low toggling rate for WAs (NACp 8 and 9 accuracies only).  There was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs occurred between position accuracy levels for 
Aircraft A (p = 0.333) and Aircraft B (p = 0.111).  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the 
number of runs in which multiple TIs and multiple WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, 
and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between IAs for less accurate position accuracy (NACp 8 and 9).  The 
toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Sometimes multiple IAs occurred after either or both 
aircraft aborted the takeoff.  For both aircraft, multiple TIs were generated when transmitting truth position 
data.  These multiple TIs occurred after either or both aircraft aborted the takeoff. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 158 and 159), IAs occurred consistently across 
equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p 
= 0.883), RSIs (p = 0.293), and WAs (p = 0.93) occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there 
was also no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.81), RSIs (p = 0.134), and WAs 
(p = 0.935) occurred between equipage levels. 
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Table 158.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336 236,    70.2     10,      3.0 13,    3.9   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336 243,    72.3   113,    33.6 14,    4.2   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336 245,    72.9   132,    39.3   6,    1.8   0,    0.0 
Both 336 241,    71.7   145,    43.1 10,    3.0   1,    0.3 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336 236,    70.2     11,      3.3 18,    5.4   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336 243,    72.3   113,    33.6 12,    3.6   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336 244,    72.6   136,    40.5 20,    6.0   1,    0.3 
Both 336 247,    73.5   147,    43.8   9,    2.7   1,    0.3 
 
Table 159.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 196,    58.3   17,    5.1 
Aircraft A 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 198,    58.9     3,    0.9 
Aircraft B 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 193,    57.4     5,    1.5 
Both 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 190,    56.5     1,    0.3 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 199,    59.2   21,    6.2 
Aircraft A 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 191,    56.9   11,    3.3 
Aircraft B 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 195,    58.0     3,    0.9 
Both 336   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 193,    57.4     2,    0.6 
 
The rate of TI toggling was high except when Neither aircraft were equipped with CD&R (Table 158).  
The rate of RSI toggling was very low.  WA toggling was highest when Neither aircraft were equipped 
(Table 159).  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs occurred 
between position accuracy levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.250) and Aircraft B (p = 0.50).  There was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs occurred between Neither 
aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs occurred between Neither 
aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was also a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs occurred between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Tables 160 and 161).  The rate of IA generation was consistent across all equipage levels as was the case 
when transmitting data with various position accuracies (Tables 158 and 159); however, there were no 
multiple WAs when transmitting data with truth position accuracy.  For both aircraft, there was no 
significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which TIs and WAs occurred between the levels of 
equipage.  However, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple 
TIs occurred between Neither aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 160.  SURF IA Indication Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departures 
from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336 274,    81.5       0,      0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336 274,    81.5   111,    33.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336 274,    81.5   125,    37.2     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Both 336 274,    81.5   142,    42.3     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336 274,    81.5       0,      0.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336 274,    81.5   111,    33.0     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336 274,    81.5   125,    37.2     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
Both 336 274,    81.5   142,    42.3     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 
 
Table 161.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Both 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
Both 336     0,    0.0     0,    0.0 231,    68.8     0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The missed and nuisance boundaries were only entered when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 position accuracy, as shown in Table 162.  For both aircraft, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 
0.333) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary between position 
accuracies. 
The aircraft entered the missed boundary for a high percentage of the test runs when transmitting data 
with NACp 8 accuracy due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  The aircraft was counted as 
entering the missed boundary when the aircraft’s true position was within one runway width of the runway 
centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway width from the centerline.  There was no 
buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so a measurable difference 
between the true and detected position could cause a missed boundary to be counted. 
For both aircraft, only missed TIs and missed WAs occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 
9 accuracies (Table 163).  For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which missed TIs and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  Nuisance IAs did not occur for either aircraft. 
Further investigation was made into the missed IAs that occurred when transmitting data with NACp 9 
accuracy.  For both aircraft, the missed TIs occurred after both aircraft initiated the takeoff roll (Aircraft A: 
3 runs; Aircraft B: 6 runs), after Aircraft A rejected the takeoff (Aircraft A: 1 run; Aircraft B: 2 runs), and 
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after Aircraft B rejected the takeoff (both aircraft: 2 runs).  All of the missed WAs occurred after both 
aircraft initiated the takeoff roll and before any action was taken. 
Table 162.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Departures from Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Departure Runway 14L) 
8 362,    80.8 3.9,    2.8 8.1,    7.7 24.3 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
9     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,   0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure Runway 22R) 
8 313,    69.9 3.6,    2.5 7.8,    7.6 22.8 1,    0.2 1.0,    0.0 0.2,    0.0 0.3 
9     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Table 163.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure Runway 14L) 
8 448 145,    32.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 139,    31.0 
9 384     6,      1.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     8,      2.1 
10 256     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,      0.0 
11 192     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,      0.0 
Truth 64     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure Runway 22R) 
8 448 128,    28.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 137,    30.6 
9 384   10,      2.6 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     9,      2.3 
10 256     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,      0.0 
11 192     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,      0.0 
Truth 64     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0     0,      0.0 
 
Analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 164), the missed IAs occurred consistently across equipage 
levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 
0.864) and missed WAs (p = 0.772) occurred between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 0.754) and missed WAs (p = 0.783) 
occurred between equipage levels. 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
 
Table 164.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Departures from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Departure 14L) 
Neither 336 41,    12.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   35,    10.4 
Aircraft A 336 38,    11.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   33,      9.8 
Aircraft B 336 34,    10.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   38,    11.3 
Both 336 38,    11.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   41,    12.2 
Aircraft B (Departure 22R) 
Neither 336 38,    11.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   32,      9.5 
Aircraft A 336 37,    11.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   40,    11.9 
Aircraft B 336 32,      9.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   36,    10.7 
Both 336 31,      9.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   38,    11.3 
 
Collision avoidance – Most near collisions and collisions occurred in the absence of CD&R, 
approximately 6% of the runs, as shown in Table 165.  The addition of CD&R eliminated near collisions 
and collisions when transmitting data with NACp 10, 11, and truth position accuracy levels and reduced 
the occurrence when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracy levels.  When neither aircraft was 
equipped with CD&R, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near 
collisions and collisions occurred between position accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft A was equipped, 
there was a significant difference (p = 0.017) in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.044) 
in the number of runs in which collisions occurred between accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft B was 
equipped, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.004) and 
collisions (p = 0.012) occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Both 
aircraft were equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.086) in the number of runs in which near 
collisions and collisions occurred between position accuracy levels. 
Table 165.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Departures from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 112 7,  6.2 7,  6.2 5,  4.5 4,  3.6 5,  4.5 4,  3.6 4,  3.6 4,  3.6 
9 96 6,  6.2 6,  6.2 1,  1.0 1,  1.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 2,  2.1 2,  2.1 
10 64 4,  6.2 4,  6.2 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
11 48 3,  6.2 3,  6.2 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 16 1,  6.2 1,  6.2 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
 
For the 36 runs in which a collision occurred, except for one, Aircraft A (departing Runway 14L) was 
at approximately 50 kts (approximately 420 ft from the runway threshold) when Aircraft B began its 
departure from Runway 22R.  For the other run, Aircraft A was at approximately 70 kts (approximately 
820 ft from the runway threshold) when Aircraft B began its departure.  Most of the collisions occurred 
when Aircraft A had just lifted off and Aircraft B was on departure roll at approximately 125 kts. 
For the five collisions that occurred when Aircraft A was equipped, on three runs no WA was generated 
and the aircraft did not take action.  On one run, a WA was issued but too late to take action before the 
collision.  On one run, the aircraft received a WA and took action but did not have time to avoid the 
collision.  For the four collisions that occurred when Aircraft B was equipped, no action was taken on three 
runs because no WAs were issued.  On the other run, a WA was issued too late for the aircraft to maneuver.  
For the six collisions that occurred when Both aircraft were equipped, Aircraft A did not receive a WA on 
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five of the runs and did not maneuver; on one run an alert was issued but too late for maneuvering.  Aircraft 
B did not receive alerts on any of these runs and did not maneuver.  For all of the runs in which WAs were 
not generated when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracy, alerts would have been issued generally 
16 to 17 seconds before the collision if truth data were available. 
5.2.6 Runway Scenario – Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 13 levels, 
for a total of 1,092 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, TIs were generated on approximately 76% to 85% of the 
test runs, with less TIs generated when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy (Table 166).  RSIs were 
issued on approximately 11% and 3% of the test runs for approach Aircraft A and on 24% and 5% of the 
test runs for departure Aircraft B, when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracy levels, respectively.  
CAs were generated on 18% to 23% of the test runs for Aircraft A for all position accuracy levels and on 
7% and 1% of the test runs for Aircraft B when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracy levels, 
respectively (Table 167).  WAs were issued on 40% to 50% of the runs for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, 
there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.007) and RSIs (p < 0.001) were 
generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.474) and WAs (p = 0.080) were generated between accuracy 
levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.010), 
RSIs (p < 0.001), and CAs (p < 0.001) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.204) in the number of runs in which WAs were 
generated between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing IAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for the approach aircraft, TIs 
were issued beginning approximately 2.9 NM prior to the runway threshold.  RSIs were not issued.  CAs 
were issued when approximately 1.3 NM to 0.7 NM prior to the threshold.  WAs were issued when 
approximately 0.5 NM to 0.2 NM prior to the threshold and after landing approximately 2,065 ft to 4,600 
ft from the threshold when 129 kts to 55 kts.  For the departing aircraft, TIs were issued when initiating the 
takeoff roll until 1,025 ft from the threshold and 77 kts.  WAs were issued when 297 ft to 745 ft from the 
threshold when 42 kts to 66 kts.  RSIs and CAs were not issued onboard the departing aircraft when 
transmitting accurate position data. 
Table 166.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 364 276,    75.8 113,    31.0 40,    11.0 1,    0.3 
9 312 267,    85.6 100,    32.0 10,      3.2 1,    0.3 
10 208 176,    84.6   60,    28.9   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 132,    84.6   45,    28.9   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   44,    84.6   15,    28.9   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 364 275,    75.5 125,    34.3  89,    24.4 4,    1.1 
9 312 264,    84.6 103,    33.0   15,      4.8 0,    0.0 
10 208 176,    84.6   60,    28.9     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 132,    84.6   45,    28.9     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   44,    84.6   15,    28.9     0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
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Table 167.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival and Departure 
from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 364 66,    18.1 10,    2.8 147,    40.4 35,    9.6 
9 312 72,    23.1   3,    1.0 156,    50.0 11,    3.5 
10 208 48,    23.1   0,    0.0 104,    50.0   0,    0.0 
11 156 36,    23.1   0,    0.0   76,    48.7   0,    0.0 
Truth 52 12,    23.1   0,    0.0   24,    46.1   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 364 25,      6.9   0,    0.0 153,    42.0 30,    8.2 
9 312   3,      1.0   0,    0.0 157,    50.3 11,    3.5 
10 208   0,      0.0   0,    0.0 104,    50.0   0,    0.0 
11 156   0,      0.0   0,    0.0   76,    48.7   0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,      0.0   0,    0.0   24,    46.1   0,    0.0 
 
For TIs, toggling occurred on approximately 29% to 34% of the test runs.  For RSIs, CAs, and WAs, 
toggling only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracy levels (Tables 166 and 167).  
For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p = 0.918) 
and multiple RSIs (p = 0.528) were generated between accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which multiple CAs (p = 0.002) and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference (p = 0.564) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs were generated between accuracy levels.  
There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs (p = 0.012) and multiple 
WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between IAs for less accurate position accuracy (NACp 8 and 9).  The 
toggling was also a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Sometimes multiple IAs occurred after Aircraft A 
conducted a go-around maneuver or conducted accelerated braking and when Aircraft B aborted the takeoff 
or stopped.  For both aircraft, multiple TIs were generated when transmitting truth position data.  These 
multiple TIs occurred after Aircraft A conducted accelerated braking (3 runs), Aircraft A conducted a go-
around and Aircraft B aborted the takeoff (1 run), Aircraft A conducted accelerated braking and Aircraft B 
aborted the takeoff (3 runs), or Aircraft B aborted the takeoff (8 runs). 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 168 and 169), the rate of IA generation was similar 
between equipage levels per aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of 
runs in which TIs (p = 0.67), RSIs (p = 0.079), CAs (p = 0.978), and WAs (p = 0.588) were generated 
between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which TIs (p = 0.983), RSIs (p = 0.054), CAs (p = 0.562), and WAs (p = 0.563) were generated between 
equipage levels. 
For both aircraft, the TI toggling rate was highest when Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R and 
lowest when Neither aircraft were equipped.  The RSI and CA toggling rate was low and similar across all 
equipage levels per aircraft.  WA toggling occurred more frequently when Neither aircraft and Aircraft A 
were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple 
RSIs (p = 0.50) and multiple CAs (p = 0.264) were generated but there was a significant difference (p < 
0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs and multiple WAs were generated between Neither 
aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.124) in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs were generated but there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs and multiple WAs were 
generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 168.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 217,    79.5   26,      9.5 18,      6.6 1,    0.4 
Aircraft A 273 227,    83.2   72,    26.4 15,      5.5 1,    0.4 
Aircraft B 273 225,    82.4 112,    41.0 11,      4.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 226,    82.8 123,    45.0   6,      2.2 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273 222,    81.3   24,      8.8 23,      8.4 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 224,    82.0   76,    27.8 19,      7.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 224,    82.0 117,    42.9 37,    13.6 2,    0.7 
Both 273 221,    81.0 131,    48.0 25,      9.2 2,    0.7 
 
Table 169.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival and Departure 
from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 60,    22.0 2,      0.7 136,    49.8 26,    9.5 
Aircraft A 273 59,    21.6 2,      0.7 127,    46.5 12,    4.4 
Aircraft B 273 56,    20.5 5,      1.8 122,    44.7   5,    1.8 
Both 273 59,    21.6 4,      1.5 122,    44.7   3,    1.1 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273   7,      2.6 0,      0.0 138,    50.5 21,    7.7 
Aircraft A 273   5,      1.8 0,      0.0 126,    46.1 14,    5.1 
Aircraft B 273 10,      3.7 0,      0.0 122,    44.7   5,    1.8 
Both 273   6,      2.2 0,      0.0 128,    46.9   1,    0.4 
 
IA statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Tables 170 and 171).  The TI rate for both aircraft was slightly higher than the rate when transmitting data 
with various position accuracy levels (Tables 168 and 169); however, the rate of multiple TIs was reduced.  
RSIs were not issued when transmitting accurate data.  The CA rate for Aircraft A was similar to that which 
occurred when transmitting data with various position accuracy levels.  CAs were not generated for Aircraft 
B when transmitting accurate data.  The WA rate for both aircraft was similar to the rate when transmitting 
data with various position accuracy levels.  There were no multiple CAs or WAs when transmitting accurate 
data.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.966), 
CAs (p = 1.0), and WAs (p = 1.0) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs were generated between Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 0.966) and WAs (p = 1.0) were generated but there was 
a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs were generated between 
Neither aircraft and aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 170.  SURF IA Indication Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 235,    86.1     0,      0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 237,    86.8   54,    19.8     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 236,    86.5   99,    36.3     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 233,    85.3 111,    40.7     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273 235,    86.1     0,      0.0     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 237,    86.8   54,    19.8     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 236,    86.5   99,    36.3     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 233,    85.3 111,    40.7     0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Table 171.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 63,    23.1     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 63,    23.1     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 63,    23.1     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Both 273 63,    23.1     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273   0,      0.0     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273   0,      0.0     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   0,      0.0     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Both 273   0,      0.0     0,    0.0 126,    46.1 0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 172.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the 
boundaries was generally greater when transmitting less accurate data.  For both aircraft, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  Since Aircraft A tracked the extended centerline 
on approach and centerline after landing, the nuisance boundary was not entered.  For Aircraft B, there was 
a significant difference (p = 0.006) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the nuisance boundary 
between NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
For the approach Aircraft A, the majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the 
aircraft had crossed the runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while 
on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 1.1% of the test runs when transmitting data with 
NACp 8 accuracy. 
The departing Aircraft B entered the missed boundary for a high percentage of the test runs when 
transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  This was due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  
The aircraft was counted as entering the missed boundary when the aircraft’s true position was within one 
runway width of the runway centerline, but the detected position was greater than one runway width from 
the centerline.  There was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary 
so a measurable difference between the true and detected position could cause a missed boundary to be 
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counted.  The departing aircraft entered the nuisance boundary after lifting off and over 600 ft AGL.  The 
aircraft started drifting from the runway centerline.  Since there was no buffer between when the aircraft 
was inside or outside the nuisance boundary, as was the case for the missed boundary definition, a 
measurable difference between the true and detected position near the boundary (one runway width from 
the centerline) could cause a nuisance boundary to be counted. 
Table 172.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrival and Departure from 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 214,    58.8 5.0,    3.3   9.1,    7.9   7.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
9     1,      0.3 2.0,    0.0   1.6,    0.0   1.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0     0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0     0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0     0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0   0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 311,    85.4 5.3,    3.4 10.2,    8.9 12.3 35,    9.6 1.3,    0.9 2.7,    2.2 5.3 
9   38,    12.2 1.1,    0.4   2.0,    1.4   3.6 26,    8.3 1.2,    0.4 1.1,    0.7 2.1 
10   28,    13.5 1.0,    0.2   0.7,    0.4   1.3 11,    5.3 1.0,    0.0 0.7,    0.4 1.3 
11   15,      9.6 1.0,    0.0   0.4,    0.2   0.7   4,    2.6 1.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.2 0.8 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,    0.0   0.0   0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed IAs was low except when transmitting data with NACp 
8 accuracy, as shown in Table 173.  For both aircraft, missed TIs occurred when transmitting data with 
NACp 8 and 9 accuracy only.  Missed RSIs did not occur for either aircraft.  Missed CAs only occurred for 
Aircraft A when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Missed WAs occurred mostly when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Nuisance alerts were not generated for either aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there 
was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed TIs, missed CAs, and missed 
WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was a 
significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed TIs and missed WAs occurred 
between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 173.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
8 364 77,    21.2 0,    0.0 18,    4.9 34,    9.3 
9 312   4,      1.3 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   1,    0.3 
10 208   0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 156   0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
8 364 65,    17.9 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 30,    8.2 
9 312   4,      1.3 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
10 208   0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 156   0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,      0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
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Missed TIs should have occurred after Aircraft B initiated its takeoff roll (92% of missed TIs), after 
Aircraft B rejected its takeoff (4.7% of missed TIs), and after Aircraft A conducted accelerated braking 
after landing (3.3% of missed TIs).  All of the missed CAs and missed WAs should have occurred after 
Aircraft B initiated its takeoff roll. 
Analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 174), the missed TIs and missed CAs occurred fairly evenly 
across equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, missed WAs occurred slightly more often when Aircraft B and Both 
aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft B, slightly more missed WAs occurred when Aircraft A 
and Aircraft B were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which missed TIs (p = 0.948) and missed CAs (p = 0.175) occurred but there was a significant difference 
(p = 0.018) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A 
equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in 
the number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 0.704) and missed WAs (p = 0.044) occurred between equipage 
levels. 
Table 174.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrival and 
Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Neither 273 21,    7.7 0,    0.0 3,    1.1   2,    0.7 
Aircraft A 273 21,    7.7 0,    0.0 4,    1.5   7,    2.6 
Aircraft B 273 21,    7.7 0,    0.0 7,    2.6 13,    4.8 
Both 273 18,    6.6 0,    0.0 4,    1.5 13,    4.8 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Neither 273 14,    5.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   2,    0.7 
Aircraft A 273 20,    7.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 10,    3.7 
Aircraft B 273 19,    7.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 12,    4.4 
Both 273 16,    5.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   6,    2.2 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with various accuracy levels is shown in Table 175.  Unnecessary maneuvers did 
not occur for Aircraft A.  The frequency of occurrences of unnecessary maneuvers for Aircraft B was steady 
across accuracy levels, approximately 3% of test runs, with no unnecessary maneuvers when transmitting 
accurate data.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which unnecessary 
maneuvers occurred between accuracy levels. 
Table 175.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for ALL Evasive Actions by NACp Using SURF IA During 
Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 182 0,    0.0 6,    3.3 
9 156 0,    0.0 5,    3.2 
10 104 0,    0.0 3,    2.9 
11 78 0,    0.0 2,    2.6 
Truth 26 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 176.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number 
of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels. 
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Table 176.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using SURF IA During 
Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 273 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 273 0,    0.0 N/A 
Aircraft B 273 N/A   8,    2.9 
Both 273 0,    0.0   8,    2.9 
 
Collision avoidance – The most near collisions and collisions occurred in the absence of CD&R, 
approximately 8% of the runs, as shown in Table 177.  The addition of CD&R eliminated near collisions 
and collisions when transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth position accuracy levels and reduced 
the occurrence when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Collision avoidance was most effective 
when only arrival Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R.  When neither aircraft was equipped with CD&R, 
there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near collisions and collisions 
occurred between accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.036) and collisions (p = 0.11) occurred between 
accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft B was equipped, there was a significant difference (p = 0.004) in the 
number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there was a significant difference (p = 0.012) in the 
number of runs in which near collisions and collisions occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies. 
Table 177.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 91 7,  7.7 7,  7.7 3,  3.3 2,  2.2 5,  5.5 5,  5.5 4,  4.4 4,  4.4 
9 78 6,  7.7 6,  7.7 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
10 52 4,  7.7 4,  7.7 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
11 39 3,  7.7 3,  7.7 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 13 1,  7.7 1,  7.7 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
 
All of the collisions but one occurred on runs in which the arrival Aircraft A landed and was 
approximately 0.25 NM from the runway threshold when the departing Aircraft B began its takeoff roll.  
The other collision occurred on a run in which the arrival aircraft was approximately 630 ft from the runway 
threshold after landing when the departing aircraft began to roll.  For the two collisions when Aircraft A 
was equipped, the aircraft did not take action because the WAs were issued too late for maneuvering to 
occur before the collision.  For the five collisions when Aircraft B was equipped, on one run no WA was 
issued and the aircraft did not take action.  On two runs, the WA actually occurred just after the collision.  
On the last two runs, WAs were issued and action was taken but too late to avoid the collision.  For the four 
collisions when Both aircraft were equipped, only the departing aircraft maneuvered on one run but too late 
to avoid the collision.  The aircraft did not maneuver for these runs because WAs were not issued or issued 
too late.  For four of these runs that resulted in collision, a WA was not issued on an aircraft transmitting 
NACp 8 data but was issued for the same situation with truth accuracy; therefore, collisions may have been 
avoided on these runs if the data was more accurate. 
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5.2.7 Runway Scenario – Head-On Arrivals 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 14 levels, 
for a total of 1,176 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For Aircraft A, TIs were generated on 11% to 69% of the test runs (Table 
178).  For Aircraft B, TIs were generated on 80% to 91% of the test runs.  RSIs were issued on 
approximately 93% to 99% of the test runs for Aircraft A and on 85% to 90% of the test runs for Aircraft 
B.  CAs were generated on 43% to 86% of the test runs for Aircraft A and on 82% to 87% of the test runs 
for Aircraft B (Table 179).  WAs were issued on 81% to 86% of the test runs for both aircraft.  For Aircraft 
A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.551) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated but 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which TIs, RSIs, and CAs were 
generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which RSIs (p = 0.499), CAs (p = 0.493), and WAs (p = 
0.365) were generated but there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which TIs 
were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
Table 178.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 392 270,    68.9 169,    43.1 390,    99.5 289,    73.7 
9 336   52,    15.5     3,      0.9 317,    94.3 139,    41.4 
10 224   24,    10.7     0,      0.0 208,    92.9   40,    17.9 
11 168   18,    10.7     0,      0.0 156,    92.9   30,    17.9 
Truth 56     6,    10.7     0,      0.0   52,    92.9   10,    17.9 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 392 357,    91.1 259,    66.1 351,    89.5   95,    24.2 
9 336 274,    81.5   55,    16.4 288,    85.7   25,      7.4 
10 224 179,    79.9   11,      4.9 191,    85.3   16,      7.1 
11 168 133,    79.2   11,      6.5 147,    87.5   12,      7.1 
Truth 56   45,    80.4     2,      3.6   49,    87.5     4,      7.1 
 
Table 179.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 392 338,    86.2 252,    64.3 318,    81.1 238,    60.7 
9 336 188,    56.0   36,    10.7 283,    84.2 107,    31.9 
10 224   96,    42.9     0,      0.0 191,    85.3   48,    21.4 
11 168   72,    42.9     0,      0.0 144,    85.7   36,    21.4 
Truth 56   24,    42.9     0,      0.0   48,    85.7   12,    21.4 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 392 339,    86.5 175,    44.6 316,    80.6 215,    54.9 
9 336 277,    82.4   60,    17.9 286,    85.1   90,    26.8 
10 224 184,    82.1   40,    17.9 191,    85.3   48,    21.4 
11 168 138,    82.1   30,    17.9 144,    85.7   36,    21.4 
Truth 56   46,    82.1   10,    17.9   48,    85.7   12,    21.4 
 
When analyzing IAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, TIs were issued onboard 
Aircraft A when the aircraft had landed and was taxiing on the runway (1 run, 4,874 ft from the runway 
 129 
 
threshold at 49 kt), had already exited the runway (4 runs, 10,033 ft from the threshold), or after the aircraft 
had conducted a go-around (9,171 ft from the threshold and 432 ft AGL).  RSIs were issued on approach 
when 2.8 NM to 1.3 NM prior to the threshold and 928 ft to 454 ft AGL and again after landing when 5,246 
ft from the threshold at 39 kts until the aircraft had exited the runway (10,033 ft from the threshold).  CAs 
were issued when approximately 1.2 NM to 0.8 NM prior to the threshold and 420 ft to 295 ft AGL and 
again after landing when exiting the runway (9,835 ft from the threshold).  WAs were issued when 0.5 NM 
to 0.3 NM prior to the threshold and 200 ft to 140 ft AGL and again after landing when 7,646 ft from the 
threshold and at 30 kt until having exited the runway (9,920 ft from the threshold).  Four WAs were also 
issued after the aircraft had conducted a go-around maneuver.  For Aircraft B, both TIs and RSIs were 
issued on approach beginning approximately 2.8 NM prior to the threshold and 932 ft AGL.  CAs were also 
issued beginning 2.8 NM to 1.2 NM prior to the threshold and 925 ft to 1 416 ft AGL.  WAs were issued 
when 2.8 NM to 0.5 NM prior to the threshold and 930 ft to 190 ft AGL. 
The highest rate of IA toggling was when transmitting data with NACp 8 position accuracy (Tables 
178 and 179).  In general, the rate of toggling was consistent across NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracy levels.  
For both aircraft, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple TIs, 
multiple RSIs, multiple CAs, and multiple WAs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and 
truth accuracies. 
The toggling included gaps between alerts for the lower position accuracy levels.  The toggling was 
also a result of aircraft maneuvering, such as one or both aircraft conducting a go-around maneuver or 
Aircraft A conducting accelerated braking or exiting the runway.  IA toggling occurred for both aircraft 
when transmitting truth position data.  For Aircraft A, these multiple IAs occurred when the aircraft had 
landed and exited the runway, or after either or both aircraft had conducted a go-around maneuver.  For 
Aircraft B when transmitting accurate position data, the multiple IAs occurred after either or both aircraft 
had conducted a go-around maneuver.  The two multiple TIs occurred after a collision occurred. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 180 and 181), the indication rate varied somewhat 
by equipage level.  The alert rate was more consistent across equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.995) and WAs (p = 0.826) were generated 
between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p = 0.003) in the number of runs in which TIs 
were generated between Aircraft B equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft equipped.  
There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which RSIs were generated between 
Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.228) and WAs (p = 0.857) were 
generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs 
(p < 0.001) and RSIs (p = 0.008) were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. 
Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
The IA toggling rate also varied by equipage level (Tables 180 and 181).  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.312) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated between 
equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p = 0.003), 
multiple RSIs (p = 0.004), and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither aircraft and 
Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs (p = 0.189) and multiple CAs (p = 0.129) were 
generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which multiple TIs were generated between Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Aircraft B equipped vs Both 
aircraft equipped and in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft B equipped vs Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
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Table 180.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294   89,    30.3   44,    15.0 294,    100.0 145,    49.3 
Aircraft A 294   88,    29.9   33,    11.2 268,      91.2 120,    40.8 
Aircraft B 294 117,    39.8   61,    20.8 294,    100.0 138,    46.9 
Both 294   76,    25.9   34,    11.6 267,      90.8 105,    35.7 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 251,    85.4 103,    35.0 269,      91.5   36,    12.2 
Aircraft A 294 239,    81.3   90,    30.6 243,      82.7   46,    15.7 
Aircraft B 294 277,    94.2   91,    30.9 262,      89.1   41,    13.9 
Both 294 221,    75.2   54,    18.4 252,      85.7   29,      9.9 
 
Table 181.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294 178,    60.5   69,    23.5 251,    85.4 136,    46.3 
Aircraft A 294 180,    61.2   72,    24.5 243,    82.7   91,    30.9 
Aircraft B 294 179,    60.9   83,    28.2 245,    83.3 129,    43.9 
Both 294 181,    61.6   64,    21.8 245,    83.3   85,    28.9 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 252,    85.7   80,    27.2 251,    85.4 130,    44.2 
Aircraft A 294 238,    81.0   72,    24.5 245,    83.3   66,    22.4 
Aircraft B 294 253,    86.0   93,    31.6 245,    83.3 131,    44.6 
Both 294 241,    82.0   70,    23.8 244,    83.0   74,    25.2 
 
IA statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Tables 182 and 183).  For Aircraft A, the TI and CA rate was lower when transmitting accurate data, but 
the RSI and WA rate was similar to the rate of generation when transmitting data with various accuracy 
levels (Tables 180 and 181).  For Aircraft B, the IA rate was similar to the rate of generation when 
transmitting data with various accuracy levels.  The rate of multiple IAs was lower when transmitting truth 
position accuracy and multiple CAs were eliminated for Aircraft A.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 1.0), WAs (p = 0.999), and multiple TIs (p = 0.341) 
were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which TIs were generated between Neither aircraft and Both aircraft equipped vs. Aircraft A and 
Aircraft B equipped.  There was also a significance difference in the number of runs in which RSIs (p < 
0.001), multiple RSIs (p = 0.017), and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which WAs (p = 1.0) and multiple RSIs (p = 0.972) were generated 
between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs (p < 0.001) 
were generated between Aircraft B equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A, and Both aircraft equipped.  
There was a significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p < 0.001) were generated 
between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  There was also 
a significant difference in the number of runs in which RSIs (p < 0.001), CAs (p = 0.020), multiple CAs (p 
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= 0.024), and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped 
vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 182.  SURF IA Indication Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Head-On 
Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294   25,      8.5   4,      1.4 294,    100.0   63,    21.4 
Aircraft A 294   51,    17.4   2,      0.7 255,      86.7   46,    15.7 
Aircraft B 294   46,    15.7   3,      1.0 294,    100.0   68,    23.1 
Both 294   25,      8.5   1,      0.3 255,      86.7   43,    14.6 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 231,    78.6 24,      8.5 273,    92.9   21,      7.1 
Aircraft A 294 231,    78.6 34,    11.6 234,    79.6   22,      7.5 
Aircraft B 294 276,    93.9 13,      4.4 273,    92.9   24,      8.2 
Both 294 213,    72.5   7,      2.4 235,    79.9   22,      7.5 
 
Table 183.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294 126,    42.9   0,      0.0 252,    85.7   84,    28.6 
Aircraft A 294 126,    42.9   0,      0.0 251,    85.4   39,    13.3 
Aircraft B 294 126,    42.9   0,      0.0 252,    85.7   97,    33.0 
Both 294 126,    42.9   0,      0.0 252,    85.7   49,    16.7 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 252,    85.7 63,    21.4 252,    85.7   84,    28.6 
Aircraft A 294 231,    78.6 45,    15.3 252,    85.7   27,      9.2 
Aircraft B 294 252,    85.7 63,    21.4 252,    85.7 103,    35.0 
Both 294 232,    78.9 41,    13.9 252,    85.7   45,    15.3 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 184.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the 
boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies and in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered 
the nuisance boundary between NACp 8 and 9 accuracy vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft 
B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the 
missed and nuisance boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the aircraft had crossed the 
runway threshold for landing.  The aircraft only entered the missed boundary while on approach before 
crossing the runway threshold during 0.8% of the test runs for Aircraft A and 2.0% of the test runs for 
Aircraft B when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  Since the aircraft tracked the extended centerline 
on approach and centerline after landing, the nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft exited the 
runway. 
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Table 184.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 382,    97.5 9.1,    5.7 16.6,    12.6 15.5 72,    18.4 5.0,    5.9 14.3,    21.2 10.4 
9   35,    10.4 1.4,    0.7   1.4,      1.2 1.4 41,    12.2 1.3,    0.7   1.8,      1.4 1.8 
10   24,    10.7 1.0,    0.0   0.5,      0.4 0.5 19,      8.5 1.0,    0.0   0.6,      0.4 0.6 
11     7,      4.2 1.0,    0.0   0.3,      0.1 0.3   7,      4.2 1.0,    0.0   0.2,      0.1 0.2 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0   0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 274,    69.9 4.0,    3.3   7.4,      7.0 6.3 10,    2.5 2.2,    2.8 6.8,    10.2 3.2 
9     2,      0.6 1.0,    0.0   0.2,      0.0 0.2   0,    0.0    0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0    0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0   0,    0.0    0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0    0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0   0,    0.0    0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0    0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0   0,    0.0    0,    0.0     0,      0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance IAs were relatively low, as shown in Tables 
185 and 186.  Missed and nuisance IAs for both aircraft were highest when transmitting data with NACp 8 
accuracy.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed TIs (p 
= 0.292) and missed CAs (p = 0.111) occurred between accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which missed RSIs (p < 0.001), missed WAs (p < 0.001), nuisance TIs (p < 0.001), 
nuisance RSIs (p = 0.006), nuisance CAs (p < 0.001), and nuisance WAs (p < 0.001) occurred between 
NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in 
the number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 0.149), nuisance TIs (p = 0.333), and nuisance RSIs (p = 
0.333) occurred between accuracy levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which missed RSIs, missed CAs, and missed WAs occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, 
and truth accuracies. 
Table 185.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 392   2,    0.5   7,    1.8 2,    0.5 46,    11.7 
9 336   1,    0.3   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   7,      2.1 
10 224   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   1,      0.4 
11 168   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
Truth 56   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 392 15,    3.8 25,    6.4 8,    2.0 34,      8.7 
9 336   8,    2.4 10,    3.0 0,    0.0   2,      0.6 
10 224   2,    0.9   5,    2.2 0,    0.0   1,      0.4 
11 168   2,    1.2   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
Truth 56   1,    1.8   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 
 
For Aircraft A, the missed TIs should have occurred after Aircraft A or Aircraft B conducted a go-
around maneuver, depending on CD&R equipage.  The missed RSIs should have occurred after Aircraft A 
landed and was less than 39 kts.  The missed CAs should have occurred after Aircraft A had landed and 
was exiting the runway.  Two of the missed WAs should have occurred after Aircraft A conducted a go-
around maneuver; the rest of the missed WAs should have occurred after Aircraft A landed and was less 
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than 39 kts.  For Aircraft B, six of the missed TIs should have occurred while the aircraft was on approach, 
prior to crossing the runway threshold; nine should have occurred just prior to touchdown, at 16 ft AGL; 
11 should have occurred soon after the aircraft landed and was greater than 86 kts; and two should have 
occurred after the aircraft conducted a go-around maneuver.  Three of the missed RSIs should have occurred 
after Aircraft B landed and was approximately 36 kts.  All of the other missed RSIs should have occurred 
when the aircraft was on approach at approximately 633 ft AGL.  All of the missed CAs should have 
occurred when the aircraft was on approach and 419 ft AGL.  One of the missed WAs should have occurred 
when Aircraft B was on approach and 505 ft AGL; two should have occurred after Aircraft B conducted a 
go-around maneuver; and other missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was on approach and 
194 ft AGL. 
An IA was considered a nuisance if it was generated at the same time the aircraft was determined to be 
within the nuisance boundary.  Nuisance IAs for both aircraft occurred after the aircraft landed and exited 
the runway. 
Table 186.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
8 532 19,    4.8 21,    5.4 13,    3.3 23,    5.9 
9 456   0,    0.0 10,    3.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
10 304   0,    0.0   5,    2.2   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 228   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 76   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
8 532   1,    0.3   1,    0.3   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
9 456   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
10 304   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 228   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 76   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
When analyzed by equipage level (Tables 187 and 188), in general, the missed and nuisance IAs were 
similarly distributed between equipage levels.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p = 0.020) 
in the number of runs in which nuisance RSIs occurred between Neither aircraft and Aircraft A equipped 
vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which missed TIs (p = 0.578), missed RSIs (p = 0.203), missed CAs (p = 0.50), missed WAs (p = 0.168), 
nuisance TIs (p = 0.644), nuisance CAs (p = 0.265), and nuisance WAs occurred (p = 0.754) between 
equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed 
TIs (p = 0.092), missed RSIs (p = 0.442), missed CAs (p = 0.113), missed WAs (p = 0.228), and nuisance 
TIs (p = 0.25), nuisance RSIs (p = 0.25) occurred between equipage levels. 
Unnecessary maneuvering - The percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily 
when transmitting data with the various accuracy levels is shown in Table 189.  Unnecessary maneuvers 
only occurred during NACp 8 and 9 accuracy test runs.  There was a significant difference in the number 
of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth 
accuracies for Aircraft A (p < 0.001) and Aircraft B (p = 0.012). 
The number and percentage of test runs in which the aircraft maneuvered unnecessarily based on the 
CD&R equipage level is shown in Table 190.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number 
of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred between equipage levels for Aircraft A and Aircraft B. 
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Table 187.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 1,    0.3   7,    2.4 
Aircraft A 294   1,    0.3   2,    0.7 0,    0.0 14,    4.8 
Aircraft B 294   1,    0.3   3,    1.0 0,    0.0 18,    6.1 
Both 294   1,    0.3   2,    0.7 1,    0.3 15,    5.1 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 12,    4.1   7,    2.4 4,    1.4   4,    1.4 
Aircraft A 294   8,    2.7   8,    2.7 1,    0.3 10,    3.4 
Aircraft B 294   4,    1.4 13,    4.4 1,    0.3 11,    3.7 
Both 294   4,    1.4 12,    4.1 2,    0.7 12,    4.1 
Table 188.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Head-On Arrivals 
Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Neither 294 4,    1.4 15,    5.1 4,    1.4 7,    2.4 
Aircraft A 294 6,    2.0 12,    4.1 2,    0.7 7,    2.4 
Aircraft B 294 4,    1.4   4,    1.4 2,    0.7 4,    1.4 
Both 294 5,    1.7   5,    1.7 5,    1.7 5,    1.7 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Neither 294 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 294 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 294 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 294 1,    0.3   1,    0.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Table 189.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All Evasive Actions by NACp Using SURF IA During 
Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
8 196 25,    12.8 4,    2.0 
9 168   4,      2.4 0,    0.0 
10 112   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 84   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 28   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Table 190.  Unnecessary Maneuvers for All NACp by Evasive Action Using SURF IA During Head-
On Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # 
Runs 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Neither 294 N/A N/A 
Aircraft A 294 15,    5.1 N/A 
Aircraft B 294 N/A 2,    0.7 
Both 294 14,    4.8 2,    0.7 
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Collision avoidance –All of the runs resulted in a near collision and approximately 79% resulted in a 
collision in the absence of CD&R, as shown in Table 191.  CD&R was most effective when Aircraft B was 
equipped, resulting in no collisions when transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11 and truth accuracies.  When 
neither aircraft were equipped with CD&R, there was no significant difference in the number of near 
collisions (100% of runs for each equipage level) and collisions (p = 1.0) between accuracy levels.  When 
only Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near 
collisions (p = 0.954) and collisions (p = 0.842) occurred between accuracy levels.  When only Aircraft B 
was equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 0.250) in the number of runs in which near collisions 
occurred but there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which collisions 
occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  When Both aircraft were equipped, 
there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.424) and collisions 
(p = 0.916) occurred between accuracy levels. 
Table 191.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Head-On Arrivals Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 98 98, 100 77, 78.6 81, 82.7 42, 42.9 63, 64.3 27, 27.6 84, 85.7 26, 26.5 
9 84 84, 100 66, 78.6 66, 78.6 30, 35.7 42, 50.0   0,   0.0 78, 92.9 18, 21.4 
10 56 56, 100 44, 78.6 44, 78.6 20, 35.7 28, 50.0   0,   0.0 52, 92.9 12, 21.4 
11 42 42, 100 33, 78.6 33, 78.6 15, 35.7 21, 50.0   0,   0.0 39, 92.9   9, 21.4 
Truth 14 14, 100 11, 78.6 11, 78.6   5, 35.7   7, 50.0   0,   0.0 13, 92.9   3, 21.4 
 
For the condition when truth position data was used and neither aircraft maneuvered (11 collisions), 
the scenario was designed such that a collision occurred when Aircraft A (arrival to Runway 10) was located 
from 3.5 NM prior to the threshold, at 0.5 NM intervals, crossing the runway threshold, and 1,400 ft, 3,700 
ft, and 5,500 ft past the threshold when Aircraft B began its approach to Runway 28, 3.5 NM prior to the 
runway threshold.  For nine of these collisions, both aircraft had landed and were decelerating or taxiing 
down the runway when the collision occurred.  For one collision, Aircraft A was taxiing down the runway 
and Aircraft B was just about to touchdown.  For one collision, Aircraft A was exiting the runway as Aircraft 
B was about to touchdown. 
When only Aircraft A was equipped and transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth position 
accuracies, collisions occurred when Aircraft A was located 0.5 NM prior to the threshold, crossing the 
threshold, and 1,400 ft, 3,700 ft, and 5,500 ft down the runway after landing when Aircraft B began its 
approach.  No maneuvering (accelerated braking to exit the runway) was made for the collisions that 
occurred when Aircraft A was 5,500 ft down the runway when Aircraft B began its approach.  At the 
collision, Aircraft A was exiting the runway and Aircraft B was about to touch down (25 ft AGL).  For 
these runs, the WA was not issued until the collision point, except for two runs when transmitting NACp 9 
accuracy which had multiple WAs.  For the 42 collisions that occurred when transmitting data with NACp 
8 position accuracy, Aircraft A was located at the five locations above when Aircraft B began its approach 
along with 3.5 NM, 3.0 NM, 2.5 NM, 2.0 NM, and 1.5 NM prior to the runway threshold.  Twenty-nine 
collisions occurred when both aircraft were taxiing on the runway and 13 occurred when Aircraft A was 
exiting the runway.  Maneuvering (accelerated braking) occurred on 18 of the 42 collision runs but not with 
enough time to avoid the collision.  For the 24 collisions in which maneuvering did not occur, WAs were 
not issued on nine runs, multiple alerts occurred on nine runs, and single WAs were generated on six runs.  
The aircraft was to maneuver after the first WA but this was not always the case, resulting in a maneuver 
that was initiated later than intended. 
For the 27 collisions that occurred when Aircraft B was equipped, 20 occurred when both aircraft were 
taxiing on the runway; five occurred when Aircraft A was exiting the runway; and two occurred when 
Aircraft B was climbing out.  WAs were not issued on Aircraft B on three of these runs.  Maneuvering 
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occurred on nine of the 27 collision runs but not in enough time to avoid the collision; on six runs 
accelerated braking was conducted and on three runs a go-around was conducted. 
When Both aircraft were equipped, when transmitting data with NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth position 
accuracies, both aircraft received WAs on the other aircraft, both aircraft maneuvered (conducted a go-
around), and the collision occurred when the aircraft were climbing out.  For the 26 collisions that occurred 
when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, 11 collisions (42%) also occurred when both aircraft were 
climbing out (both aircraft conducted a go-around maneuver).  These collisions occurred on runs in which 
Aircraft A was located 3.5 NM, 3.0 NM or 2.5 NM prior to the runway threshold when Aircraft B began 
its approach.  These collisions may not have occurred if the CD&R system coordinated alerting between 
aircraft so that only one aircraft received a WA.  For the remaining 15 collisions in which NACp 8 accuracy 
was used, nine collisions occurred when both aircraft were taxiing on the runway; one occurred when 
Aircraft A was taxiing on the runway and Aircraft B had conducted a go-around; and five occurred when 
Aircraft A was exiting the runway.  Maneuvering occurred on six of these 15 runs; on one run both aircraft 
conducted accelerated braking, on three runs only Aircraft A conducted accelerated braking, and on two 
runs only Aircraft B conducted a go-around. 
5.2.8 Runway Scenario – Arrivals to Intersecting Runways 
For each of the 20 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 13 levels, 
for a total of 1,092 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For both aircraft, TIs were generated on approximately 85% of the test runs 
(Table 192).  RSIs were only issued when transmitting data with NACp 8 and 9 accuracy levels.  CAs were 
generated on approximately 39% of the test runs for Aircraft A and 42% of the test runs for Aircraft B 
(Table 193).  The rate of WAs was slightly lower when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For both 
aircraft there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which TIs and RSIs were 
generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.983) and WAs (p = 0.331) occurred 
between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which CAs (p = 0.646) and WAs (p = 0.29) were generated between accuracy levels. 
Table 192.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 324,    89.0 182,    50.0 91,    25.0 8,    2.2 
9 312 265,    84.9   76,    24.4 14,      4.5 2,    0.6 
10 208 176,    84.6   34,    16.4   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 132,    84.6   24,    15.4   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   44,    84.6     8,    15.4   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 305,    83.8 154,    42.3 40,    11.0 2,    0.6 
9 312 264,    84.6   50,    16.0   9,      2.9 0,    0.0 
10 208 176,    84.6   16,      7.7   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 132,    84.6   12,      7.7   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   44,    84.6     4,      7.7   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
 
When analyzing IAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, TIs were issued onboard 
Aircraft A when on approach and approximately 2.9 NM to 1.4 NM prior to the runway threshold and 965 
ft to 489 ft AGL and when 35 ft prior to the threshold and 35 ft AGL until 5,101 ft past the threshold and 
43 kts.  CAs were issued onboard Aircraft A when approximately 1.3 NM prior to the runway threshold 
and 440 ft AGL (16 runs) and when approximately 0.9 NM prior to the threshold and 330 ft AGL (4 runs).  
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WAs were issued when Aircraft A was on approach from approximately 0.5 NM prior to the runway 
threshold and 200 ft AGL (20 runs) and when 0.4 NM prior to the threshold and 177 ft AGL (4 runs).  For 
Aircraft B, TIs were issued when on approach and approximately 2.9 NM to 2.0 NM prior to the runway 
threshold and 965 ft to 662 ft AGL.  CAs occurred when the aircraft was between approximately 2.9 NM 
prior to the runway threshold and 960 ft AGL and 1.2 NM prior to the threshold and 430 ft AGL.  WAs 
occurred when the aircraft was between approximately 2.9 NM to 0.5 NM prior to the runway threshold 
and 955 ft to 200 ft AGL.  RSIs were not issued onboard either aircraft. 
Table 193.  SURF IA Alert Statistics For All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 149,    40.9 24,      6.6 162,    44.5 60,    16.5 
9 312 121,    38.8   1,      0.3 144,    46.1 37,    11.9 
10 208   80,    38.5   0,      0.0   96,    46.1 20,      9.6 
11 156   60,    38.5   0,      0.0   72,    46.1 15,      9.6 
Truth 52   20,    38.5   0,      0.0   24,    46.1   5,      9.6 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 153,    42.0 70,    19.2 161,    44.2 67,    18.4 
9 312 132,    42.3 49,    15.7 144,    46.1 35,    11.2 
10 208   88,    42.3 32,    15.4   96,    46.1 20,      9.6 
11 156   66,    42.3 24,    15.4   72,    46.1 15,      9.6 
Truth 52   22,    42.3   8,    15.4   24,    46.1   5,      9.6 
 
The highest rate of IA toggling was when transmitting NACp 8 position data (Tables 192 and 193).  In 
general, the rate of toggling was consistent across NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracy levels per multiple alert 
type and aircraft.  The overall rate of toggling for RSIs was very low.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant 
difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p < 0.001), multiple RSIs (p = 0.005), and multiple 
CAs (p < 0.001) were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no 
significant difference (p = 0.257) in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between 
accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in 
which multiple TIs were generated between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was 
no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs (p = 0.127), multiple CAs (p = 
0.959), and multiple WAs (p = 0.042) were generated between accuracy levels. 
Table 192.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 324,    89.0 182,    50.0 91,    25.0 8,    2.2 
9 312 265,    84.9   76,    24.4 14,      4.5 2,    0.6 
10 208 176,    84.6   34,    16.4   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 132,    84.6   24,    15.4   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   44,    84.6     8,    15.4   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 305,    83.8 154,    42.3 40,    11.0 2,    0.6 
9 312 264,    84.6   50,    16.0   9,      2.9 0,    0.0 
10 208 176,    84.6   16,      7.7   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156 132,    84.6   12,      7.7   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   44,    84.6     4,      7.7   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
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Table 193.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 149,    40.9 24,      6.6 162,    44.5 60,    16.5 
9 312 121,    38.8   1,      0.3 144,    46.1 37,    11.9 
10 208   80,    38.5   0,      0.0   96,    46.1 20,      9.6 
11 156   60,    38.5   0,      0.0   72,    46.1 15,      9.6 
Truth 52   20,    38.5   0,      0.0   24,    46.1   5,      9.6 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 153,    42.0 70,    19.2 161,    44.2 67,    18.4 
9 312 132,    42.3 49,    15.7 144,    46.1 35,    11.2 
10 208   88,    42.3 32,    15.4   96,    46.1 20,      9.6 
11 156   66,    42.3 24,    15.4   72,    46.1 15,      9.6 
Truth 52   22,    42.3   8,    15.4   24,    46.1   5,      9.6 
 
The toggling included gaps between IAs at the lower position accuracy levels.  The toggling was also 
a result of aircraft maneuvering.  Multiple IAs occurred after Aircraft A or Aircraft B or both conducted a 
go-around maneuver and also when Aircraft A had crossed the runway threshold.  Sometimes a multiple 
IA occurred onboard the aircraft after it was in the intersection of the runways or had passed the intersecting 
runway, which is not necessary since the aircraft is moving away from the intersection. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Tables 194 and 195), IA generation was similar across all 
equipage levels for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs 
in which TIs (p = 0.386), RSIs (p = 0.71), CAs (p = 0.987), and WAs (p = 0.998) were generated between 
equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in which TIs 
(p = 0.77), RSIs (p = 0.902), CAs (p = 0.242), and WAs (p = 0.998) were generated between equipage 
levels. 
Table 194.  SURF IA Indication Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273 236,    86.5 93,    34.1 22,      8.1 4,    1.5 
Aircraft A 273 232,    85.0 69,    25.3 26,      9.5 1,    0.4 
Aircraft B 273 243,    89.0 93,    34.1 30,    11.0 3,    1.1 
Both 273 230,    84.2 69,    25.3 27,      9.9 2,    0.7 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273 230,    84.2 70,    25.6 14,      5.1 2,    0.7 
Aircraft A 273 230,    84.2 46,    16.9 11,      4.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 235,    86.1 68,    24.9 13,      4.8 0,    0.0 
Both 273 226,    82.8 52,    19.1 11,      4.0 0,    0.0 
 
For both aircraft, the TI toggling rate was higher when Neither aircraft and Aircraft B was equipped.  
The RSI toggling rate was similar between equipage levels.  The CA toggling rate was similar between 
equipage levels for Aircraft A but was higher when Neither aircraft and Aircraft B was equipped for Aircraft 
B.  The WA toggling rate was higher when Neither aircraft and Aircraft B was equipped for both aircraft.  
For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple RSIs (p = 0.341) 
and multiple CAs (p = 0.989) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p = 0.018) and multiple WAs (p < 0.001) were generated 
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between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft 
B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple TIs (p = 0.028) and multiple 
RSIs (p = 0.062) were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) 
in the number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft 
and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 195.  SURF IA Alert Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrivals to Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273 109,    39.9   6,      2.2 124,    45.4 57,    20.9 
Aircraft A 273 106,    38.8   7,      2.6 126,    46.1 11,      4.0 
Aircraft B 273 109,    39.9   6,      2.2 124,    45.4 62,    22.7 
Both 273 106,    38.8   6,      2.2 124,    45.4   7,      2.6 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273 122,    44.7 64,    23.4 125,    45.8 52,    19.1 
Aircraft A 273 106,    38.8 27,      9.9 125,    45.8 13,      4.8 
Aircraft B 273 125,    45.8 63,    23.1 124,    45.4 64,    23.4 
Both 273 108,    39.6 29,    10.6 123,    45.0 13,      4.8 
 
IA statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position accuracy was transmitted 
(Tables 196 and 197).  The TI, CA, and WA generation rate was similar to the rate of generation when 
transmitting data with various position accuracy levels (Tables 194 and 195).  RSIs were not issued when 
transmitting accurate data.  The multiple TI and multiple WA rate was reduced.  Multiple CAs for Aircraft 
A did not occur with accurate data, but, for Aircraft B, the rate was similar to the rate that occurred when 
transmitting data with various position accuracy levels.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which TIs (p = 1.0), multiple TIs (p = 0.980), CAs (p = 1.0), and WAs (p = 1.0) 
were generated between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of 
runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft 
A and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in 
which TIs (p = 1.0), multiple TIs (p = 0.961), CAs (p = 0.143), and WAs (p = 1.0) were generated between 
equipage levels.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple 
CAs and multiple WAs were generated between Neither aircraft and Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and 
Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 196.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple RSI  
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273 231,    84.6 42,    15.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 231,    84.6 45,    16.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 231,    84.6 42,    15.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 231,    84.6 42,    15.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273 231,    84.6 21,      7.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273 231,    84.6 24,      8.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273 231,    84.6 21,      7.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 273 231,    84.6 22,      8.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
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Table 197.  SURF IA Alert Statistics When Transmitting Truth Position Data for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273 105,    38.5   0,      0.0 126,    46.1 42,    15.4 
Aircraft A 273 105,    38.5   0,      0.0 126,    46.1   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B 273 105,    38.5   0,      0.0 126,    46.1 61,    22.3 
Both 273 105,    38.5   0,      0.0 126,    46.1   3,      1.1 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273 126,    46.1 63,    23.1 126,    46.1 42,    15.4 
Aircraft A 273 106,    38.8 22,      8.1 126,    46.1   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B 273 126,    46.1 63,    23.1 126,    46.1 61,    22.3 
Both 273 108,    39.6 27,      9.9 126,    46.1   3,      1.1 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The number of runs in which the aircraft entered the defined missed and 
nuisance boundaries increased as the position accuracy decreased, as shown in Table 198.  The number of 
times (count) and amount of time (duration and percentage of run length) that the aircraft were within the 
boundaries was greater when transmitting less accurate data.  Aircraft B did not enter the nuisance boundary 
because the aircraft always tracked the runway centerline and did not exit the runway.  For both aircraft, 
there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed 
boundary between NACp 8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was also a significant 
difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which Aircraft A entered the nuisance boundary between 
NACp 8 and 9 accuracies vs. NACp 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
The majority of occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the aircraft had crossed the 
runway threshold for landing.  When transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy, the aircraft only entered the 
missed boundary while on approach before crossing the runway threshold during 1.1% of the test runs for 
Aircraft A and 0.0% of the test runs for Aircraft B.  Since the aircraft tracked the extended centerline on 
approach and centerline after landing, the nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft exited the runway. 
Table 198.  SURF IA Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Arrivals to Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 351,    96.4 7.5,    4.6 13.6,    10.1 12.5 154,    42.3 4.3,    3.3 7.1,    6.5 6.2 
9   78,    25.0 1.4,    1.0   1.4,      1.2 1.2   97,    31.1 1.2,    0.4 1.7,    1.3 1.6 
10   47,    22.6 1.0,    0.0   0.5,     0.3 0.5   42,    20.2 1.0,    0.0 0.5,    0.3 0.5 
11   27,    17.3 1.0,    0.0   0.3,     0.1 0.2   17,     10.9 1.0,    0.0 0.2,    0.0 0.2 
Truth     0,      0.0  0.0,    0.0   0.0,     0.0 0.0     0,       0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 268,    73.6 3.8,    2.6   6.8,      6.2 6.1     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
9     4,      1.3 2.0,    0.8   0.4,      0.1 0.4     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
10     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
11     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0   0.0,      0.0 0.0     0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The number of test runs that contained missed and nuisance IAs was low, as shown in Tables 199 and 
200.  Missed IAs for both aircraft mainly occurred when transmitting data with NACp 8 accuracy.  For both 
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aircraft, there were no instances of missed RSI’s.  Nuisance indications only occurred when transmitting 
data with NACp 8 accuracy for Aircraft A.  There were no nuisance alerts for either aircraft.  For Aircraft 
A, there was a significant difference in the number of runs in which missed TIs (p < 0.001), missed WAs 
(p < 0.001), nuisance TIs (p < 0.001), and nuisance RSIs (p = 0.004) occurred between NACp 8 vs. NACp 
9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies.  There was no significant difference (p = 0.111) in the number of runs in 
which missed CAs occurred between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p 
< 0.001) in the number of runs in which missed TIs, missed CAs, and missed WAs occurred between NACp 
8 vs. NACp 9, 10, 11, and truth accuracies. 
For Aircraft A, 24 of the missed TIs should have occurred when the aircraft was on approach while 14 
should have occurred after the aircraft landed.  The missed CAs should have occurred while the aircraft 
was on approach.  Seven of the missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was on approach while 
11 should have occurred after the aircraft landed.  For Aircraft B, 20 missed TIs should have occurred when 
the aircraft wan on approach and two should have occurred after the aircraft landed.  All of the missed CAs 
and missed WAs should have occurred when the aircraft was on approach. 
An indication was considered a nuisance if it was generated at the same time the aircraft was determined 
to be within the nuisance boundary.  Therefore, the nuisance indications for Aircraft A occurred as the 
aircraft was exiting the runway. 
Table 199.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 36,    9.9 0,    0.0   2,    0.5 17,    4.7 
9 312   2,    0.6 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   1,    0.3 
10 208   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364 21,    5.8 0,    0.0 16,    4.4 17,    4.7 
9 312   1,    0.3 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
10 208   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
Table 200.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All Evasive Actions by NACp for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
8 364 10,    2.8 5,    1.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
8 364   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
9 312   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
10 208   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
11 156   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 52   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
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When analyzing based on CD&R equipage level (Tables 201 and 202), the rate of missed TIs was 
higher when Aircraft A and Both aircraft were equipped.  The missed CAs for Aircraft A occurred when 
Both aircraft were equipped and, for Aircraft B, the rate of missed CAs was higher when Neither aircraft 
or Aircraft B was equipped.  The rate of missed WAs was highest when Aircraft B was equipped.  Nuisance 
indications occurred when Aircraft A, Aircraft B, and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 0.069), missed CAs (p = 
0.062), and nuisance RSIs (p = 0.374) occurred between equipage levels.  There was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which missed WAs (p = 0.005) and nuisance TIs (p = 0.019) occurred between 
Aircraft B equipped vs. Neither aircraft, Aircraft A equipped, and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, 
there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed TIs (p = 0.076), missed CAs (p 
= 0.208), and missed WAs (p = 0.046) occurred between equipage levels. 
Table 201.  SURF IA Missed IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed TI 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed CA 
(#, Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273   5,    1.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   4,    1.5 
Aircraft A 273 14,    5.1 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   6,    2.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 10,    3.7 
Both 273 13,    4.8 0,    0.0 2,    0.7   4,    1.5 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273   3,    1.1 0,    0.0 6,    2.2   4,    1.5 
Aircraft A 273   9,    3.3 0,    0.0 3,    1.1   1,    0.4 
Aircraft B 273   2,    0.7 0,    0.0 5,    1.8   8,    2.9 
Both 273   8,    2.9 0,    0.0 2,    0.7   4,    1.5 
 
Table 202.  SURF IA Nuisance IA Statistics for All NACp by Evasive Action for Arrivals to 
Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Nuisance TI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance RSI 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 14L) 
Neither 273   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273   2,    0.7 1,    0.4 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   6,    2.2 2,    0.7 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 273   2,    0.7 2,    0.7 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 22R) 
Neither 273   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft A 273   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 273   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
Both 273   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
Collision avoidance – As shown in Table 203, near collisions only occurred when Both aircraft were 
equipped with CD&R (no significant difference (p= 0.674) between accuracy levels).  These near collisions 
occurred after both aircraft had conducted a go-around maneuver.  Collisions did not occur during this 
scenario. 
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Table 203.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using SURF IA for 
Equipage Combinations for Arrivals to Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Neither Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
8 91 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 5,  5.5 0,  0.00 
9 78 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 6,  7.7 0,  0.00 
10 52 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 4,  7.7 0,  0.00 
11 39 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 3,  7.7 0,  0.00 
Truth 13 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 0,  0.00 1,  7.7 0,  0.00 
 
5.3 Directive Alerting Results 
Directive alerting specifies the action to take to resolve a conflict situation in lieu of providing a generic 
WA.  The directive given depends on the conflict situation.  Examples of directive alerts are as follows:  
“go-around” when on approach, “abort” when departing, “stop” when taxiing or rolling-out, and “climb” 
when air-to-air conflict on approach.  The directive alerts can be displayed in the cockpit visually and 
audibly, similar to the method used for WAs. 
Directive alerting was evaluated for three scenarios (two runway and one taxiway), two levels of 
surveillance accuracy (NACp 10 and truth), and three levels of CD&R system equipage (only Aircraft A 
equipped, only Aircraft B equipped, and Both aircraft equipped), for a total of 18 cases (Appendix A).  
These three scenarios were selected because the directive alert generated by ATCAM could have a different 
outcome from the standard maneuvering conducted for the other test cases.  Truth surveillance accuracy 
was evaluated to obtain results of directive alerting with accurate data.  NACp 10 surveillance accuracy 
was selected for evaluation based on the SURF IA requirements for large airports [RTCA, 2010].  There 
was no need to evaluate the condition where neither aircraft take action since directive alerting requires 
action. 
5.3.1 Directive Alerting - Arrival and departure from intersecting runways 
For each of the 6 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 13 levels, for 
a total of 195 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For the arrival Aircraft A, CAs were generated on 2.6% of runs and WAs 
were generated on approximately 16% of the runs, independent of position accuracy level (Table 204).  For 
the departing Aircraft B, CAs were not issued.  WAs were generated on 69% of the runs, independent of 
accuracy level.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which CAs and WAs 
were generated between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, only one CA was issued 
onboard the approach aircraft when 1,323 ft prior to the runway threshold and 106 ft AGL.  WAs were 
issued when the aircraft was between 184 ft prior to the runway threshold and 47 ft AGL until 4,093 ft past 
the runway threshold after landing and 71 kts.  For the departing aircraft, WAs were issued when 4 ft to 
141 ft from the runway threshold and 7 kts to 29 kts. 
Alert toggling did not occur for either aircraft for these test conditions. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 205), for Aircraft A, all of the CAs and the majority 
of the WAs were issued when only Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R.  The rate of WA generation was 
evenly distributed across equipage levels for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference 
in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.004) and WAs (p < 0.001) were generated between Aircraft A 
equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft equipped.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p 
= 1.0) in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between equipage levels. 
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Table 204.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
10 156 4,    2.6 0,    0.0   26,    16.7 0,    0.0 
Truth 39 1,    2.6 0,    0.0     6,    15.4 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
10 156 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 108,    69.2 0,    0.0 
Truth 39 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   27,    69.2 0,    0.0 
 
Table 205.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Aircraft A 65 5,    7.7 0,    0.0 30,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   2,      3.1 0,    0.0 
Both 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Aircraft A 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 45,    69.2 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 45,    69.2 0,    0.0 
Both 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 45,    69.2 0,    0.0 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 206).  The CA rate for Aircraft A was the same as that which occurred when transmitting data with 
various position accuracy levels (Table 205).  The frequency of WA generation was higher for Aircraft A 
than that which occurred when transmitting data with various position accuracy levels; however, the WA 
rate was the same for Aircraft B.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p = 0.004) in the number 
of runs in which CAs were generated between Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft 
equipped.  There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which WAs were generated between 
equipage levels for Aircraft A (p = 0.108) and Aircraft B (p = 1.0). 
Table 206.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
for Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Aircraft A 65 5,    7.7 0,    0.0 30,    46.1 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 20,    30.8 0,    0.0 
Both 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 20,    30.8 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Aircraft A 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 45,    69.2 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 45,    69.2 0,    0.0 
Both 65 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 45,    69.2 0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The arrival Aircraft A did not enter the missed or nuisance boundary 
during any of the runs (Table 207).  The departure Aircraft B only entered the missed and nuisance boundary 
when transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference in the 
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number of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary (p = 0.209) and nuisance boundary (p = 
0.125) between accuracy levels. 
The departing Aircraft B entered the missed boundary when transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy 
due to the criteria for entering the missed boundary.  The aircraft was counted as entering the missed 
boundary when the aircraft’s true position was within one runway width of the runway centerline, but the 
detected position was greater than one runway width from the centerline.  As such, there was no buffer 
between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary so a measurable difference between 
the true and detected position could cause a missed boundary to be counted.  The departing aircraft entered 
the nuisance boundary after lifting off and over 620 ft AGL.  The aircraft started drifting from the runway 
centerline.  Since there was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the nuisance 
boundary, as was the case for the missed boundary definition, a measurable difference between the true and 
detected position near the boundary (one runway width from the centerline) could cause a nuisance 
boundary to be counted. 
Table 207.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Directive Alerting for Arrival 
and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
10 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0   0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0   0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
10 9,    5.8 1.1,    0.3 0.7,    0.4 1.3 11,    7.0 1.0,    0.0 0.5,    0.2 1.1 
Truth 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0   0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Missed CAs did not occur for either aircraft (Table 208).  Missed WAs only occurred for Aircraft A 
(approximately 20% of the runs).  Nuisance alerts did not occur for either aircraft during this scenario.  For 
Aircraft A, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which missed WAs 
occurred between accuracy levels.  When analyzing missed WAs that occurred when transmitting truth 
position data, for Aircraft A, an alert should have been issued onboard the aircraft as the other aircraft 
aborted its departure.   
Table 208.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All Evasive 
Actions by NACp for Arrival And Departure from Intersecting Runway Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
10 156 0,    0.0 30,    19.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 39 0,    0.0   8,    20.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
10 156 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 39 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 209), the missed WAs occurred when Aircraft B and 
Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number 
of runs in which missed WAs occurred between Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B and Both aircraft 
equipped. 
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Table 209.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All NACp by 
Evasive Action for Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival) 
Aircraft A 65 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 65 0,    0.0 18,    27.7 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 65 0,    0.0 20,    30.8 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Departure) 
Aircraft A 65 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 65 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 65 0,    0.0   0,      0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
Collision avoidance – Near collisions only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy 
and Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R (Table 210).  There were no collisions.  When Aircraft A was 
equipped, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near collisions 
occurred between accuracy levels. 
The two near collisions occurred after the arrival Aircraft A landed, conducted accelerated braking after 
receiving a WA and stopped on the runway.  The departing aircraft continued its departure since it was not 
equipped with CD&R on these test runs. 
Table 210.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Directive Alerting For Arrival and Departure from Intersecting 
Runways Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C 
10 52 2,  3.8 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
Truth 13 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 0,  0.0 
5.3.2 Directive Alerting – Head-on arrivals 
For each of the 6 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay on Aircraft B was evaluated at 14 levels, for 
a total of 210 test runs.  
Algorithm performance – For Aircraft A, CAs were generated on 21% of the runs, independent of 
position accuracy level (Table 211).  For Aircraft B, CAs were generated on 51% of the runs when 
transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy and 47% of the runs when transmitting data with truth accuracy.  
WAs were generated on 86% of the runs for either aircraft, independent of the position accuracy levels.  
There was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs were generated between accuracy 
levels for Aircraft A (p = 1.0) and Aircraft B (p = 0.857).  There was also no significant difference in the 
number of runs in which WAs (p = 1.0) were generated between accuracy levels for both aircraft. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, CAs were issued onboard 
Aircraft A when approximately 2,680 ft prior to the runway threshold and 177 ft AGL, 1,325 ft prior to the 
threshold and 106 ft AGL, or 9,848 ft past the threshold after landing and 5 kts.  WAs were issued when 
approximately 870 ft prior to the runway threshold and 82 ft AGL until approximately 8,565 ft past the 
threshold after landing and 30 kts.  For Aircraft B, four of the CAs occurred after the aircraft had conducted 
a go-around maneuver.  The remainder of the CAs occurred when the aircraft was between 7,768 ft to 2,673 
ft prior to the runway threshold and 443 ft AGL to 177 ft AGL.  WAs occurred when the aircraft was 
between 2.3 NM to 861 ft prior to the runway threshold and 764 ft AGL to 82 ft AGL. 
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Table 211.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Head-on Arrivals Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
10 168 36,    21.4 1,    0.6 144,    85.7   8,      4.8 
Truth 42   9,    21.4 0,    0.0   36,    85.7   2,      4.8 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
10 168 85,    50.6 0,    0.0 144,    85.7 29,    17.3 
Truth 42 20,    47.6 0,    0.0   36,    85.7   7,    16.7 
 
CA toggling only occurred on one run for Aircraft A (Table 211).  WA toggling occurred on 5% of the 
runs for Aircraft A, independent of position accuracy level, with toggling occurring on approximately 17% 
of the runs for Aircraft B for each accuracy level.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the 
number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple WAs were generated between accuracy levels. 
Multiple alerts occurred after both aircraft conducted a go-around maneuver, when both aircraft 
conducted accelerated braking, and when Aircraft A exited the runway.  WA toggling occurred for both 
aircraft when transmitting truth position data.  For Aircraft A, these two multiple alerts occurred when 
Aircraft B conducted a go-around maneuver and when Aircraft B had conducted a go-around maneuver and 
Aircraft A conducted accelerated braking.  For Aircraft B when transmitting accurate position data, all of 
the multiple alerts occurred after Aircraft A had exited the runway; on two of these runs, Aircraft B also 
conducted a go-around maneuver. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 212), for both aircraft, alert generation was similar 
across all equipage levels.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which 
CAs and WAs were generated between equipage levels. 
The multiple CA occurred onboard Aircraft A when Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  The 
WA toggling rate was 7% for Aircraft A when only Aircraft B and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft 
B, the WA toggling rate was higher when only Aircraft A and Both aircraft were equipped.  For Aircraft 
A, there was no significant difference (p = 0.333) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs and multiple 
WAs were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p = 0.003) 
in the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between Aircraft A equipped vs. Aircraft B 
and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 212.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All NACp by Evasive Action for 
Head-on Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Aircraft A 70 15,    21.4 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B 70 15,    21.4 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   5,      7.1 
Both 70 15,    21.4 1,    1.4 60,    85.7   5,      7.1 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Aircraft A 70 35,    50.0 0,    0.0 60,    85.7 20,    28.6 
Aircraft B 70 35,    50.0 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   5,      7.1 
Both 70 35,    50.0 0,    0.0 60,    85.7 11,    15.7 
 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 213).  All alert rates were the same as when transmitting data with various accuracy levels (Table 
212), except the rate of CAs was slightly lower for Aircraft B when only Aircraft B was equipped with 
CD&R.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 1.0) 
and WAs (p = 1.0) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant 
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difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.620) and WAs (p = 1.0) were generated between 
equipage levels. 
Multiple alerts were eliminated for Aircraft A when transmitting accurate position data.  The multiple 
alert rate for Aircraft B was similar to the rate when transmitting data with various accuracy levels (Table 
212).  For Aircraft B, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs in which multiple 
WAs were generated between Aircraft B equipped vs. Aircraft A and Both aircraft equipped. 
Table 213.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
for Head-on Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Aircraft A 70 15,    21.4 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B 70 15,    21.4 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Both 70 15,    21.4 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Aircraft A 70 35,    50.0 0,    0.0 60,    85.7 20,    28.6 
Aircraft B 70 30,    42.9 0,    0.0 60,    85.7   0,      0.0 
Both 70 35,    50.0 0,    0.0 60,    85.7 13,    18.6 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – The missed boundary was only entered when transmitting data with 
NACp 10 accuracy (Table 214).  The nuisance boundary was entered when transmitting data with NACp 
10 accuracy for Aircraft A only.  For Aircraft A, there was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number 
of runs in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary and nuisance boundary between NACp 10 vs. 
truth accuracy.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which 
the aircraft entered the missed boundary between accuracy levels. 
All occurrences of entering the missed boundary was after the aircraft had crossed the runway threshold 
for landing.  Since the aircraft tracked the extended centerline on approach and centerline after landing, the 
nuisance boundary was entered as the aircraft exited the runway. 
Table 214.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Directive Alerting for Head-on 
Arrivals Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
10 51,     30.4 1.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.3 0.5 40,    23.8 1.0,    0.0 0.4,    0.2 0.4 
Truth   0,       0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0   0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
10   3,      1.8 1.0,    0.0 0.3,    0.1 0.2   0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth   0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0   0,      0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 
 
Missed alerts only occurred onboard Aircraft B on 1% of the test runs when transmitting data with 
NACp 10 accuracy (Table 215).  Nuisance alerts did not occur for either aircraft.  For Aircraft B, there was 
no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between accuracy 
levels.  Both of the missed WAs for Aircraft B should have occurred after the aircraft conducted a go-
around maneuver and was 680 ft AGL. 
When analyzing by CD&R equipage level (Table 216), the two missed WAs occurred onboard Aircraft 
B when Both aircraft were equipped with CD&R.  For Aircraft B, there was no significant difference (p = 
0.11) in the number of runs in which missed WAs occurred between equipage levels. 
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Table 215.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All Evasive 
Actions by NACp for Head–on Arrivals Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
10 168 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 42 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
10 168 0,    0.0 2,    1.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 42 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Table 216.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All NACp by 
Evasive Action for Head-on Arrivals Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A (Arrival Runway 10) 
Aircraft A 70 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 70 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 70 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B (Arrival Runway 28) 
Aircraft A 70 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 70 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 70 0,    0.0 2,    2.9 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – No unnecessary maneuvers occurred for this scenario. 
Collision avoidance – Collision avoidance was most effective when Both aircraft were equipped with 
CD&R and least effective when only Aircraft B was equipped (Table 217).  When Aircraft A and Aircraft 
B were equipped with CD&R, there was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which 
near collisions and collisions occurred between accuracy levels.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there 
was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which near collisions occurred between 
accuracy levels. 
Table 217.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Directive Alerting for Head-on Arrivals Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C 
10 56 16,  28.6 4,  7.1 16,  28.6 8,  14.3 8,  14.3 0,  0.0 
Truth 14   4,  28.6 1,  7.1   4,  28.6 2,  14.3 2,  14.3 0,  0.0 
 
For equipped aircraft, WAs were issued on 10 runs when the aircraft was 82 ft AGL and on five runs 
when the aircraft was 179 ft AGL, with all aircraft landing and conducting accelerated braking.  When 
Aircraft A was equipped with CD&R, the collision occurred just before Aircraft A exited the runway.  When 
Aircraft B was equipped, the collision occurred on five runs just before Aircraft B exited the runway, on 
four runs after Aircraft B conducted accelerated braking and was taxiing down the runway at 30 kts, and 
on one run after Aircraft B had stopped on the runway. 
5.3.3 Directive Alerting – Taxi intersection 
For each of the 6 cases in this scenario, an initiation delay and initial location for Aircraft B were 
evaluated at 76 levels, for a total of 1,140 test runs.  
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Algorithm performance – CAs were generated for 56% to 59% of the test runs and WAs were generated 
for 50% to 54% of the runs depending on the position accuracy level (Table 218).  For Aircraft A, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.462) and WAs (p = 0.335) were 
generated between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number 
of runs in which CAs (p = 0.799) and WAs (p = 0.306) were generated between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing alerts that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for Aircraft A, CAs were 
issued when the aircraft was approximately 217 ft to 718 ft from Aircraft B and WAs were issued when 
approximately 198 ft to 399 ft from Aircraft B.  For Aircraft B, CAs were issued when approximately 236 
ft to 718 ft from Aircraft A and WAs were issued when approximately 217 ft to 399 ft from Aircraft A. 
Alert toggling only occurred when transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy (Table 218).  For Aircraft 
A, there was a significant difference (p = 0.008) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were 
generated between NACp 10 accuracy and truth accuracy.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in 
the number of runs in which multiple WAs were generated between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there 
was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which multiple CAs were generated between 
accuracy levels. 
For Aircraft A, CA toggling was due to position accuracy (13 runs) and maneuvering (11 runs).  
Multiple CAs occurred after Aircraft B began to taxi.  The WA toggling was due to position accuracy.  For 
Aircraft B, the CA toggling occurred after both aircraft stopped on the taxiway. 
Table 218.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All Evasive Actions by NACp for 
Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
10 912 535,    58.7 24,    2.6 491,    53.8 1,    0.1 
Truth 228 127,    55.7   0,    0.0 114,    50.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
10 912 517,    56.7   2,    0.2 493,    54.1 0,    0.0 
Truth 228 132,    57.9   0,    0.0 114,    50.0 0,    0.0 
 
When analyzing by equipage level (Table 219), CAs were issued on approximately 56% to 59% of the 
runs for both aircraft.  WAs were issued on approximately 53% of the runs for all equipage levels for both 
aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.838) 
and WAs (p = 0.996) were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant 
difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.804) and WAs (p = 0.986) were generated between 
equipage levels. 
Table 219.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All NACp by Evasive Action for Taxi 
Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Aircraft A 380 225,    59.2 9,    2.4 201,    52.9 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 380 217,    57.1 8,    2.1 202,    53.2 1,    0.3 
Both 380 220,    57.9 7,    1.8 202,    53.2 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
Aircraft A 380 221,    58.2 0,    0.0 201,    52.9 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 380 212,    55.8 0,    0.0 203,    53.4 0,    0.0 
Both 380 216,    56.8 2,    0.5 203,    53.4 0,    0.0 
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The rate of alert toggling was low for all equipage levels (Table 219).  For Aircraft A, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which multiple CAs (p = 0.88) and multiple WAs (p = 0.333) 
were generated between equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the 
number of runs in which multiple CAs (p = 0.111) and multiple WAs (p = 0.333) were generated between 
equipage levels. 
Alert statistics were also compiled by CD&R equipage level when truth position data was transmitted 
(Table 220).  In general, alerts were issued at a similar rate as when transmitting data with various accuracy 
levels (Table 219).  Multiple alerts did not occur when transmitting accurate data.  For both aircraft, there 
was no significant difference in the number of runs in which CAs (p = 0.996) and WAs (p = 0.986) were 
generated between equipage levels. 
Table 220.  ATCAM Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting When Transmitting Truth Position Data 
for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Multiple WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Aircraft A 380 220,    57.9 0,    0.0 188,    49.5 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 380 220,    57.9 0,    0.0 190,    50.0 0,    0.0 
Both 380 219,    57.6 0,    0.0 190,    50.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
Aircraft A 380 220,    57.9 0,    0.0 188,    49.5 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 380 220,    57.9 0,    0.0 190,    50.0 0,    0.0 
Both 380 219,    57.6 0,    0.0 190,    50.0 0,    0.0 
 
Missed and nuisance alerts – Both aircraft entered the defined missed boundary for a large percentage 
of test runs when transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy (Table 221).  Neither aircraft entered the 
nuisance boundary for this scenario.  There was a significant difference (p < 0.001) in the number of runs 
in which the aircraft entered the missed boundary between NACp 10 accuracy vs. truth accuracy. 
The aircraft entered the missed boundary only when crossing the intersecting taxiway.  As previously 
discussed, the high rate of entering the missed boundary was due to the missed boundary definition.  There 
was no buffer between when the aircraft was inside or outside the missed boundary; therefore, a very small 
difference between the true and detected position caused a missed boundary to be counted. 
Table 221.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Boundary Statistics for Directive Alerting for Taxi 
Intersection Scenario. 
 Entered Missed Boundary Entered Nuisance Boundary 
 
 
NACp 
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD) 
% of 
Run 
Length
# Runs, 
% Runs 
Count 
(weighted 
mean, SD) 
Duration 
(seconds) 
(mean, SD)
% of 
Run 
Length 
Aircraft A 
10 513,     56.2 1.1,    0.3 0.6,    0.3 1.7 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth     0,       0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B 
10   353,   38.7 1.1,    0.3 0.6,    0.6 1.9 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
Truth       0,     0.0 0.0,    0.0    0,    0.0 0.0 0,    0.0 0.0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0.0 
 
The missed alert rate was low for this scenario (Table 222).  It was only possible for a nuisance alert to 
be generated when taxiing across a taxiway; however, no nuisance alerts were issued for either aircraft for 
this scenario.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which missed 
CAs (p = 0.687) and missed WAs (p = 1.0) occurred between accuracy levels.  For Aircraft B, there was a 
significant difference (p = 0.013) in the number of runs in which missed CAs occurred between NACp 10 
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accuracy vs. truth accuracy.  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which 
missed WAs occurred between accuracy levels. 
When analyzing missed CAs that occurred when transmitting truth position data, for Aircraft A, two of 
the alerts should have occurred when Aircraft A was 579 ft down the taxiway and Aircraft B was crossing 
604 ft down the taxiway.  Three of the alerts should have occurred when Aircraft A was 712 ft down the 
taxiway and Aircraft B was crossing 803 ft down the taxiway. 
Table 222.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All Evasive 
Actions by NACp for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 
NACp 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
10 912 27,    3.0 3,    0.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 228   5,    2.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
10 912 29,    3.2 2,    0.2 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Truth 228   0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Analyzing the data based on equipage level (Table 223) shows that, missed CAs occurred on 
approximately 2% to 3% of the test runs for both aircraft depending on the equipage level.  The missed WA 
rate was very low for all equipage levels for both aircraft.  For Aircraft A, there was no significant difference 
in the number of runs in which missed CAs (p = 0.543) and missed WAs (p = 0.259) occurred between 
equipage levels.  For Aircraft B, there was also no significant difference in the number of runs in which 
missed CAs (p = 0.371) and missed WAs (p = 0.111) occurred between equipage levels. 
Table 223.  ATCAM Missed and Nuisance Alert Statistics for Directive Alerting for All NACp by 
Evasive Action for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
Total # 
Runs 
Missed CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Missed WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance CA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Nuisance WA 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 
Aircraft A 380   8,    2.1 2,    0.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 380 13,    3.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 380 11,    2.9 1,    0.3 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 
Aircraft A 380   7,    1.8 2,    0.5 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Aircraft B 380 13,    3.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
Both 380   9,    2.4 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvering – Only one unnecessary maneuver occurred for Aircraft A when 
transmitting data with NACp 10 accuracy (Table 224).  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the 
number of runs in which unnecessary maneuvers occurred for Aircraft A between accuracy levels. 
The unnecessary maneuver occurred onboard Aircraft A when only Aircraft A was equipped with 
CD&R (Table 225).  There was no significant difference (p = 1.0) in the number of runs in which 
unnecessary maneuvers occurred for Aircraft A between equipage levels. 
Table 224.  Unnecessary Maneuvers Using ATCAM for Directive Alerting for All Evasive Actions 
by NACp for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 
NACp 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
10 608 1,    0.2 0,    0.0 
Truth 152 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 153 
 
Table 225.  Unnecessary Maneuvers Using ATCAM for Directive Alerting for All NACp by Evasive 
Action for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
CD&R 
Equipage 
 
Total # Runs 
Aircraft A 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft B 
(# Runs, % Runs) 
Aircraft A 380 1,    0.3 N/A 
Aircraft B 380 N/A 0,    0.0 
Both 380 0,    0.0 0,    0.0 
 
Collision avoidance – Collision avoidance was most effective when Both aircraft were equipped with 
CD&R, although approximately 5% of the test runs still resulted in collision (Table 226).  Since both aircraft 
conducted identical operations, it was expected that collision avoidance would be similar for both aircraft.  
When Aircraft A was equipped, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near 
collisions (p = 0.979) and collisions (p = 1.0) occurred between equipage levels.  When Aircraft B was 
equipped, there was no significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.462) and 
collisions (p = 0.713) occurred between equipage levels.  When Both aircraft were equipped, there was no 
significant difference in the number of runs in which near collisions (p = 0.779) and collisions (p = 1.0) 
occurred between equipage levels. 
Investigation was performed on the test runs that resulted in collision for the truth data condition.  It 
was determined that for these test runs, WAs were generated (4 to 8 seconds before collision); however, by 
the time the pilot reaction delay (2 seconds) was over, the aircraft was projected to stop closer than 100 ft 
from the intersecting taxiway centerline.  As a result, the aircraft continued taxi and a collision occurred. 
Table 226.  Number/Percentage of Near Collisions (NC) and Collisions (C) Using ATCAM for 
Equipage Combinations for Directive Alerting for Taxi Intersection Scenario. 
 
 
NACp 
 
# Runs per 
Equipage 
CD&R Equipage 
Aircraft A Aircraft B Both 
NC C NC C NC C 
10 304 107,  35.2 60,  19.7 104,  34.2 56,  18.4 67,  22.0 18,  5.9 
Truth 76   26,  34.2 15,  19.7   22,  28.9 12,  15.8 15,  19.7   4,  5.3 
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6 Discussion 
The SURF IA SPR has proposed horizontal position accuracy requirements [RTCA, 2010] for the 
SURF IA function.  Through analysis, the SPR identified that to meet safety requirements, horizontal 
position accuracy when on the airport surface must be NACp 10 or higher for large airports (the Operational 
Evolution Partnership 35 airports).  This study was conducted at KORD, which fits into this airport 
category.  Experimental results are summarized and discussed in this section, in relation to this NACp 10 
position accuracy requirement. 
6.1 ATCAM and SURF IA Algorithms 
6.1.1 Algorithm Performance 
Alert generation varied during this study due to the accuracy of the data transmitted by the aircraft and 
the initial starting location and movement timing of the aircraft.  When conducting a standard approach 
operation while transmitting truth data, the ATCAM algorithm generally issued a CA when the aircraft was 
approximately 1.3 NM prior to the runway threshold and a WA when approximately 1 NM prior to the 
threshold.  The SURF IA algorithm issued TIs when approximately 2.8 NM prior to the threshold, RSIs 
when approximately 1.9 NM prior to the threshold, CAs when approximately 1.2 NM prior to the threshold, 
and WAs when approximately 0.5 NM prior to the threshold. 
During departure, the algorithms are designed to rarely issue CAs since this is a critical phase of flight 
and there is little time to evaluate the potential conflict situation.  However, when transmitting truth data, 
the ATCAM algorithm issued CAs during the departure with crossing taxi traffic scenario after a WA was 
issued and the aircraft aborted the departure.  When conditions were met, ATCAM issued WAs early in the 
departure; when the aircraft’s ground speed was 15 kts or less.  Taking action based on these timely alerts 
saves wear on the aircraft and aborts the departure early enough that the aircraft can attempt the departure 
again without having to reposition.  The SURF IA algorithm issued TIs when in position and holding or 
just after takeoff roll was initiated, RSIs when 35 kts or less, and WAs when greater than 40 kts.  SURF IA 
did not issue CAs.  Although the SURF IA SPR [RTCA, 2010] specifies that IAs must be inhibited above 
80 kts, both the ATCAM and SURF IA algorithm currently generate alerts throughout the departure; any 
alerts issued when the aircraft is greater than 80 kts would not be displayed to the flight crew. 
When an aircraft was taxiing across a runway and accurate position data was being transmitted, 
ATCAM issued a CA when approximately 345 ft to 245 ft before the runway hold line and a WA when 
approximately 245 ft before the hold line.  SURF IA issued a TI and RSI approximately 275 ft before the 
runway hold line but did not issue an alert until the aircraft nose was at the runway edge (approximately 76 
ft over the hold line). 
The ATCAM algorithm also generates alerts for potential conflicts on taxiways.  When aircraft were 
taxiing in the same direction, alerts were issued earlier the faster the aircraft were closing.  During taxi 
intersection conflict scenarios, CAs were issued when the aircraft were 719 ft to 217 ft apart and WAs were 
issued when 399 ft to 198 ft apart.  In head-on taxi situations, CAs were issued when the aircraft were 
approximately 1027 ft apart and WAs when approximately 635 ft apart. 
IA toggling occurred when multiple instances of IAs were generated during a test run.  IA toggling is 
undesirable (i.e., it is a distraction to the flight crew and could cause mistrust in the technology).  The alert 
toggling rates (percent of test runs) when using the ATCAM algorithm are presented in Table 227.  For all 
scenario types, the multiple alert rates were highest when transmitting NACp 8 accuracy.  The rate of 
multiple CAs when transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies was 2% of the runs or less for the runway 
scenarios, 22.3% or less for the taxi scenarios, and 1.1% to 4.6% for the low altitude scenarios.  The rate of 
multiple WAs when transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies was 19.2% or less for the runway 
scenarios, 23.1% or less for the taxi scenarios, and 0.5% or less for the low altitude scenarios.  The higher 
rate of multiple WAs occurred during the arrival and departure from same runway scenario, head-on arrivals 
scenario, taxi following scenario, and taxi head-on scenario.  For all other runway scenarios, the rate of 
multiple WAs when transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies was 2.2% or less of the runs and for the 
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other taxi scenario, the rate was 0.1% of the runs or less.  In many instances, the toggling included gaps 
between alerts when transmitting less accurate data (NACp 8 and 9 accuracies).  Not all toggling was due 
to inaccurate position data; multiple alerts also occurred as a result of aircraft maneuvering; i.e., after an 
aircraft rejected the takeoff, conducted accelerated braking, conducted a go-around maneuver, initiated the 
takeoff, stopped on the runway or taxiway, or exited the runway.  On intersecting runway scenarios, a 
multiple alert would sometimes occur after the aircraft has past the intersection, which was not necessary 
since the threat had passed.  The ATCAM algorithm utilizes techniques to minimize alert toggling [Otero 
et al, 2013]. 
Table 227.  Alert Toggling Rates (% of Test Runs) When Using the ATCAM Algorithm. 
 Multiple CA Multiple WA 
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Aircraft A 
Arrival / taxi crossing   3.9   1.1   0.0 0.0 0.0 15.7   3.5   1.1   0.5   0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.4   0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8   3.2   1.4   0.6   0.1 
Arrival / departure same rwy 11.9   1.8   0.0 0.0 0.0 28.2   5.6   5.6   5.6   5.6 
Departures intersecting rwys   0.0   0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   9.6   6.2   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting   0.6   0.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   8.0   6.1   1.9   1.9   1.9 
Head-on arrivals 52.5   2.4   0.9 0.0 0.0 63.5   8.6   3.6   3.0   3.6 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 10.7   0.6   0.0 0.0 0.0 27.5   5.8   0.5   0.0   0.0 
Taxi following 42.4 34.5 19.6 2.4 0.0 33.7 22.0   6.3   0.0   0.0 
Taxi intersection 36.5 16.3   3.2 0.1 0.0 21.1   4.0   0.1   0.0   0.0 
Taxi head-on 20.3   3.2   1.4 1.3 1.9 31.0 16.4 13.9 15.4 23.1 
Arrival / crossing airborne   4.3   1.7   1.1 1.1 1.1   0.9   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5 
Departure / crossing airborne   3.9   4.2   4.5 4.6 4.5   0.2   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Aircraft B 
Arrival / taxi crossing 19.4   3.0   1.8 1.9 2.0 17.6   5.6 2.2   1.7   1.4 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.9   0.1   0.1 0.1 0.1 15.2   4.4 1.1   0.4   0.1 
Arrival / departure same rwy 48.0   5.6   0.0 0.0 0.0 42.9   6.0 5.6   5.6   5.6 
Departures intersecting rwys   0.0   0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   8.3   4.7 0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting   0.0   0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9   8.0 0.0   0.0   0.0 
Head-on arrivals   9.7   1.5  0.9 0.0 0.0 62.8 34.8 19.2 14.3 14.3 
Arrivals intersecting rwys   4.7   1.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 21.4   5.1 0.0   0.0   0.0 
Taxi following 45.4 33.9 22.3 1.2 0.0 37.8 22.0 5.4   1.2   0.0 
Taxi intersection 14.5   1.8   0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5   2.1 0.0   0.0   0.0 
Taxi head-on 23.1   8.3   2.4 1.3 0.0 32.4 15.4 11.1 12.8 23.1 
Arrival / crossing airborne   3.7   1.5   1.2 1.1 1.2   0.7   0.5 0.5   0.5   0.5 
Departure / crossing airborne   2.5   2.5   2.7 2.7 2.8   0.9   0.4 0.0   0.0   0.0 
 
The alert toggling rates when using the SURF IA algorithm are presented in Table 228.  Overall, the 
rate of multiple TIs was high, even when transmitting more accurate position data.  In contrast, the rate of 
multiple RSIs was low when transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies, except for the head-on arrivals 
scenario.  There were no multiple CAs when transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies, except during 
the head-on arrivals scenario and arrivals to intersecting runways scenario.  The rate of multiple WAs was 
highest when transmitting NACp 8 accuracy.  There were also no multiple WAs when transmitting NACp 
10 and higher accuracies, except during the arrival and departure from the same runway scenario, the head-
on arrivals scenario, and the arrivals to intersecting runways scenario.  The highest rate of multiple CAs 
and WAs occurred during the head-on arrivals scenario and arrivals to intersecting runways scenario.  In 
many instances, the toggling included gaps between IAs when transmitting less accurate data (NACp 8 and 
9 accuracies).  Not all toggling was due to inaccurate position data; multiple alerts also occurred as a result 
of aircraft maneuvering; i.e., after an aircraft aborted the takeoff, conducted accelerated braking, conducted 
a go-around maneuver, initiated the takeoff, stopped on the runway, or exited the runway.  On intersecting 
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runway scenarios, a multiple alert would sometimes occur onboard an aircraft after it was in the intersection 
of the runways or had passed the intersection, which was not necessary since the aircraft is moving away 
from the intersection.  In some instances indication toggling occurred by design.  Some situations warrant 
a multiple TI; as the situation progresses, an RSI or alert is generated, then, if the situation changes, the 
indication may be degraded back to a less severe TI.  The SURF IA algorithm does not have any 
mechanisms in place to address toggling between aircraft states. 
Table 228.  IA Toggling Rates (% of Test Runs) When Using the SURF IA Algorithm. 
 Multiple TI Multiple RSI 
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Aircraft A 
Arrival / taxi crossing 17.6   1.3   0.0   0.0   0.0   5.8   1.1   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing 14.4   1.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   1.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 52.0   9.7   8.3   8.3 11.1 19.4   1.4   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 17.2 34.1 37.5 37.5 37.5   0.2   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 31.0 32.0 28.9 28.9 28.9   0.3   0.3   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Head-on arrivals 43.1   0.9   0.0   0.0   0.0 73.7 41.4 17.9 17.9 17.9 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 50.0 24.4 16.4 15.4 15.4   2.2   0.6   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Aircraft B 
Arrival / taxi crossing 41.1 13.1   6.8   6.2   5.8 36.7 11.0 3.6 2.7 2.1 
Departure / taxi crossing 70.7 14.2   0.8   0.8   0.7 34.9   9.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 88.9 46.8 22.9 23.1 22.2 57.9 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 19.0 33.9 37.5 37.5 37.5   0.4   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 34.3 33.0 28.9 28.9 28.9   1.1   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 66.1 16.4   4.9   6.5   3.6 24.2   7.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 42.3 16.0   7.7   7.7   7.7   0.6   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 Multiple CA Multiple WA 
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Aircraft A 
Arrival / taxi crossing   2.5   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   9.8   1.8   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   6.3   1.1   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 21.4   3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.4   3.2   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys   0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   4.2   1.8   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting   2.8   1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   9.6   3.5   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Head-on arrivals 64.3 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.7 31.9 21.4 21.4 21.4 
Arrivals intersecting rwys   6.6   0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5 11.9   9.6   9.6   9.6 
Aircraft B 
Arrival / taxi crossing   5.1   0.1   0.0   0.0   0.0 11.6   2.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   7.5   1.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 41.3   5.1   0.0   0.0   0.0 31.4   7.4   2.8   1.8   2.8 
Departures intersecting rwys   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   6.0   2.6   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   8.2   3.5   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Head-on arrivals 44.6 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 54.9 26.8 21.4 21.4 21.4 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 19.2 15.7 15.4 15.4 15.4 18.4 11.2   9.6   9.6   9.6 
6.1.2 Nuisance and Missed Alerts 
As discussed in Section 4.5.2, a nuisance IA is defined as any indication or alert generated by a properly 
functioning CD&R system that is inappropriate or unnecessary for the particular situation [RTCA, 2010].  
Nuisance IAs could distract the flight crew unnecessarily, reduce confidence in the system, and negatively 
affect safety and operational effectiveness.  Repeated nuisance IAs could decrease the use of CD&R and 
reduce expeditious flight crew response to true IAs. 
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As determined by the SURF IA SPR [RTCA, 2010], acceptable rates for displaying nuisance IA from 
a safety perspective are as follows: nuisance indications, 4 x 10-2 per operation or less and nuisance alerts, 
1 x 10-3 per operation or less.  An operation is defined as all of the states that comprise one takeoff and one 
landing procedure, i.e., taxiing, holding short of runway, entering/exiting/crossing a runway, in position 
and holding, takeoff roll, approach, and landing.  For this study, each runway conflict scenario only 
contained one takeoff or landing procedure per aircraft, but not both; therefore, the nuisance rates stated 
above are being divided in half (nuisance indication: 2 x 10-2 or less, nuisance alerts, 5 x 10-4 or less) to 
determine acceptability of the rate of nuisance IAs issued during the testing.  Only the runway conflict 
scenarios were evaluated for nuisance rate acceptability since the SURF IA SPR does not address taxi and 
low altitude air-to-air conflict situations at this time. 
When using the ATCAM algorithm, the rate of nuisance CAs and WAs met the SURF IA nuisance 
acceptability rate for all runway conflict scenarios and position accuracy levels except as shown in Table 
229. 
Table 229.  ATCAM Conditions That Did Not Meet Nuisance Acceptability Rate. 
Scenario Aircraft NACp Alert 
Arrival / taxi crossing Taxi crossing 8 CA, WA 
Departure / taxi crossing Taxi crossing 8 CA, WA 
Arrival / departure same runway Departure 8 CA, WA 
Head-on arrivals Arrival Runway 10 8 CA, WA 
Head-on arrivals Arrival Runway 10 9 WA 
 
When using the SURF IA algorithm, the rate of nuisance IAs met the SURF IA nuisance acceptability 
rate for all runway conflict scenarios and positions accuracy levels except as shown in Table 230. 
Table 230.  SURF IA Conditions That Did Not Meet Nuisance Acceptability Rate. 
Scenario Aircraft NACp Alert 
Arrival / taxi crossing Taxi crossing 8 TI, RSI, CA, WA 
Departure / taxi crossing Taxi crossing 8 TI, RSI, WA 
Head-on arrivals Arrival Runway 10 8 TI, RSI, CA, WA 
Head-on arrivals Arrival Runway 10 9 RSI 
Head-on arrivals Arrival Runway 10 10 RSI 
Arrivals to intersecting runways Arrival Runway 14L 8 TI 
 
For both algorithms, the nuisance acceptability rate was not met in many instances when transmitting 
NACp 8 accuracy.  Each algorithm had one instance of not meeting the nuisance acceptability rate when 
transmitting NACp 9 accuracy (head-on arrival scenario).  The SURF IA algorithm had one instance of not 
meeting the nuisance acceptability rate for an indication when transmitting NACp 10 accuracy.  Based on 
this evaluation, NACp 10 and higher accuracy is sufficient for meeting acceptable nuisance alert rates and 
may be acceptable for meeting nuisance indication rates, NACp 9 accuracy may be acceptable for meeting 
the nuisance IA rate, and NACp 8 is not acceptable.  
A missed IA is defined as a failure to provide an indication or alert when it is necessary provided 
ownship and traffic are adequately equipped [RTCA, 2010].  Missed IAs represent a reduction in CD&R 
benefits and result in operations that are similar to today’s operations where IAs are not provided.  The 
SURF IA SPR did not address missed IA from the safety perspective; therefore, acceptable rates for missed 
IAs were not provided. 
In this study, an algorithm dependent definition was used to determine the rate of missed IAs.  If an IA 
was generated when transmitting truth data but an IA was not generated at the same instance when 
transmitting NACp data, then a missed IA was counted. 
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The missed alert rates when using the ATCAM algorithm are presented in Table 231.  For all scenario 
types except the arrival and departure from intersecting runways, the missed alert rates were highest when 
transmitting NACp 8 accuracy.  When transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies, the rate of missed CAs 
was 0.6% of the runs or less for the runway scenarios, 4.5% or less for the taxi scenarios, and 0.5% or less 
for the low altitude scenarios.  When transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies, the rate of missed WAs 
was low for the low altitude scenarios (0.2% of runs) but was much higher for the runway (14.9% to 15.4% 
of runs) and taxi (13.9% of runs or less) scenarios.  The higher rate of missed WAs occurred during the 
departures from intersecting runway scenario, arrival and departure from intersecting runways scenario, 
and taxi head-on scenario.  For all other runway scenarios, the rate of missed WAs when transmitting NACp 
10 and higher accuracy was 1.5% or less of the runs and for the other taxi scenarios, the rate was 0.7% of 
the runs or less. 
Table 231.  Missed Alert Rates (% of Test Runs) When Using the ATCAM Algorithm. 
 Missed CA  Missed WA  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Aircraft A 
Arrival / taxi crossing   2.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.0   7.3   2.4   0.4   0.2   0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   8.1   2.6   1.1   0.5   0.2 
Arrival / departure same rwy   2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   2.0   0.9   0.0   0.9   0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.4 15.4 12.9 12.5 12.5 
Arrival / departure intersecting   3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 13.1 14.9 15.4 15.4 
Head-on arrivals   0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.8   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3   1.6   0.5   1.3   0.0 
Taxi following   8.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0   2.6   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Taxi intersection   7.7 3.4 3.5 2.5 2.3   7.1   2.1   0.7   0.0   0.0 
Taxi head-on 12.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8   9.6   9.6   7.7   0.0 
Arrival / crossing airborne   1.4 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1   1.3   0.4   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Departure / crossing airborne   4.8 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.1   1.9   0.3   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Aircraft B 
Arrival / taxi crossing   3.4 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.0   8.5   2.1   0.6   0.2   0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 10.8   1.9   0.7   0.4   0.3 
Arrival / departure same rwy   4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   2.8   0.0   0.0   0.9   0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0   9.9   6.6   6.2   6.2 
Arrival / departure intersecting   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.8   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Head-on arrivals   0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0   2.6   2.7   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys   6.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0   1.4   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Taxi following   7.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0   2.0   1.2   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Taxi intersection 13.0 7.1 4.5 2.4 0.0   8.2   2.3   0.6   0.0   0.0 
Taxi head-on 12.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 11.2 13.9 10.9   0.0 
Arrival / crossing airborne   1.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0   1.8   0.4   0.1   0.0   0.0 
Departure / crossing airborne   3.4 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.0   2.5   0.5   0.2   0.2  0.2 
 
The missed IA rates when using the SURF IA algorithm are presented in Table 232.  The SURF IA 
algorithm was only evaluated for the runway scenarios.  The missed IA rates were highest when transmitting 
NACp 8 accuracy.  When transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracies, the rate of missed TIs was 5.6% of 
the runs or less, missed RSIs was 0.6% to 2.2% of the runs, missed CAs was 2.8% of the runs or less, and 
missed WAs was 1.0% to 1.2% of the runs.  The higher occurrence of missed TIs were for the arrival and 
departure from same runway scenario; otherwise, the rate was 1.8% or less. 
For both algorithms, when transmitting truth position accuracy, missed alerts occurred because of the 
ADS-B transmission model.  The transmission model resulted in a slight delay between the aircraft’s 
position at the time of transmitting the ADS-B message and the position at the time of reception of the 
ADS-B message by the other aircraft.  This delay was present in all scenarios, but this position difference 
 159 
 
was negligible compared to the NACp position uncertainty error.  As a result, one aircraft did not detect a 
conflict with the other aircraft based on the broadcast position, but if instantaneous position information 
were used, a conflict would have been detected.  The small error introduced by the movement of the aircraft 
between transmission and reception of the ADS-B message resulted in just enough difference in relation to 
the other aircraft’s position to result in the missed alerts. 
Table 232.  Missed IA Rates (% of Test Runs) When Using the SURF IA Algorithm. 
 Missed TI  Missed RSI  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Aircraft A 
Arrival / taxi crossing   2.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0   5.1 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy   8.7 5.6 5.6 4.6 0.0   4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 32.4 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 21.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals   0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0   1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys   9.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B 
Arrival / taxi crossing   2.5 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.1   4.6 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing   0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 16.5 2.6 1.2 0.9 0.6 
Arrival / departure same rwy   6.0 0.9 4.2 2.8 0.0   3.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 28.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 17.9 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals   3.8 2.4 0.9 1.2 1.8   6.4 3.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys   5.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 Missed CA  Missed WA  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Aircraft A 
Arrival / taxi crossing 3.7 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.0   8.1 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   9.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   4.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Aircraft B 
Arrival / taxi crossing 3.6 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 8.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 2.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 2.0 0.5 2.8 0.9 0.0 11.9 2.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.6 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6.1.3 Unnecessary Maneuvering 
Previous research has shown that pilots instinctively react upon receiving airport traffic WAs in the 
flight deck [Jones et al, 2010] without necessarily confirming with secondary or additional information 
first; therefore, it is critical that alerting only occurs when needed.  Otherwise, the flight crew could make 
unnecessary maneuvers that can cause delays, equipment wear, and other costs to airlines. 
Since this was not a human-in-the-loop study, an algorithm-dependent method was devised to 
determine whether a maneuver (go-around, accelerated braking, rejected take-off, climb, descend, 
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accelerate during taxi, and decelerate during taxi) was unnecessary.  Maneuvering was considered 
unnecessary if made based on a WA issued when the aircraft were broadcasting NACp accuracy, but for 
the same test conditions, a WA was not issued when broadcasting truth position data.  Only the test runs in 
which maneuvering was possible were evaluated for unnecessary maneuvers. 
The unnecessary maneuvering rates when using the ATCAM algorithm were as shown in Table 233. 
Table 233.  Unnecessary Maneuvering Rates When Using the ATCAM Algorithm. 
 Unnecessary Maneuvering Rate 
Aircraft A (% of runs)  
Unnecessary Maneuvering Rate 
Aircraft B (% of runs) 
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Arrival / taxi crossing 11.0 3.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 3.4 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Departure / taxi crossing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 2.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 1.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 4.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxi following 51.0 25.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 43.9 21.4 10.7 2.4 0.0 
Taxi intersection 23.3 10.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 16.4 5.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 
Taxi head-on 5.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / crossing airborne 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Departure / crossing airborne 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
The unnecessary maneuvering rates when using the SURF IA algorithm were as shown in Table 234. 
Table 234.  Unnecessary Maneuvering Rates When Using the SURF IA Algorithm. 
 Unnecessary Maneuvering Rate 
Aircraft A (% of runs)  
Unnecessary Maneuvering Rate 
Aircraft B (% of runs) 
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Arrival / taxi crossing 3.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure same rwy 4.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.6 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 12.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Unnecessary maneuvers were more prevalent when transmitting less accurate position data, particularly 
when transmitting NACp 8 and 9 accuracies.  When using the ATCAM algorithm, there were no 
unnecessary maneuvers for the intersecting runway scenarios.  When transmitting NACp 10 and higher 
accuracy, unnecessary maneuvers occurred on 0.4% of the runs or less for the arrival and taxi crossing 
aircraft, on 1.4% or less for the departing aircraft, and on 0.2% or less for the airborne crossing aircraft.  
The occurrence of unnecessary maneuvers was higher for the taxi aircraft (10.7% of the runs or less when 
transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracy).  When using the SURF IA algorithm, unnecessary maneuvers 
occurred for the departing aircraft during the arrival and departure from intersecting runways scenario; 
otherwise, there were no unnecessary maneuvers for the arrival, departure, and taxi crossing aircraft when 
transmitting NACp 10 accuracy or higher. 
6.1.4 Collision Avoidance 
Overall, collision avoidance was more effective when both aircraft were equipped with CD&R and 
maneuvered to avoid a collision after a WA was issued.  As expected, collisions occurred most often when 
neither aircraft were equipped and did not take any action to avoid a collision.  Sometimes, however, 
collision avoidance was more effective when one aircraft was equipped with CD&R over the other aircraft.  
For example, during the arrival with departure from same runway scenario, collision avoidance was more 
effective when the arrival was equipped with CD&R. 
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Positional accuracy did not have any effect on the collision rate when neither aircraft was equipped 
with CD&R.  This was due to the fact that for some scenario conditions a collision was unavoidable because 
neither aircraft took evasive action. 
The collision rates when using the ATCAM algorithm are presented in Table 235.  When using NACp 
10 and higher accuracy and both aircraft were equipped with CD&R, collisions occurred on 0% to 0.2% of 
the test runs for the runway conflict scenarios, 0% to 5.8% of the test runs for the taxi scenarios, and 0.2% 
to 1.5% of the test runs for the low altitude conflict scenarios.  Collisions were sometimes unavoidable for 
the approach aircraft due to the phase of the operation when a WA was issued; i.e., high speed rollout or 
too low to conduct a go-around maneuver.  As described above, alerts were not inhibited on departure when 
above 80 kts as specified in the SURF IA SPR.  For the departing aircraft, WAs were sometimes issued 
after the aircraft reached the decision takeoff speed (131 kts) and the departure was not aborted.  Sometimes 
WAs were issued but not with enough time for the aircraft to stop prior to a collision.  Other times the 
collision was caused when the aircraft aborted the departure.  For example, if the departing aircraft aborted 
the takeoff and stopped on the runway as another aircraft was landing on the same runway, a collision 
resulted.  During the taxi trials that resulted in collision, either a WA was not issued, a WA was issued after 
the collision, or the alert was not provided in enough time for maneuvering to be effective. 
Table 235.  Collision Rates (% of Test Runs) When Using the ATCAM Algorithm. 
 Neither Aircraft CD&R Equipped  Aircraft A CD&R Equipped  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Arrival / taxi crossing 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 6.4 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 
Departure / taxi crossing 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.5 10.2 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.9 
Arrival / departure same rwy 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 3.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.7 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 34.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxi following 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 20.4 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxi intersection 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 20.1 19.5 18.8 18.4 18.4 
Taxi head-on 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 91.2 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 
Arrival / crossing airborne 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Departure / crossing airborne 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
 
 Aircraft B Aircraft CD&R Equipped  Both Aircraft CD&R Equipped  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Arrival / taxi crossing 3.1 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 2.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Departure / taxi crossing 7.3 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Arrival / departure same rwy 50.8 44.4 44.4 44.4 44.4 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 4.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxi following 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxi intersection 23.7 16.9 13.8 14.0 13.2 16.9 4.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxi head-on 91.2 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 34.1 9.0 5.8 5.1 0.0 
Arrival / crossing airborne 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Departure / crossing airborne 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
 
When using the SURF IA algorithm, the collision rates were as shown in Table 236.  When using NACp 
10 accuracy and higher and both aircraft were equipped with CD&R, collisions occurred on 0% to 21.5% 
of the test runs for the runway conflict scenarios.  Again, collisions were sometimes unavoidable for the 
approach aircraft due to the phase of the operation when a WA was issued; i.e., high speed rollout or too 
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low to conduct a go-around maneuver.  As when using the ATCAM algorithm, for the departing aircraft, 
WAs were sometimes issued after the aircraft reached the decision takeoff speed (131 kts) and the departure 
was not aborted; other times the collision was caused when the aircraft aborted the departure.  When an 
aircraft was taxiing across a runway, a WA was not timely; the alert generally did not occur until the aircraft 
was on or almost on the runway resulting in no action since the aircraft was past the runway shoulder. 
Table 236.  Collision Rates (% of Test Runs) When Using the SURF IA Algorithm. 
 Neither Aircraft CD&R Equipped  Aircraft A CD&R Equipped  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Arrival / taxi crossing 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 8.8 9.2 9.2 9.0 9.1 
Departure / taxi crossing 14.4 14.4 14.5 14.4 14.4 12.6 12.7 12.7 12.6 12.5 
Arrival / departure same rwy 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 19.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 3.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 42.9 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.7 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 Aircraft B Aircraft CD&R Equipped  Both Aircraft CD&R Equipped  
NACp 8 9 10 11 Truth 8 9 10 11 Truth 
Arrival / taxi crossing 7.9 9.0 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.0 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 
Departure / taxi crossing 12.8 14.0 14.1 14.1 14.1 11.7 12.5 12.6 12.5 12.5 
Arrival / departure same rwy 41.3 35.2 33.3 33.3 33.3 12.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Departures intersecting rwys 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Arrival / departure intersecting 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Head-on arrivals 27.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.5 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 
Arrivals intersecting rwys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
6.1.5 Unwanted Alert 
Unwanted alerts were evaluated for the approach and departure with crossing taxi traffic scenarios 
when only using the ATCAM CD&R algorithm.  An alert was considered to be unwanted (i.e., nuisance) 
if the true position of the taxi aircraft was behind the hold line but the detected position indicated that the 
aircraft was over the hold line, causing an alert.  Based on the analysis, 99% of unwanted alerts could be 
avoided if the alert zone was placed 390 ft past the hold line if traffic were transmitting NACp 8 position 
data, 135 ft past the hold line with NACp 9 accuracy, and 55 ft past the hold line with NACp 10 accuracy.  
The maximum standard for separation between the hold line and runway centerline is 280 ft [FAA, 2009b] 
to accommodate the largest aircraft.  Assuming the runway is 150 ft wide, the distance between the runway 
hold line and runway edge is 205 ft.; therefore, a 390 ft alerting zone buffer is not practical.  A 135 ft buffer 
would place the alert zone 70 ft before the runway edge and a 55 ft buffer would place the alert zone 150 ft 
before the runway edge.  Consideration must also be given to the reference point for the aircraft data.  If 
the data is referenced from the aircraft CG and translation to the aircraft’s nose position is not made, a larger 
alerting zone buffer may be required.  For example, for the aircraft used in this study, the nose position was 
72.8 ft from the CG.  Using a 135 ft buffer would cause alerts to not be issued until the aircraft’s nose was 
on the runway.  To summarize, transmitting NACp 9 data accuracy may be sufficient for reducing unwanted 
alerts when taxiing across a runway provided the data is translated to the aircraft nose position.  NACp 10 
and higher data accuracy is sufficient even if the data is referenced from the aircraft CG.  NACp 8 data 
accuracy is not sufficient. 
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6.2 Directive Alerting 
An initial implementation of directive alerting was developed for the ATCAM algorithm.  Directive 
alerting specifies the action to take to resolve a conflict situation in lieu of providing a generic WA.  The 
directive given depends on the conflict situation.  The directives that were possible for the scenarios 
evaluated and the directives that were actually issued during the testing are shown in Table 237.  These 
directives were issued at the same time an ATCAM WA was issued. 
Table 237.  Directives Alerts. 
Scenario Directives Possible Directives Issued 
Arrival / departure intersecting 
runways 
No resolution available 
Go-around 
Land and emergency stop 
Abort takeoff 
Expedite takeoff 
Emergency stop 
No resolution available 
Land and emergency stop 
Abort takeoff 
Emergency stop 
Head-on arrivals No resolution available 
Go-around 
Land and emergency stop 
Abort takeoff 
Emergency stop 
Exit / clear runway 
No resolution available 
Go-around 
Exit / clear runway 
Intersecting taxi No resolution available 
Emergency stop 
Reduce speed 
Increase speed 
Turn right 
Turn left 
No resolution available 
Emergency stop 
Reduce speed 
 
A comparison was conducted of the maneuvers made by the aircraft during the ATCAM evaluation, 
when maneuvers were made based on a standard set of actions according to the scenario type, and during 
the directive alerting evaluation, when maneuvers were made based on the directive issued (Table 240).  
For the arrival and departure from intersecting runways scenario, the actions taken were equivalent, with 
no collisions for the ATCAM evaluation and directive alerting evaluation.  For the head-on arrivals 
scenario, the actions were equivalent for the aircraft approaching Runway 10 (Aircraft A).  For the aircraft 
approaching Runway 28 (Aircraft B); however, fewer go-around maneuvers and more frequent accelerated 
braking occurred when directive alerting was in effect.  More collisions also occurred with directive 
alerting.  For the intersecting taxi scenario, during the ATCAM evaluation the action taken after a WA was 
issued was to conduct accelerated braking and stop.  With directive alerting, the ‘stop’ directive was also 
issued, but for some scenarios a ‘reduce speed’ directive was issued that resulted in normal braking.  As a 
result, more collisions occurred with directive alerting.  Based on these results, directive alerting was not 
as effective and more research is necessary to determine the feasibility of providing directive alerts to the 
flight crew. 
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Table 240.  ATCAM versus Directive Alerting Comparison. 
 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
 
NACp 
 
 
 
Aircraft 
ATCAM Directive Alerting 
Colli-
sions 
#runs 
 
Actions* 
(# runs, type) 
Colli-
sions 
#runs 
 
Actions 
(# runs, type) 
Arrival / 
departure 
intersecting 
runways 
Truth 
(13 
runs) 
A 0     5 accelerated braking 0     5 accelerated braking 
B   18 rejected takeoffs   18 rejected takeoffs 
10 
(52 
runs) 
A 0   21 accelerated braking 0   20 accelerated braking 
B   72 rejected takeoffs   72 rejected takeoffs 
Head-on 
arrivals 
Truth 
(14 
runs) 
A 0   24 accelerated braking 3   24 accelerated braking 
B     2 accelerated braking 
  21 go-around 
    4 accelerated braking 
  19 go-around 
10 
( 56 
runs) 
A 0   96 accelerated braking 12   96 accelerated braking 
B     8 accelerated braking 
  84 go-around 
  16 accelerated braking 
  76 go-around 
Intersecting 
taxi 
Truth 
(76 
runs) 
A 24   40 accelerated braking 31   26 accelerated braking 
  16 normal braking 
B   52 accelerated braking   29 accelerated braking 
  29 normal braking 
10 
(304 
runs) 
A 102 152 accelerated braking 134 115 accelerated braking 
  61 normal braking 
B 214 accelerated braking 109 accelerated braking 
133 normal braking 
*ATCAM actions only include scenarios when Aircraft A, Aircraft B, or both aircraft were equipped 
with CD&R. 
7 Conclusions 
Two CD&R algorithms for the airport TMA were evaluated in a fast-time batch simulation study.  The 
purpose of the study was to evaluate the performance of the aircraft-based CD&R algorithms during various 
runway, taxiway, and low altitude scenarios, multiple levels of CD&R system equipage, and various levels 
of horizontal position accuracy. 
Alert generation varied during this study due to the accuracy of the data transmitted by the aircraft and 
the initial starting location and movement timing of the aircraft.  Although both algorithms effectively 
issued alerts for collision avoidance, differences were noted in implementation.  The SURF IA algorithm 
issued indications, which provide an early awareness of potential traffic threats in many situations; the 
ATCAM algorithm does not currently issue indications.  For the scenarios reported on herein, when 
transmitting truth data and the aircraft was conducting a standard approach, the SURF IA algorithm issued 
WAs when the aircraft was closer to the runway threshold (approximately 0.5 NM) than with the ATCAM 
algorithm (approximately 1 m).  When conditions were met, the ATCAM algorithm issued WAs early in 
the departure (15 kts or less).  Taking action based on these timely alerts saves wear on the aircraft and 
aborts the departure early enough that the aircraft can attempt the departure again without having to 
reposition.  Although the SURF IA algorithm did not issue WAs on departure until the aircraft’s ground 
speed was greater than 40 kts, indications were issued as early as when the aircraft was in position and 
holding, providing traffic awareness.  When an aircraft was taxiing across a runway, the ATCAM algorithm 
issued alerts as early as 345 ft before the runway hold line, whereas, SURF IA issued indications 
approximately 275 ft before the runway hold line but did not issue alerts until the aircraft nose was at the 
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runway edge, which may be too late for the aircraft to stop, provided the pilot does not take action until an 
alert is issued. 
Alert toggling occurs when multiple instances of indications or alerts are generated as a result of 
position accuracy or aircraft maneuvering.  Alert toggling can be a distraction to the flight crew and could 
cause mistrust in the technology.  In general, alert toggling occurred more frequently as the position 
accuracy was reduced, especially when transmitting NACp 8 and NACp 9 accurate data; however, for some 
test scenarios, the rate of toggling was high for all position accuracy levels.  The toggling included gaps 
between alerts in many instances, i.e., the alert would turn “on” and “off” and then later would be issued 
again.  Other times, an alert would be issued more than once during a test run as a result of maneuvering.  
In some instances, indication toggling occurred by design.  For some situations, indications were issued 
initially, as the situation became more critical alerts were issued, and once the situation began to be resolved, 
an indication would be reissued. 
It is critical that alerts only occur when needed; otherwise, the flight crew could make unnecessary 
maneuvers that can cause delays, equipment wear, and other costs to airlines.  The rate of unnecessary 
maneuvers was affected by position accuracy, with more unnecessary maneuvers occurring as the position 
accuracy decreased (NACp 8 and 9).  When using the ATCAM algorithm and the aircraft were transmitting 
NACp 10 and higher accuracy, the rate of unnecessary maneuvers was 1.4% or less, except during the taxi 
conflict scenarios, where the rate was higher (10.7% or less).  There were no unnecessary maneuvers when 
using the SURF IA algorithm and the aircraft were transmitting NACp 10 and higher accuracy, except for 
the departing aircraft during an intersecting runway scenario. 
Nuisance indications and alerts could distract the flight crew unnecessarily, reduce confidence in the 
system, and negatively affect safety and operational effectiveness.  For runway conflict scenarios, 
acceptable rates for displaying nuisance indications and alerts from a safety perspective are specified in the 
SURF IA SPR.  For both algorithms, the nuisance acceptability rate was not met in many instances when 
transmitting NACp 8 accuracy.  Each algorithm had one instance of not meeting the nuisance acceptability 
rate when transmitting NACp 9 accuracy (head-on arrival scenario).  The SURF IA algorithm had one 
instance of not meeting the nuisance acceptability rate for an indication when transmitting NACp 10 
accuracy.  Based on this evaluation, NACp 10 and higher accuracy is sufficient for meeting acceptable 
nuisance alert rates and may be acceptable for meeting nuisance indication rates, NACp 9 accuracy may be 
acceptable for meeting the nuisance IA rate, and NACp 8 is not acceptable.  
Missed indications and alerts represent a reduction in CD&R benefits and result in operations such as 
they currently exist, where CD&R indications and alerts are not provided.  Missed indications and alerts 
were not assessed in the SURF IA SPR from the safety perspective; therefore, acceptable rates for missed 
indications and alerts were not provided.  Based on the algorithm dependent definition used in determining 
the rate of missed indications and alerts, overall, the missed indication and alert rates were highest when 
the aircraft were transmitting NACp 8 accuracy.  When the aircraft were transmitting NACp 10 and higher 
accuracy, the overall rate of missed indications and alerts was low for both algorithms, except for the missed 
WA rate during select scenarios (intersecting runway and taxi head-on) when using the ATCAM algorithm. 
Overall, collision avoidance was more effective when both aircraft were equipped with CD&R and 
maneuvered to avoid a collision after a WA was issued.  As expected, collisions occurred most often when 
neither aircraft were equipped and did not take any action to avoid a collision.  Sometimes, however, 
collision avoidance was more effective when one aircraft was equipped with CD&R over the other aircraft.  
For example, for the arrival with departure from same runway scenario, collision avoidance was more 
effective when the arrival was equipped with CD&R.  Collisions were sometimes unavoidable due to the 
phase of the operation when a WA was issued; i.e., high speed rollout or too low to conduct a go-around 
maneuver.  Other times the collision was caused by the maneuvering aircraft; e.g., the departing aircraft 
aborted takeoff and stopped on the runway as another aircraft was landing on the same runway.  In some 
instances, the alert was not timely and the aircraft was in a position (e.g., on the runway) in which action 
could not be taken to avoid a collision. 
In order to reduce the number of unwanted alerts when taxiing across a runway, a buffer is needed 
between the hold line and the alerting zone so alerts are not generated when an aircraft is behind the hold 
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line.  Testing indicated that as the position accuracy decreases, a larger buffer is required.  When 
transmitting NACp 8 data accuracy, such a large buffer would be required that it is not practical.  
Transmitting NACp 9 data accuracy may be sufficient provided the data is referenced from the aircraft nose 
position.  NACp 10 and higher data accuracy is sufficient even if the data is referenced from the aircraft 
center-of-gravity. 
The SURF IA SPR has proposed horizontal position accuracy requirements for the SURF IA function. 
Through analysis, the SPR identified that to meet safety requirements, horizontal position accuracy when 
on the airport surface must be NACp 10 or higher for large airports, such as that used for this study.  The 
analysis conducted in this experiment (nuisance and missed IAs, alert toggling, unnecessary maneuvering, 
collision avoidance, and unwanted alerts) supports the NACp 10 requirement for performing the runway 
conflict CD&R function to reduce the likelihood and severity of runway incursions and collisions. 
Finally, an initial implementation of directive alerting was evaluated for select scenarios, position 
accuracy levels, and CD&R equipage.  Directive alerting specifies the action to take to resolve a conflict 
situation in lieu of providing a generic WA.  Based on this evaluation, maneuvering based on directive 
alerts resulted in more collisions than when maneuvers were made based on a standard set of actions 
according to scenario type.  More research is necessary to determine the feasibility of providing directive 
alerts to the flight crew. 
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Appendix A:  Test Matrix 
 
Scenario   R1 Arrival / Taxi 
   R2 Departure / Taxi 
   R3 Arrival / Departure – same runway 
   R4 Departure / Departure – intersecting runways 
   R5 Arrival / Departure – intersecting runways 
   R6 Arrival / Arrival – same runway 
   R7 Arrival / Arrival – intersecting runways 
   T1 Taxi following 
   T2 Taxi / Taxi intersection 
   T3 Taxi / Head-on 
   L1 Arrival / Traffic crossing  
   L2 Departure / Traffic crossing 
 
Algorithm   A  ATCAM 
   S ATSA SURF IA 
 
Evasive Action   Aircraft A Aircraft B 
   NN No  No 
   YN Yes  No 
   NY No  Yes 
   YY Yes  Yes 
 
Horizontal Position   8 NACp8   (< 92.6m (305.6 ft)) 
Accuracy     9 NACp9   (< 30 m (99 ft)) 
   10 NACp10 (< 10 m (33 ft)) 
   11 NACp11 (< 3 m (9.9 ft)) 
    T truth 
 
Directive Alert  Y (evasive action based on directive alert) 
   N (evasive action not based on directive alert) 
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Repeat 1-40 for R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7 = 280 cases 
Repeat 1-20 for T1, T2, T3, L1, L2 = 100 cases       (380 cases total) 
 
Case No. Scenario Algorithm Evasive Action Horizontal 
Position 
Directive 
Alert 
ATCAM evaluation 
1 All A NN T N 
2 All A NN 8 N 
3 All A NN 9 N 
4 All A NN 10 N 
5 All A NN 11 N 
6 All A YN T N 
7 All A YN 8 N 
8 All A YN 9 N 
9 All A YN 10 N 
10 All A YN 11 N 
11 All A NY T N 
12 All A NY 8 N 
13 All A NY 9 N 
14 All A NY 10 N 
15 All A NY 11 N 
16 All A YY T N 
17 All A YY 8 N 
18 All A YY 9 N 
19 All A YY 10 N 
20 All A YY 11 N 
SURF IA evaluation 
21 R1 – R7 S NN T N 
22 R1 – R7 S NN 8 N 
23 R1 – R7 S NN 9 N 
24 R1 – R7 S NN 10 N 
25 R1 – R7 S NN 11 N 
26 R1 – R7 S YN T N 
27 R1 – R7 S YN 8 N 
28 R1 – R7 S YN 9 N 
29 R1 – R7 S YN 10 N 
30 R1 – R7 S YN 11 N 
31 R1 – R7 S NY T N 
32 R1 – R7 S NY 8 N 
33 R1 – R7 S NY 9 N 
34 R1 – R7 S NY 10 N 
35 R1 – R7 S NY 11 N 
36 R1 – R7 S YY T N 
37 R1 – R7 S YY 8 N 
38 R1 – R7 S YY 9 N 
39 R1 – R7 S YY 10 N 
40 R1 – R7 S YY 11 N 
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Case No. Scenario Algorithm Evasive Action Horizontal 
Position 
Directive 
Alert 
Directive alert evaluation 
381 R5 A YN T Y 
382 R5 A YN 10 Y 
383 R5 A NY T Y 
384 R5 A NY 10 Y 
385 R5 A YY T Y 
386 R5 A YY 10 Y 
387 R6 A YN T Y 
388 R6 A YN 10 Y 
389 R6 A NY T Y 
390 R6 A NY 10 Y 
391 R6 A YY T Y 
392 R6 A YY 10 Y 
392 T2 A YN T Y 
394 T2 A YN 10 Y 
395 T2 A NY T Y 
396 T2 A NY 10 Y 
397 T2 A YY T Y 
398 T2 A YY 10 Y 
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Appendix B:  Standard Test Runs by Scenario 
 
B.1  Runway Scenario – Arrival with Taxi Crossing 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 10 threshold.  Aircraft B’s initial 
position was placed at 14 different locations along the length of Runway 10 (0, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 
3000, 3500, 4000, 4500, 5000, 6000, 7500, 9000, and 10,000 feet from the runway threshold) simulating 
various taxiway entry points and at 18 locations away from the runway (300, 320, 340, 360, 380, 400, 450, 
500, 550, 600, 650, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 feet from the runway centerline).  Aircraft 
B began to taxi when Aircraft A was at 14 different points in its approach and rollout (see Aircraft B 
Initiation Delay in Table B.1).  For each initiation delay for Aircraft B, the number of test runs to be 
conducted was determined by the initial locations of Aircraft B that were relevant.  For example, all 
locations where Aircraft B would cross the runway behind Aircraft A were considered not relevant.  As 
shown in Table B.1, the number of test runs was the number of locations along the runway (maximum of 
14 locations from 0 to 10,000 ft from the Runway 10 threshold) by the number of locations away from the 
runway (maximum of 18 locations). 
 
Table B.1.  Arrival with Taxi Crossing Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) Number of Test Runs 
(locations along runway x locations away from runway) 
0    (Aircraft A 3.5 NM to threshold) All locations (14 x 18 = 252) 
13  (Aircraft A 3.0 NM to threshold) All locations (14 x 18 = 252) 
26  (Aircraft A 2.5 NM to threshold) All locations (14 x 18 = 252) 
40  (Aircraft A 2.0 NM to threshold) All locations (14 x 18 = 252) 
53  (Aircraft A 1.5 NM to threshold) 0 to 10,000 ft (14 x 16) 
1,000 to 10,000 ft (13 x 1) 
1,500 to 10,000 ft (12 x 1) 
(14x16) + 13 + 12 = 249 
66  (Aircraft A 1.0 NM to threshold) 0 to 10,000 ft (14 x 14) 
1,000 to 10,000 ft (13 x 2) 
2,000 to 10,000 ft (11 x 1) 
3,000 to 10,000 ft (9 x 1) 
(14x14)+(13x2)+11+9 = 242 
80  (Aircraft A 0.5 NM to threshold) 0 to 10000 (14 x 7) 
1,000 to 10,000 ft (13 x 3) 
1,500 to 10,000 ft (12 x 1) 
2,000 to 10,000 ft (11 x 2) 
2,500 to 10,000 ft (10 x 1) 
3,000 to 10,000 ft (9 x 1) 
3,500 to 10,000 ft (8 x 1) 
4,000 to 10,000 ft (7 x 1) 
4,500 to 10,000 ft (6 x 1) 
(14x7)+(13x3)+12+(11x2)+10+9+8+7+6 = 211 
93  (Aircraft A crosses threshold) 0 to 10000 (14 x 4) 
1,000 to 10,000 ft (13 x 2) 
1,500 to 10,000 ft (12 x 1) 
2,000 to 10,000 ft (11 x 1) 
2,500 to 10,000 ft (10 x 2) 
3,000 to 10,000 ft (9 x 2) 
3,500 to 10,000 ft (8 x 2) 
4,000 to 10,000 ft (7 x 1) 
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4,500 to 10,000 ft (6 x 2) 
5,000 to 10,000 ft (5 x 1) 
(14x4)+(13x2)+12+11+(10x2)+(9x2)+(8x2)+7+(6x2)+5 = 183 
97  (glide-path aim-point, 1000 ft past 
threshold) 
1,000 to 10,000 ft (13 x 1) 
1,500 to 10,000 ft (12 x 1) 
2,000 to 10,000 ft (11 x 2) 
2,500 to 10,000 ft (10 x 2) 
3,000 to 10,000 ft (9 x 1) 
3,500 to 10,000 ft (8 x 2) 
4,000 to 10,000 ft (7 x 3) 
4,500 to 10,000 ft (6 x 5) 
5,000 to 10,000 ft (5 x 1) 
13+12+(11x2)+(10x2)+9+(8x2)+(7x3)+(6x5)+5 = 148 
109  (Aircraft A 3400 ft past threshold) 3,500 to 10,000 ft (8 x 4) 
4,000 to 10,000 ft (7 x 4) 
4,500 to 10,000 ft (6 x 5) 
5,000 to 10,000 ft (5 x 5) 
(8x4)+(7x4)+(6x5)+(5x5) = 115 
129 (Aircraft A 5400 ft past threshold) 4,500 to 10,000 ft (6 x 3) 
5,000 to 10,000 ft (5 x 11) 
6,000 to 10,000 ft (4 x 4) 
(6x3)+(5x11)+(4x4) = 89 
160  (Aircraft A 7000 ft past threshold) 6,000 to 10,000 ft (4 x 14) 
7,500 to 10,000 ft (3 x 4) 
(4x14)+(3x4) = 68 
198  (Aircraft A 9000 ft past threshold) 9,000 to 10,000 ft (2 x 18) 
2x18 = 36  
218  (Aircraft A 9800 ft past threshold) 10,000 ft (1 x 18) = 18 
 
The standard number of test runs for this scenario is: 
252+252+252+252+249+242+211+183+148+115+89+68+36+18 = 2367 runs 
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B.2  Runway Scenario – Departure with Taxi Crossing 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially in position on Runway 10 for departure.  Aircraft B’s initial 
position was placed at 12 different locations along the length of Runway 10 (0, 60, 280, 660, 1100, 1800, 
2500, 3400, 5200, 6800, 8000, and 9000 feet from the runway threshold) simulating various taxiway entry 
points and at 18 locations away from the runway (300, 320, 340, 360, 380, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 
700, 800, 900, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 feet from the runway centerline).  Aircraft B began to taxi when 
Aircraft A was at 12 different locations along its departure and climb out (see Aircraft B Initiation Delay 
in Table B.2).  For each initiation delay for Aircraft B, the number of test runs to be conducted was 
determined by the initial locations of Aircraft B that were relevant.  For example, all locations where 
Aircraft B would cross the runway behind Aircraft A were considered not relevant.  As shown in Table B.2, 
the number of test runs was the number of locations along the runway (maximum of 12 locations from 0 to 
9,000 ft from the Runway 10 threshold) by the number of locations away from the runway (maximum of 
18 locations). 
Table B.2.  Departure with Taxi Crossing Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) Number of Test Runs 
(locations along runway x locations away from runway) 
0  (Aircraft A at threshold) 0 to 9,000 ft (12 x 7) 
60 to 9,000 ft (11 x 3) 
280 to 9,000 ft (10 x 2) 
660 to 9,000 ft (9 x 2) 
1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 1) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 1) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 1) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 1) 
(12x7)+(11x3)+(10x2)+(9x2)+8+6+4+3 = 176 
6  (Aircraft A 180 ft from threshold) 0 to 9,000 ft (12 x 3) 
60 to 9,000 ft (11 x 4) 
280 to 9,000 ft (10 x 3) 
660 to 9,000 ft (9 x 2) 
1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 1) 
1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 1) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 1) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 1) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 1) 
9,000 to 9,000 ft (1 x 1) 
(12x3)+(11x4)+(10x3)+(9x2)+8+7+6+5+3+1 = 158 
10  (Aircraft A 470 ft from threshold) 60 to 9,000 ft (11 x 6) 
280 to 9,000 ft (10 x 2) 
660 to 9,000 ft (9 x 3) 
1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 1) 
1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 1) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 1) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 1) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 1) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 1) 
(11x6)+(10x2)+(9x3)+8+7+6+5+4+2 = 145 
14  (Aircraft A 890 ft from threshold) 60 to 9,000 ft (11 x 2) 
280 to 9,000 ft (10 x 4) 
660 to 9,000 ft (9 x 2) 
1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 2) 
1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 2) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 1) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 1) 
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5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 1) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 1) 
(11x2)+(10x4)+(9x2)+(8x2)+(7x2)+6+5+4+3 = 128 
18  (Aircraft A 1,430 ft from threshold) 280 to 9,000 ft (10 x 2) 
660 to 9,000 ft (9 x 4) 
1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 2) 
1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 2) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 2) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 1) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 2) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 1) 
(10x2)+(9x4)+8+8+7+7+6+6+5+4+4+2 = 113 
22  (Aircraft A 2,100 ft from threshold) 1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 5) 
1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 3) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 2) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 2) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 2) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 1) 
(8x5)+(7x3)+(6+x2)+(5x2)+(4x2)+3 = 94 
26  (Aircraft A 2,920 ft from threshold) 1,100 to 9,000 ft (8 x 1) 
1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 4) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 3) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 3) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 2) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 1) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 1) 
8+(7x4)+(6x3)+(5x3)+(4x2)+3+2 = 82 
30  (Aircraft A 3,860 ft from threshold) 1,800 to 9,000 ft (7 x 1) 
2,500 to 9,000 ft (6 x 4) 
3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 4) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 3) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 1) 
9,000 to 9,000 ft (1 x 1) 
7+(6x4)+(5x4)+(4x3)+3+1 = 67 
37  (Aircraft A 5,810 ft from threshold) 3,400 to 9,000 ft (5 x 5) 
5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 4) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 2) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 1) 
(5x5)+(4x4)+(3x2)+1 = 49 
43  (Aircraft A 7,600 ft from threshold) 5,200 to 9,000 ft (4 x 5) 
6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 3) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 1) 
9,000 to 9,000 ft (1 x 1) 
(4x5)+(3x3)+2+1 = 32 
47  (Aircraft A 8,790 ft from threshold) 6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 6) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 1) 
9,000 to 9,000 ft (1 x 1) 
(3x6)+2+1 = 21 
50  (Aircraft A 10,000 ft from threshold) 6,800 to 9,000 ft (3 x 2) 
8,000 to 9,000 ft (2 x 2) 
9,000 to 9,000 ft (1 x 2) 
(3x2)+(2x2)+(1x2) = 12 
The standard number of test runs for this scenario is: 
176+158+145+128+113+94+82+67+49+32+21+12 = 1077 runs 
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B.3  Runway Scenario – Arrival with Departure from Same Runway 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 10 threshold.  Aircraft B was 
initially in position on Runway 10 for departure.  Aircraft B began its departure when Aircraft A was at 9 
different points in its approach (Table B.3).  Since the initial locations of Aircraft A and B did not vary, 
there were only 9 standard test runs for this scenario. 
 
Table B.3.  Arrival with Departure from Same Runway Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) 
0      (Aircraft A 3.5 NM to threshold) 
13    (Aircraft A 3.0 NM to threshold) 
26    (Aircraft A 2.5 NM to threshold) 
40    (Aircraft A 2.0 NM to threshold) 
53    (Aircraft A 1.5 NM to threshold) 
66    (Aircraft A 1.0 NM to threshold) 
80    (Aircraft A 0.5 NM to threshold) 
93    (Aircraft A cross threshold) 
97    (Aircraft A at glide-path aim-point) 
 
 
B.4  Runway Scenario – Departures from Intersecting Runways 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially in position on Runway 14L for departure.  Aircraft B was 
initially in position on Runway 22R for departure.  Aircraft A began its departure when Aircraft B was at 
7 different points in its departure (Table B.4).  Conversely, Aircraft B began its departure when Aircraft A 
was at 10 different points in its departure (Table B.4).  There were 16 unique standard test runs for this 
scenario. 
 
Table B.4.  Departures from Intersecting Runways Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) Aircraft A Initiation Delay (sec) 
0     (Aircraft A at threshold) 0     (Aircraft B at threshold) 
6     (Aircraft A at 30 kts) 4     (Aircraft B at 20 kts) 
10   (Aircraft A at 50 kts) 8     (Aircraft B at 40 kts) 
14   (Aircraft A at 70 kts) 12   (Aircraft B at 60 kts) 
18   (Aircraft A at 90 kts) 16   (Aircraft B at 80 kts) 
22   (Aircraft A at 110 kts) 20   (Aircraft B at 100 kts) 
26   (Aircraft A at 130 kts) 25   (Aircraft B at 120 kts, runway intersection) 
30   (Aircraft A at 150 kts)  
34   (Aircraft A at 170 kts)  
37   (Aircraft A at intersection, just lifted off)  
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B.5  Runway Scenario – Arrival And Departure from Intersecting Runways 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 10 threshold.  Aircraft B was 
initially in position on Runway 22R for departure.  Aircraft B began its departure roll when Aircraft A was 
at 13 different points in its approach and rollout (Table B.5).  There were 13 unique standard test runs for 
this scenario. 
 
Table B.5.  Arrival and Departure from Intersecting Runways Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) 
0      (Aircraft A 3.5 NM to threshold) 
13    (Aircraft A 3.0 NM to threshold) 
26    (Aircraft A 2.5 NM to threshold) 
39    (Aircraft A 2.0 NM to threshold) 
53    (Aircraft A 1.5 NM to threshold) 
66    (Aircraft A 1.0 NM to threshold) 
79    (Aircraft A 0.5 NM to threshold) 
93    (Aircraft A crossing threshold) 
96    (Aircraft A 635 ft from threshold) 
100  (Aircraft A 0.25 NM from threshold) 
110  (Aircraft A 0.5 NM from threshold) 
126  (Aircraft A 0.8 NM from threshold) 
140  (Aircraft A 1 NM from threshold) 
 
B.6  Runway Scenario – Head-On Arrivals 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 10 threshold.  Aircraft B was 
initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 28 threshold.  Aircraft B began its approach when Aircraft A was at 
14 different points in its approach and roll out (Table B.6).  Aircraft A always began its approach at the 
beginning of the test run.  As a result, there were 14 standard test runs for this scenario. 
 
Table B.6.  Head-On Arrivals Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) 
0      (Aircraft A 3.5 NM to threshold) 
13    (Aircraft A 3.0 NM to threshold) 
26    (Aircraft A 2.5 NM to threshold) 
40    (Aircraft A 2.0 NM to threshold) 
53    (Aircraft A 1.5 NM to threshold) 
66    (Aircraft A 1.0 NM to threshold) 
80    (Aircraft A 0.5 NM to threshold) 
93    (Aircraft A crossing threshold) 
97    (Aircraft A 1,400 ft past threshold) 
109  (Aircraft A 3,700 ft past threshold) 
129  (Aircraft A 5,500 ft past threshold) 
160  (Aircraft A 7,100 ft past threshold) 
198  (Aircraft A 9,000 ft past threshold) 
218  (Aircraft A 9,800 ft past threshold) 
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B.7  Runway Scenario – Arrivals to Intersecting Runways 
For this scenario, Aircraft A was initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 14L threshold.  Aircraft B was 
initially 3.5 NM prior to the Runway 22R threshold.  Aircraft B began its approach when Aircraft A was at 
13 different points in its approach and rollout (Table B.7).  There were 13 unique standard test runs for this 
scenario. 
 
Table B.7.  Arrivals to Intersecting Runways Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) 
0      (Aircraft A 3.5 NM to threshold) 
13    (Aircraft A 3.0 NM to threshold) 
26    (Aircraft A 2.5 NM to threshold) 
39    (Aircraft A 2.0 NM to threshold) 
53    (Aircraft A 1.5 NM to threshold) 
66    (Aircraft A 1.0 NM to threshold) 
79    (Aircraft A 0.5 NM to threshold) 
93    (Aircraft A crossing threshold) 
96    (Aircraft A 1,100 ft past threshold) 
100  (Aircraft A 2,000 ft past threshold) 
110  (Aircraft A 3,800 ft past threshold) 
126  (Aircraft A 5,300 ft past threshold) 
140  (Aircraft A 1 NM past threshold) 
 
B.8  Taxi Scenario – Taxi Following 
Aircraft A taxied at a constant speed on Taxiway M toward Runway 10 (Table B.8).  Aircraft B was 
also taxiing on Taxiway M toward Runway 10, ahead of Aircraft A, but at 10 kts.  There were 7 standard 
test runs for this scenario. 
Table B.8.  Taxi Following Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft A start speeds (kts) 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
22 
24 
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B.9  Taxi Scenario – Taxi Intersection 
Aircraft A began taxi on Taxiway M at M7, taxiing toward Runway 10, at 15 kts.  Aircraft B taxied 
across Taxiway M, heading south, starting from a complete stop and accelerating to 15 kts at 3.3 ft/s2.  
Aircraft B’s initial position was placed at 4 different locations along Taxiway M (400, 600, 800, and 1000 
feet ahead of Aircraft A) simulating various taxiway crossing points and at 5 locations away from the 
runway (260, 410, 560, 710, and 860 feet from Taxiway M centerline).  Aircraft B began to taxi when 
Aircraft A was at 5 different locations along Taxiway M (Aircraft B Initiation Delay in Table B.9).  For 
each initiation delay for Aircraft B, the number of test runs to be conducted was determined by the initial 
locations of Aircraft B that were relevant.  For example, all locations where Aircraft B would cross the 
taxiway behind Aircraft A were considered not relevant.  As shown in Table B.9, the number of test runs 
was the number of locations along the taxiway (maximum of 4 locations from 400 to 1,000 ft ahead of 
Aircraft A) by the number of locations away from the taxiway (maximum of 5 locations). 
 
Table B.9.  Taxi Intersection Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) Number of Test Runs 
(locations along runway x locations away from runway) 
0   (Aircraft A starting position) 400 to 1,000 (4 x 5 = 20) 
6   (Aircraft A 150 ft from starting position) 400 to 1,000 (4 x 5 = 20) 
12 (Aircraft A 300 ft from starting position) 400 to 1,000 (4 x 1) 
600 to 1,000 (3 x 3) 
800 to 1,000 (2 x 1) 
4+(3x3)+2 = 15 
18 (Aircraft A 450 ft from starting position) 600 to 1,000 (3 x 2) 
800 to 1,000 (2 x 2) 
1,000 to 1,000 (1 x 1) 
(3x2)+(2x2)+1 = 11 
24 (Aircraft A 600 ft from starting position) 600 to 1,000 (3 x 1) 
800 to 1,000 (2 x 3) 
1,000 to 1,000 (1 x 1) 
3+(2x3)+1 = 10 
 
The standard number of test runs for this scenario is: 
20+20+15+11+10 = 76 runs 
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B.10  Taxi Scenario – Taxi Head-On 
Aircraft A, began taxi on Taxiway M at M2, traveling toward Runway 10 at 15 kts, taking a right turn 
onto Taxiway T.  Aircraft B began taxi on Taxiway T at T1 traveling toward Taxiway M at 15 kts.  Aircraft 
A began to taxi when Aircraft B was at 7 different locations along its taxi route (at T1, 1,600 ft, 3,200 ft, 
4,800 ft, 6,400 ft, 8,000 ft, and 9,600 ft (crossing Taxiway M) from T1).  Conversely, Aircraft B began to 
taxi when Aircraft A was at 7 different locations along its taxi route (at M2, 9,500 ft, 7,900 ft, 6,300 ft, 
4,700 ft, 3,100 ft, and 1,500 ft from T1).  There were 13 unique standard test runs for this scenario. 
 
Table B.10.  Taxi Head-On Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) Aircraft A Initiation Delay (sec) 
0       (Aircraft A at M2) 0       (Aircraft B at T1) 
50     (Aircraft A 9,500 ft from T, finish turn onto T) 63     (Aircraft B 1,600 ft from T1) 
113   (Aircraft A 7,900 ft from T) 126   (Aircraft B 3,200 ft from T1) 
176   (Aircraft A 6,300 ft from T) 189   (Aircraft B 4,800 ft from T1) 
239   (Aircraft A 4,700 ft from T) 252   (Aircraft B 6,400 ft from T1) 
302   (Aircraft A 3,100 ft from T) 315   (Aircraft B 8,000 ft from T1) 
365   (Aircraft A 1,500 ft from T) 378   (Aircraft B 9,600 ft from T1, crossing M) 
 
B.11  Air-To-Air Scenario – Arrival with Crossing Traffic 
Aircraft A was initially 4 NM prior to the Runway 10 threshold.  Aircraft B’s initial position was placed 
at 7 different locations along Aircraft A’s approach path (3, 2.5, 2, 1.5, 1, 0.5 and 0 NM from the Runway 
10 threshold), at 4 locations away from Aircraft A’s approach path (2195, 4445, 6695, and 8945 feet from 
the extended runway centerline), and at 7 different altitudes (100, 250, 400, 550, 700, 850, and 1000 ft 
AFE).  Aircraft B began to fly forward when Aircraft A was at 7 different points along its approach (Table 
B.11).  There were 1,372 standard test runs for this scenario (7 x 4 x 7 x 7). 
Table B.11.  Arrival with Crossing Traffic Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) 
0      (meet Aircraft A when 4 NM to threshold) 
13    (meet Aircraft A when 3.5 NM to threshold) 
27    (meet Aircraft A when 3 NM to threshold) 
40    (meet Aircraft A when 2.5 NM to threshold) 
53    (meet Aircraft A when 2 NM to threshold) 
67    (meet Aircraft A when 1.5 NM to threshold) 
80    (meet Aircraft A when 1.0 NM to threshold) 
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B.12  Air-To-Air Scenario – Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Traffic 
Aircraft A was initially in position on Runway 10 for departure.  Aircraft B’s initial position was placed 
at 7 different locations along Aircraft A’s departure path (5000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 9,000, 10,000, and 
11,000 ft from the runway threshold), at 3 locations away from the runway (3100, 3950, and 4800 feet from 
the runway centerline), and at 7 different altitudes (100, 250, 400, 550, 700, 850, and 1000 ft AFE).  Aircraft 
B began to fly forward when Aircraft A was at 7 different points in its departure (Table B.12).  There were 
1,029 standard test runs for this scenario (7 x 3 x 7 x 7). 
 
Table B.12.  Departure Climb-Out with Crossing Traffic Standard Test Runs. 
Aircraft B Initiation Delay (sec) 
0        (Aircraft A at threshold) 
3        (Aircraft A 115 ft from threshold) 
7        (Aircraft A 355 ft from threshold) 
10      (Aircraft A 620 ft from threshold) 
13      (Aircraft A 960 ft from threshold) 
16      (Aircraft A 1,385 ft from threshold) 
19      (Aircraft A 1,875 ft from threshold) 
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